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Preface
Particle accelerators have received ever growing attention since their invention in 
the 1930s. They have developed from one-of-a-kind facilities for fundamental 
research to a wide range of facilities with specialized applications. Their use in 
fundamental research is no longer limited to nuclear and particle physics. 
Synchrotron light sources are, despite their diminutive name, full-fledged particle 
accelerators and serve material science, chemistry, and biology. Spallation neutron 
sources employ the most powerful proton accelerators (measured by the product of 
beam intensity and maximal beam energy) so far constructed. Medicine employs 
scores of compact electron linear accelerators with a limited energy range (E < 
25 MeV), and the advent of proton and heavy ion therapy has led to the construction 
of specialized synchrotron facilities. Industry uses accelerators, for example, in the 
production of semiconductors, for the sterilization of medical equipment, and for 
the polymerization of plastics.
The extension of fundamental research facilities to large national or transnational 
organizations led to a simplified access of researchers to accelerators. These users 
are not specialized in accelerator technology and related fields, but they have diverse 
academic and technological backgrounds. The entry of accelerators into the medical 
field enhances the demand for reliable and safe operation in the interest of patients 
and medical staff alike. In industry, finally, the emphasis is on reliability and cost- 
effectiveness. In short, accelerators are used by many non-specialists as a tool which 
must conform to regulations and standards like other means of production.
International bodies and national regulators define stringent technical and orga-
nizational criteria for the safe use of technical facilities and equipment, targeted to 
protect clients, users, and the environment alike from harm. These regulations apply 
naturally to particle accelerators. Operators and users are legally obliged to imple-
ment regulations and morally bound to respect recommendations as much as techni-
cally feasible.
Occupational safety is concerned with controlling the hazardous effects of profes-
sional activities for workers, the public, and the environment. Occupational safety 
draws essential information from physics, chemistry, engineering, occupational 
health, and environmental protection for providing an optimal, appropriate protection 
vi
from occupational hazards. For particle accelerators, occupational safety creates the 
conditions for obtaining research, medical, or business objectives in a safe and respon-
sible manner without creating harm for workers, the public, and the environment.
This book gives an overview of the vast subject of safety at particle accelera-
tors. It is targeted at managers, scientists, engineers, and users at accelerator facili-
ties. It serves also as a first introduction for safety professionals who take up work 
at a particle accelerator or who are generally curious on safety in these facilities. 
The book is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 gives a working definition of 
hazard and risk as an essential introduction to occupational safety. Chapter 2 
briefly introduces particle accelerators and then describes safety aspects of their 
core technologies: magnets, cryogenics, radiofrequency, lasers, and beam inter-
ception. Chapter 3 treats safety topics connected to accelerator beams and ionizing 
radiation. In Chap. 4, safety hazards also occurring in major industries are 
described in their relation to particle accelerators: electrical and mechanical safety, 
pressure vessels, fire safety, occupational noise, and environmental impact. The 
concluding Chap. 5 closes the loop opened in Chap. 1 with a more detailed descrip-
tion of the safety process, it gives an overview of safety organization in accelerator 
centres, and describes beam safety and functional safety, a concept frequently 
employed at accelerators.
At around 150 pages, the book cannot be exhaustive, but presents an overview of 
the subject to the interested reader. References are given to recent literature, prefer-
ably to documents freely available on the Internet or as links to websites. All refer-
ences were up to date at the time of publication; however, occupational safety is a 
rapidly evolving field. References to regulatory context (directives, laws, standards) 
may change rapidly, and the reader is warned to check all references for validity 
before applying them in a real-world accelerator facility.
Safety is based on science and engineering, but it is not a hard science. The 
“human factor” and the personal viewpoint inevitably enter in risk assessments and 
in the implementation of mitigation measures. I regularly profit from the collabora-
tion with fellow occupational safety specialists when defining the best risk control 
measures within a limited budget of money, time, and manpower. The responsibility 
for this book’s content, including any mistakes, is nevertheless solely my own. The 
opinions expressed in the book do not always reflect policies of my employer, the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN.
This book is dedicated to Marta, my wife and greatest support. Thank you!
Stay safe and healthy.
Geneva, 2020  Thomas Otto 
Preface
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Abstract It is not possible to write a book on Safety at Accelerators, or on occupa-
tional safety in general, without a practical understanding of the technical language 
of the field. Like in other scientific or technical fields, words are used with a specific 
meaning, often deviating from their everyday use. These terms must be clarified 
before penetrating deeper into the subject. Central to occupational safety are the 
terms of hazard, risk, and control. A more detailed description of these concepts is 
found in Chap. 5.
1.1  Hazard
An informal definition of hazard is simply “something with the potential to cause 
harm”. In occupational safety, harm manifests itself either by an accident or an 
occupational illness.
Hazard can be classified by the technical domain it originates from (e.g. mechan-
ical, electrical, chemical, physical, psychosocial hazards). Another way of charac-
terisation is by the vector of the hazard: the potential harm is carried by an equipment 
(for example machine, tool, experimental apparatus), an activity (for example pro-
duction, construction, maintenance, dismantling) or a substance, either used in the 
activity (basic material, catalyser, …) or produced in the process (exhaust gases, 
dust, …). Numerous hazards exist at the workplaces in an accelerator facility: in the 
accelerator building or tunnel, in workshops, laboratories and in offices. This book 
puts the focus on specific hazards at particle accelerators, for example magnetic 
fields, cryogenic temperatures, and ionising radiation. Industrial hazards present in 
industry and services impact also the construction, operation, and maintenance of 
accelerators and one chapter is dedicated to them with references to guidelines in 
occupational health and safety (OHS).
A useful tool to classify hazards is a hazard list, as reproduced in Annex A. It 
contains both general hazards from industry and business and specific hazards 
occurring at accelerator sites.
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1.2  Risk
The informal definition of risk is “a measure of the probability of a hazard to cause 
harm, and of the severity of the consequences.” By reducing risk, one reduces the 
probability or/and the severity of harmful effects and therefore improves safety.
Measure is often meant in a qualitative sense. Risk can be classified on a coarse 
scale as low, medium, or high. Such a qualitative judgement is based on a good 
knowledge of the employed activities, equipment and substances and previous pro-
fessional experience and remains always subjective.
Quantitative risk assessment makes use of published data on failure rates of com-
ponents or equipment, accident rates and of models for the behaviour of complex 
systems. It is a specialist’s domain and is employed in high-hazard industries, such 
as the chemical and nuclear industries [2].
Often a risk assessment will be situated between the purely qualitative and quan-
titative and it is up to the professional judgement of the safety specialist and the line 
management to determine the correct level of assessment.
Risk and hazard are often confounded in colloquial language. People speak of a 
“high risk” activity, but they usually mean a high hazard activity. While there may 
exist considerable hazards at a workplace, it is the purpose of occupational safety to 
reduce and control the risk of these hazards in such a way that workers are not 
harmed and that the integrity of the public and the environment is preserved.
1.3  Control
The goal of occupational safety is the elimination of hazards and the diminution of 
risks. One speaks in this context of “control” (or control measure). To control a 
danger at the workplace, one may progress by elimination, install technical protec-
tion measures, equip  the worker with personal protections or instruct and train 
them to avoid the hazards. In many cases, the required control for a given hazard or 
risk is dictated by law and regulations. Where this is not the case, it is up to line 
management and occupational safety specialists to agree on the appropriate level of 
control. It shall reduce risk to a level acceptable by management and workers, with-
out impeding the activity (e.g. the operation of a facility, the conduction of an exper-
iment) beyond the necessary, and without causing incommensurate cost. Choosing 
and implementing an appropriate level of control is a matter of professional judge-
ment, and as such is based on experience.
The European Union has published a directive, a document that the member 
states must translate in national law, where a hierarchy of controls is first evoked [1]. 
The directive stipulates that the employer shall take the measures necessary for the 
safety and health protection of workers. He or she shall implement these measures 
based on the following general principles of prevention:
1 Introduction to Occupational Safety
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 (a) avoiding risks.
 (b) evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided
 (c) combating the risks at the source
 (d) adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the design of work 
places, the choice of work equipment and the choice of working and production 
methods, with a view, in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work 
at a predetermined work-rate and to reducing their effect on health
 (e) adapting to technical progress;
 (f) replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;
 (g) developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, orga-
nization of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of 
factors related to the working environment;
 (h) giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective 
measures;
 (i) giving appropriate instructions to the workers.
This European directive defines a framework for occupational health and safety, 
based on a few principles. More than 30 years old, it has shown its effectiveness and 
has not been revised since. Its principles influence all following directives and laws 
relating to occupational safety. The U.S. National Institute of occupational safety 
and health has cast the hierarchy of controls in a more useful way [3]. It gives pref-
erence to eliminating or replacing a risk, and to collective protective measures. 
Personal protective equipment, technical instruction and safety training of the work-
ers is designated as the least effective measure in this hierarchy of controls. It is 
known that the effectiveness of these measures for the reduction of accidents and 
occupational illness depends on individual factors and is generally lower than the 
technical measures listed first.
References
 1. Council Directive of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improve-
ments in the safety and health of workers at work, 89/331/EEC, http://data.europa.eu/eli/
dir/1989/391/2008-12-11
 2. Directive 2012/18/EU on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous sub-
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Chapter 2
Risks and Hazards of Particle Accelerator 
Technologies
Abstract In this section, the motivation and operation of particle accelerators are 
briefly introduced. Then, safety aspects of the key building blocks are treated. 
Magnets provide the steering forces for accelerated particles. Cryogenics provides 
the low temperatures required for the operation of superconducting magnets; radio-
frequency technologies impart energy to accelerated particles. A byproduct of their 
operation is Non-ionising radiation. Another type of NIR is represented by lasers 
which find increasing use in accelerator applications. Finally, collimators shape the 
particle beams and protect sensitive elements, while dumps absorb the particles at 
the end of their course.
2.1  Accelerators for Pedestrians
2.1.1  Why Particle Accelerators?
Fundamental research provided the first motivation to accelerate subatomic particles 
to ever higher energies. One approach to understand the need for high energies is the 
analogy to an optical microscope: to analyse the properties of subatomic particles, 
with dimensions less than a femtometre (1 fm = 10−15 m), probes with a wavelength 
of the same order of magnitude were required. The de Broglie wavelength λB of a 















The approximation is valid in the ultrarelativistic case where the total energy E 
is at least three times the rest-mass energy mc2 of the particle. Inserting numerical 
values in this equation yields an energy of 1.24 GeV, which is ultrarelativistic for 
electrons, to achieve a De Broglie wavelength of 1 fm. For probing smaller struc-
tures, even higher energies would be required.
A second picture to grasp the need for high energies is the creation of new 
particles. Einstein’s relation of the equivalence of matter and energy is:
6
 E m c= 0
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To generate a particle with rest mass m0 in a relativistic collision, the total centre-of- 
mass energy of the colliding particles must be at least of the value indicated by 
Einstein’s relation. In CERN’s electron-positron collider LEP, operating in the 
1990s, the particles had an individual energy of 45 GeV [2]. In a head-on collision 
this added to 90 GeV, enough to produce the Z-Boson, one of the mediators of the 
electro-weak interaction. Much higher particle energy is required when particles 
collide with a fixed target, for this reason the high-energy frontier of particle physics 
is explored by colliders.
Ever higher energies than achievable by LEP were necessary to test theoretical 
models of particle physics, a process which culminated so far with the construction 
and operation of CERN’s LHC at a centre-of-mass energy of 13–14 TeV [3]. It per-
mitted the discovery of the Higgs boson, the last missing element in the Standard 
Model of particle physics. Its present objective is to find evidence of physical pro-
cesses not described by the Standard Model, and to lay the experimental fundament 
to a new, more complete theory of particle physics.
2.1.2  The Particle Accelerator Family
The simplest accelerator was found in cathode ray tubes (in wide use for monitors 
in television sets and oscilloscopes until the breakthrough of flat screens). Electrons 
were emitted by a cathode (a heated piece of metal), accelerated by a static voltage 
gradient between cathode and anode, and deflected by transversal electric or mag-
netic fields. The energy of an electron with charge e traversing an electrical voltage 
difference U is E = eU, it is expressed in the unit eV (1 eV = 1.602 10−19 J). The 
accelerated electrons hit a phosphorescent screen, thus forming a visible image. The 
limitation of a static voltage accelerator is the voltage breakdown between anode 
and cathode.
2.1.2.1  Linear Accelerator
Linear accelerators (“linac”) overcome the limitation of the breakdown voltage by 
accelerating particles passing through a series of aligned accelerating structures. 
This allows adding up the energy gain. Linear accelerators are relatively simple and 
are the workhorse in the medical field, where they accelerate electrons to energies 
between 6 and 25 MeV for the generation of bremsstrahlung X-rays for diagnostics 
and therapy. An estimate places the number of medical linacs at 14000 worldwide, 
counting for approximately 30% of all accelerators.
Modern high-power accelerators are realised as linear accelerators. A recent, 
operating example is the Spallation Neutron Source SNS at Oak Ridge (USA). A 
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liquid mercury (Hg) target is bombarded by a proton beam with an energy E = 1 GeV 
and a beam power P = 1.4 MW. Mercury atoms are shattered upon impact of a pro-
ton and 20–30 neutrons are released per collision. They are moderated and guided 
to experimental stations with spectrometric instruments. More power translates into 
more neutron flux, and the SNS plans an upgrade to E = 1.3 GeV and P = 2.8 MW 
[8]. The European Spallation Source ESS in Lund (SE), presently under construc-
tion, will use a proton driver with E = 2 GeV and P = 5 MW [5].
Similar instantaneous beam intensities as for spallation neutron sources are 
envisaged for beam-dump facilities. In these, the accelerated particle beam is pro-
jected onto a massive beam dump/ target. Detectors are placed downstream from the 
beam dump /target, where it is hoped that exotic, hitherto unobserved particles can 
be identified.
At the high-energy end, linear accelerators become very long. The International 
Linear Collider Study (ILC) projects a linear electron/positron collider which could 
be built in several stages, with a final collision energy of 500 GeV. At this energy, 
the two Linacs built in opposing direction would have a length of 31 km [7].
2.1.2.2  Cyclotron
In a linac, the accelerated particles pass each accelerating gap only once. In a 
circular accelerator, of which the simplest example is the cyclotron (Fig. 2.1), the 
accelerating gap is passed repetitively. Between the poles of a large electromagnet, 
two D-shaped, hollow electrodes are placed. Between the “Dees”, as these electrodes 
are called, a high-frequency alternating voltage is applied. In the centre of the slit 
Fig. 2.1 Compact cyclotron IBA Cyclone® KIUBE for production of radiopharmaceuticals by 
protons with kinetical energy up to Ekin = 18 MeV. (Image: IBA, Louvain-la-Neuve, BE)
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separating the “Dees” an ion source is placed. Ions emitted by the source will be 
accelerated by passing the field gap between the “Dees”, while their path is bent by 
the magnetic dipole field. At every passage they gain kinetic energy, leading to the 
next orbit with a higher radius because magnetic flux density B, particle momentum 
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Once they have passed the gap between the Dees, the particles are shielded by 
the Dee-walls from the electrical field which passes through the reverse polarity. At 
the outer radius of the “Dees”, the particles are extracted at their maximum energy 
by a septum magnet.
There are two limitations to the cyclotron principle:
• At high energies, relativistic effects become important and the revolution 
frequency in the magnetic field is no longer matching the frequency of the 
electrical accelerating field. This can be overcome by introducing variable 
accelerating frequencies in so-called synchrocyclotrons.
• The maximal radius of the particles’ orbit and thus the maximal energy is 
determined by the size of the magnetic poles. The presently largest cyclotron is 
located at TRIUMF in Vancouver (CA), its magnet has a diameter of 18 m and a 
magnetic flux density of 0.46 T. The mechanical problems of a large magnet size 
can be overcome by splitting it in several units. The Swiss Paul Scherrer Institute 
in Villigen (CH) operates its ring cyclotron with eight sectors and obtains a beam 
power of P = 1.2 MW at an energy of E = 590 MeV [6].
Smaller Cyclotrons are used in medical centres to produce radioisotopes from 
which radiopharmaceuticals are synthesised for diagnostics (SPECT and PET) and 
for  targeted tumour therapy. In industry, cyclotrons are used to implant ions into 
materials to modify their physical properties, for example in highly integrated 
microelectronic circuits.
2.1.2.3  Synchrotron
To reach even higher particle energies, one resorts to repetitive acceleration in a 
synchrotron, another type of circular accelerator. Here, the average particle orbit is 
closed, the path of the particle oscillates around it. The magnetic bending field is 
produced by dipole magnets arranged along the particle orbit; their field extends 
only over the comparatively small volume of the beam line. The magnetic flux den-
sity is increased synchronously with the particle’s energy gain so that the average 
radius of the orbit remains constant.
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Accelerators with the synchrotron principle are built from circumferences of a 
few 10 metres to 27 km (CERN’s LHC, [3]), and synchrotrons with a circumference 
of nearly 100 km are envisaged (CERN’s Future Circular Collider, [4]).
Synchrotrons are used predominantly in research applications, where particle 
beams are accelerated and collided either with fixed targets or with each other (see 
below, “Collider”), or produce synchrotron radiation (see below, “Storage Ring”). A 
few medical treatment facilities world-wide employ synchrotrons for accelerating 
protons or charged heavy ions for hadron therapy. For a few cancer types and sites, 
this modality of radio oncology is advantageous over conventional radiotherapy and 
requires accelerators of a size comparable to those of research centres.
2.1.2.4  Storage Ring
The first synchrotrons were built to accelerate particles to high energies and to make 
them collide against external or internal targets as soon as they reached the termi-
nal energy.
There are two reasons to keep particles for extended times circulating in a 
synchrotron, which is then called a storage ring:
• The generation of synchrotron radiation
• The collision of particles with each other (see below, “Collider”)
Synchrotron radiation is a by-product of the acceleration and change of direction 
of electrons. The electromagnetic radiation emitted upon momentum change is in 
the near-UV range of wavelengths and is used for material and biological research. 
While one tries to minimise the emission of synchrotron radiation in high-energy 
accelerators, because of the induced loss of energy, one maximises it in special cir-
cular accelerators, the synchrotron light sources (Fig. 2.2). They prove invaluable in 
material research, from semiconductors to biological samples.
Two features of synchrotron light sources are:
Fig. 2.2 Swiss Light Source SLS at PSI, Villigen, a synchrotron light source. The round accelerator 




• the emission of synchrotron radiation is enhanced by making the particles follow 
undulatory paths in straight sections of the ring (so-called Undulators and 
Wigglers).
• the energy emitted in form of synchrotron light must be continuously restored by 
operating the accelerating RF cavities.
In synchrotron light sources, the electrons may be stored in the synchrotron 
which accelerated them in the first place. This leads to an operation scheme where 
the ring is filled with a low-energy beam provided by a linac or a smaller synchro-
tron, the electrons are accelerated to the terminal energy, and then synchrotron light 
is produced and emitted. The light intensity will decrease over time because of 
beam loss. A more flexible arrangement is to separate the synchrotron for accelera-
tion and the storage ring. As soon as the intensity of the emitted synchrotron light 
become too weak one can “top up” the filling of the storage ring with a small injec-
tion form the accelerator synchrotron. This mode is called “top-up operation”. The 
split between accelerator and storage ring has other advantages. For example, the 
magnets in the storage ring need to operate only in a very small range around the 
maximal energy and thus can have a better field quality.
2.1.2.5  Free-Electron Laser
Free-Electron Lasers (FEL) are a specific type of synchrotron light source, in which 
the undulating structure of the beam path emits coherent photons (i.e. Laser, Sect. 
2.5) in the low-energy X-ray range. This is the only known source of X-ray lasers 
and opens a new research field exploiting the spatial and temporal coherence of the 
radiation. FEL are built either as a linear accelerator or in “racetrack” configuration, 
which one can imagine as a coiled-up linac in which the same accelerating cavity 
can be used during several passages.
2.1.2.6  Collider
A collider is the combination of two storage rings1 in which the beams circulate in 
opposite directions and are brought to collide at defined locations, in the centre of 
large particle physics detectors. A collider combines the characteristics of an accel-
erating synchrotron and a storage ring. It consists of circular arcs which are con-
nected by long straight sections in which the collision points are inserted. Special 
focussing magnets provide for the charged particle optics to bring the beams to 
1 In special cases, a collider can be realized within a single storage ring when the colliding particles 
are antiparticles to each other: Examples are the SPS (proton-antiproton) and the LEP (electron-
positron), both at CERN. CERN’s LHC looks like a single ring, but in reality, the magnet yoke 
houses two magnets with opposite polarity.
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collision in the smallest possible volume, to enhance the probability of a collision, 
and to bring them back to a stable orbit after the collision point.
2.1.3  Particle Acceleration from Source to Target
After this overview of different particle accelerator types, I describe the path of 
a particle from its source to the collision with another particle. This serves to 
introduce different types of hardware which are subject of the following 
sections.
Charged particles are generated in a particle source, for a proton accelerator, 
hydrogen atoms coming from an ordinary gas bottle are ionised in a plasma ion 
source. Electrons are emitted by a cathode, either by heating it, or by shining laser 
light (Sect. 2.5.1) onto it. The second method allows to impregnate a time structure 
on the flux of emitted electrons.
In their further parcourse, the charged particles are manipulated by electromagnetic 
fields, one can distinguish between
• accelerating fields, exploiting the potential difference between two electrodes or 
in a time-varying radiofrequency field (Sect. 2.4) to exert an accelerating force 
on the charged particle, and
• guiding fields generated by electromagnets (Sect. 2.2), changing the direction of 
the particle’s path.
In a simplifying manner one can say, that in a linear accelerator the technology 
defining the accelerator performance is radiofrequency (RF) technology, while in a 
circular accelerator it is magnet technology.
In a linear accelerator, the particle passes a series of RF cavities in which it draws 
kinetic energy from the electromagnetic field. The most efficient RF cavities are 
superconducting, requiring cryogenic technology (Sect. 2.3) to reach their operating 
temperature. Quadrupole magnets between the cavities keep the beam well focused. 
One the particle has reached the terminal energy of the accelerator, it is used to 
produce X-rays (in a medical linac), neutrons (in a neutron spallation source) or 
coherent X-rays (in a free electron Laser).
In a circular accelerator, the beam passes the same RF cavity repeatedly. It either 
spirals outward with increasing energy (Cyclotron) or it is kept on a unique orbit by 
magnets with increasing flux density (Synchrotron). To achieve the highest particle 
energies, strong magnetic fields are provided by superconducting magnets (Sect. 
2.2.2) cooled to operating temperature by cryogenic technology (Sect. 2.3).
Having reached the highest possible energy of a synchrotron, the beam is sent on 
a target (Sect. 2.6.2), for production and subsequent investigation of other, exotic 
particles, for example antiprotons or unstable nuclei.
Alternatively, in a storage ring or a collider, the beam is left circulating at the 
highest energy. Here, dissipative processes make the beam size larger. These pro-
cesses include scattering on rest-gas atoms in the evacuated beam line and 
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electromagnetic and strong interaction during near-collisions with the opposing 
beam particles, To prevent excessive beam loss in sensitive equipment, collimators 
(Sect. 2.6.1) remove particles which have moved too far away from the ideal orbit. 
Once the beam intensity has become too low to produce a satisfying rate of colli-
sions or intensity of synchrotron light, the beam is deflected by switches into large 
absorbers, so-called beam dumps (Sect. 2.6.3), where the energy is absorbed. If 
large deviations of the particle’s path from the nominal orbit are observed, an emer-
gency beam dump is triggered automatically to prevent damage to accelerator ele-
ments by a massive impact of the particle beam.
2.2  Magnets
Magnetic fields guide and focus particles on their orbit in circular and linear particle 
accelerators (Fig. 2.3).
One can distinguish between dipole magnets, generating the field necessary for 
bending the beam, quadrupole magnets for focussing it, and higher-order multipole 
magnets for correcting either deviations from the ideal field shape by the simpler 
magnets, or non-linear ion-optical effects induced by the particle beam itself.
2.2.1  Normal Conducting Magnets
A normal conducting magnet is an electromagnet powered by a resistive current 
(running in “normal” conductors), operating at room temperature. It consists of 
coils to produce the magnetic induction, which are wound around an iron yoke 
with the purpose of shaping the magnetic flux lines to the desired multipole shape. 
As a rule of thumb, normal conducting magnets can be used for flux densities of 
up to B  =  2  T, above this value, only superconducting magnets are economi-
cally viable.
Dipole magnets create a homogeneous magnetic field in the gap of their yoke, 
oriented at a right angle to the direction of the particle beam. The Lorentz Force 
deflects the beam in the direction orthogonal to both its original velocity and the 
Fig. 2.3 Warning sign for 
magnetic field hazards, 
after [1]. (Source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
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magnetic field lines. A popular realisation of a dipole magnet is the C-type magnet 
(Fig. 2.4), because it leaves easy access to the vacuum chamber enclosing the par-
ticle beam.








Here, N is the number of turns of the electrical conductor, I is the electrical 
current, lair is the gap-width between the magnet poles and η  is an efficiency 
coefficient and usually close to one. The required magnetic flux density can be 
achieved by varying the number of turns or the electrical current.







with the inductivity given by L = ημ0N2A/g  . The shape factor A is related to the 
geometry of the magnet, in a dipole it corresponds approximately to the product of 
length and width of the magnet pole. Further information can be found in [9, 16].
As an example, the parameters of a dipole magnet in the Super Proton Synchrotron 
SPS are given in Table 2.1 and its layout is illustrated in Fig. 2.5. This magnet is a 
Window-frame magnet, for which the relation between current-turns, gap-width 
and magnetic flux density is, in first order, identical to a C-type magnet.
Fig. 2.4 Schematic cut 
through a C-Type Dipole 
magnet in direction of the 
beam. liron and lair are the 
length of the magnetic flux 
lines in the yoke and in the 




2.2.2  Superconducting Magnets
Normal conducting magnets with iron yokes are limited to a magnetic flux density 
of approximately 2 T because of saturation effects in the iron. Stronger magnetic 
fields can be produced in superconducting magnets. Superconductivity is a low- 
temperature phenomenon in many metals, where electrical resistance R vanishes 
once the material has a temperature T < Tc, the critical temperature.
Superconductivity was discovered by H. Kammerlingh Onnes in 1911 in mercury 
below the critical temperature of Tc = 4.2 K, after having liquefied helium three 
years earlier. It was soon discovered that superconductivity is also a function of 
magnetic flux density B and current density J, beyond a critical value Bc or Jc the 
material becomes normal conducting. The boundary between super- and normal 
conducting state can be described by the relation of the critical current Jc as a func-
tion of temperature T and magnetic flux density B and visualized as a hyperplane in 
the 3-dimensional phase diagram with coordinates T, B and J (Fig. 2.6).
Fig. 2.5 SPS Dipole magnet Left: Cut through the magnet [11]. Right: magnet on a transport 
carriage. The closed current loops are clearly visible in this perspective. (Copyright CERN, reused 
with permission)
Table 2.1 Parameters of SPS 
dipole magnet type B2
Peak momentum pc 450 GeV
Bending radius ρ 741 m
Required magnetic flux density B 2.04 T
Gap width g 52 mm
Number of turns N 16
Peak current Ipeak 5.75 kA
Coil resistance (1 magnet) R 4.4 mΩ
Inductance (1 magnet) L 9.9 mH
Stored energy at peak current 
(1 magnet)
W 163 kJ
Source: [11], p. 47 and [10]
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The presently most used superconducting alloy for magnets is Nb-Ti, with a 
critical temperature of 9.2 K at zero field and zero current. To achieve a magnetic 
flux density of 8 T with sufficient operational margin for accelerator operation it is 
necessary to cool the magnet to a temperature of approximately 1.9 K.
Table 2.2 and Fig.  2.7 illustrate the LHC dipole magnet, the most powerful 
accelerator magnet currently in operation. Higher flux densities of up to 16 T can be 
reached by using the alloy Nb3Sn, with a critical temperature of 18.2 K at zero field 
and current density.
Fig. 2.6 Critical surface of the Nb–Ti superconductor [14]. The critical surface separates points in 
T-B-J space in which the magnet is superconducting from those where it is normal conducting. 
Left: Operational margin of the magnet on the load line, i.e. how much J or B may increase before 
the magnet becomes normal conducting. Right: Temperature margin at a given field and current 
density, i.e. how much T may increase before the magnet becomes normal conducting. (Image 
reproduced with permission by John Wiley and Sons)
Table 2.2 Parameters of 
LHC dipole magnet
Peak momentum pc 7000 GeV
Bending radius ρ 2800 m
Required magnetic flux density B 8.33 T
Aperture (Gap width) g 53 mm
Nominal current Ipeak 11.9 kA
Inductance (1 magnet) L 98 mH






2.2.3  Safety Aspects of Magnets
The nature of hazards from normal and superconducting magnets are similar: 
exposure to strong magnetic fields, exertion of magnetic forces on metallic objects 
and electrical hazards. The hazards emerging from the use of cryogenics will be 
treated in Sect. 2.3.
Personnel is usually not exposed to these hazards during operation, because in 
these phases, access to accelerator buildings or tunnels is forbidden or restricted. 
However, the life cycle of accelerator magnets includes test phases, for example 
after fabrication, for diagnostic purposes or after maintenance and repair. These 
tests are conducted in accessible locations: in laboratories or workshops, or in the 
accelerator area outside of operation. Personnel may stay close to the magnet to 
perform measurements, or they follow other occupations in the vicinity of the 
tested magnet.
2.2.3.1  Magnetic Field Hazard
During magnetic testing, personnel may be exposed to the magnetic fringe field 
penetrating out of the magnet yoke. This is unavoidable, for example, when making 
electrical or magnetic measurements for which the magnet must be powered. For 
accelerator dipole magnets, a rule of thumb is that the dipole field falls over two 
gap-widths by a factor of 5 [15]. In the example of the SPS dipole magnet (Table 2.1), 
the fringe field in 10 cm from the pole face would amount to 400 mT, the magnetic 
field gradient in these first 10 cm would be 16 T/m. There is presently no evidence 
of adverse health effects from an occasional exposure to magnetic fields of this 
magnitude.
Fig. 2.7 LHC Dipole magnet. Left: cut through the magnet [17], Right: artist’s 3D view of an 
opened dipole in the tunnel. (Copyright CERN, reused with permission)
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2.2.3.2  Health Effects of Magnetic Fields
The International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) 
[12] has the aim to protect workers and members of the public from harmful effects 
of static and dynamic electromagnetic fields and of non-ionising radiation (electro-
magnetic radiation with wavelengths greater than 100 nm [12]).
In 2009, ICNIRP published exposure limits to static magnetic fields [13]. They 
investigated three interaction mechanisms between magnetic fields and living tis-
sues: magnetic induction, magneto-mechanical and electrical interactions. A thor-
ough analysis of the available research literature showed:
• No pronounced physiological effects have been found from exposure to fields of 
up to 8 T, except a small increase in systolic blood pressure.
• No evidence of health effects of exposures of up to 8  T on other aspects of 
cardiovascular function, on body temperature, memory, speech, or auditory-
motor reaction time and of any other serious health effects in human volunteers.
• Magnetic fields of 2–3 T can cause transitory sensory effects including nausea, 
vertigo, metallic taste and phosphenes (light sensations induced in the retina and 
the optical nerve) when moving the head.
• The few available epidemiological studies of workers in aluminium smelters, 
chloralkaline plants or as welders do not indicate strong effects of exposure of up 
to several tens of mT on cancer incidence and reproductive health.
Based on this evidence, ICNIRP recommends that occupational exposure of the 
head and trunk shall not exceed a spatial peak magnetic flux density of 
2 T. Exceptionally, for specific applications and in controlled situations, exposure of 
up to 8 T can be permitted.
Members of the public shall not be exposed to more than 400 mT on any part of 
the body.
The electrical circuits of implanted medical devices (pacemakers, cardiac 
defibrillators, insulin pumps etc.) can be perturbed by external magnetic fields, 
leading potentially to health risks for the implanted persons. Studies have shown 
that magnetic flux densities of less than 0.5 mT have no adverse effects on implanted 
medical devices and on implants from ferromagnetic metals. This leads to the 
practical requirement to put warning signs at the limit of areas where the magnetic 
flux density may exceed 0.5 mT.
2.2.3.3  Magnetic Forces
While there is no evidence for biological effects of fringe fields from accelerator 
magnets, a more imminent danger results from the mechanical forces exerted by the 
magnetic field on metallic objects.
An external magnetic field exerts a force on the magnetic moment of a metallic 
object. The magnetic moment can be induced, as in diamagnetic and paramagnetic 
materials or permanent, as in ferromagnetic materials. The induced magnetic 
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χ is the magnetic susceptibility, for ferromagnetic materials it can take on consider-
able values, which expresses the amplification of the external field within the fer-
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As an example, consider the force on a stainless-steel spanner (χ = 100) in the 
inhomogeneous field close to the pole face of a dipole magnet. In an external field 
of B = 1 T, the induced magnetic moment in the spanner (V = 200 · 10 · 3 mm3 = 6 
· 10−6m3) is 477 A m2. The force on the spanner’s magnetic moment in an inhomo-
geneous magnetic field with gradient of 1 T/m is of the order of 500 N. The likely 
result is that the tool would be wrought out of the hands of the worker and stick to 
the pole face of the magnet. This calculation is approximate, neither the susceptibil-
ity χ is precise, it depends on material composition and thermal history, nor is the 
inhomogeneous magnetic field. It only demonstrates the order of magnitude of the 
expected forces. At a larger distance, the magnetic force on a metallic object would 
be smaller, but often large enough to mobilise it and convert it into a projectile fly-
ing in the direction of the magnet poles.
The examples and conclusions above are valid for workers on powered accelerator 
magnets. The situation is different for workers in the vicinity or inside the large, 
superconducting solenoid magnets employed in particle detectors at high-energy 
accelerators. There, magnetic flux densities may attain up to 4 T, and access should 
only be permitted to trained volunteers, following specific procedures to minimize 
the sensory effects described in the literature.
As a summary of the section on magnetic field hazards one can observe
• Personnel is exposed to the fields from accelerator magnets only in exceptional 
situations, for example in test laboratories. The fringe field of dipole and higher 
order multipole magnets decays rapidly outside of the yoke and coils.
• In this configuration, physiological effects can be excluded. They would be 
expected at magnetic flux densities exceeding 2 T. Long-term health effects have 
not been observed in groups which are regularly exposed to fields of up to 100 
mT, like welders.
• A limit of 0.5 mT is considered safe for persons with implanted medical electronic 
devices.
• Finally, the mechanical forces on ferromagnetic, metallic objects can be 
considerable and can project them in the direction of the magnet. To avoid injury, 
such objects must be banned from magnetic test stands.
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2.2.3.4  Electrical Hazards of Magnets
Accelerator magnets are electrically powered. To generate magnetic fields in 
accelerators one needs generally high current (I  >  1 A) and in some cases high 
voltage (U > 1 kV). The potential danger from a powered accelerator magnet shall 
be illustrated at the example of the SPS magnets. Figure 2.8 shows an equivalent 
electrical scheme of an electromagnet, composed of an ideal inductivity L, a 
resistance R (the ohmic resistance of the coil and cables), and a stray capacity to 
ground C.
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Fig. 2.8 A dipole bending magnet with its equivalent circuit [10]. Instead of U, the author of the 
figure uses V as symbol for voltage
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The dipole magnet of the CERN Super-Proton Synchrotron (SPS) (Table  2.2), 
powered by a continuous current of value Ipeak for test purposes, stores an 
electromagnetic energy of W = 163 kJ.  If one creates accidentally a short circuit 
between the terminals of this magnet, the circuit will drain the electrical power 
P = UI over the resistance of the short circuit Rsc with a characteristic time constant 
of   L Rsc
, which is in the order of a second. If this energy were dissipated entirely 
in the piece of metal causing the short, it would be enough to melt approximately 
100 g of iron, giving an impression of the injury and material damage which can be 
created by an accidental electrical short circuit.
In the SPS, 784 dipole magnets of two types with slightly different parameters 
are connected in series. Resistance and inductance of the magnets add up to values 
of Rtot = 3.25 Ω and Ltot = 6.6 H. The stored energy of the full SPS dipole circuit 
amounts to 109 MJ. At peak current, the resistive voltage across R is 18 kV, to which 
the induced voltage over Ltot must be added. The SPS magnets are ramped at 
1.9  kA/s, adding the induced voltage V L dI dtL = = 12 5. kV. Therefore, the 
insulation of the magnets must withstand 30 kV.







appears across the interrupter gap. The time derivative of the current is initially very 
high, and the high inductive voltage will result in an electrical arc across the gap. 
This electrical arc carries high electrical power, and its primary hazard is heat radia-
tion and projection of fused metal, not electrical shock. More on arc flashes is found 
in Sect. 4.1.1.
2.3  Cryogenics
With cryogenics one designates the realms of science and technology operating at 
temperatures lower than 120  K, where gases such as nitrogen, oxygen or argon 
begin to liquify [27]. Hazards of cryogenics are related to very low temperatures 
and to oxygen deficiency (Fig. 2.9).
Fig. 2.9 Warning signs 
against low temperatures 
and oxygen deficiency 
hazard, after [1]. (Image 
source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
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Cryogenic technology is essential for the function of a modern high-energy 
particle accelerator using superconducting magnets and radiofrequency cavities. 
Superconducting magnets are also used in Nuclear Magnet Resonance (NMR) 
imaging in medical diagnostics, and cryogenics has become a key technology with 
a certain economic impact.
The purpose of accelerator cryogenics is to cool magnets and RF cavities to 
temperatures well below the critical temperature for superconductivity Tc (see 2.2.2) 
to ascertain their functioning with enough operational margin. The cool-down is 
achieved in a heat-exchange process with helium as a cryogenic fluid, the only ele-
ment apart from the explosive hydrogen which does not become solid other than 
under extreme pressures.
Due to the size of a modern high-energy accelerator, the cryogenic installations 
have industrial dimensions. The cryogenic plants at CERN are world-wide the larg-
est of their kind.
2.3.1  Production of Low Temperatures
The physical principle of cooling an object is to transfer its thermal energy to a 
reservoir at a higher temperature by a heat exchange mechanism using mechanical 
work. The cryogenic fluid which is produced in a refrigeration plant can be trans-
ported to the object to be cooled where it absorbs part of the object’s thermal energy. 
In this process, the fluid may undergo a phase change from liquid to gaseous. 
Finally, the “warm” fluid is transported back to the refrigeration plant from where 
Fig. 2.10 Open 
thermodynamic cycle, 
transporting thermal 
energy from low 
temperature (Tc) to high 
temperature (Tw) by 
employing mechanical 
work W. (From [24])
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on the cycle repeats. This is the working principle of the refrigerator or the 
heat-pump.
The refrigeration plant makes use of a thermodynamic process to extract heat 
from the cryogenic fluid (Fig.  2.10). Heat is extracted from a low-temperature 
reservoir (Tc) and mechanical energy W is used to bring it to a higher temperature Tw 
where it is rejected to the environment. This is the principle of the heat pump, but in 
cryogenics, the interest is not the heat flow at the high temperature Qw but the heat 
flow extracted from the cold medium Qc

, in order to lower its temperature further. 
The cyclic thermodynamical process with the highest efficiency is named after the 
French physicist Carnot [18]. Accordingly, any thermodynamical process to extract 















The expression in parenthesis is called the Carnot factor”.
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of process energy at room temperature (300 K) to remove 1 W of thermal energy at 
the cryogenic temperature of 4 K.
The Carnot cycle can only be approximated, and numerous technical cycles have 
been developed for application in real refrigeration plants, see for example [26]. All 
thermodynamic cycles used for cryogenics have in common that the temperature of 
the gas is reduced by first charging it isothermally with mechanical energy in a 
compression step and then letting the gas expand, for example in a nozzle (Joule- 
Thompson process) or more efficiently, by letting it perform work against the resis-
tance of a turbine.
Due to the unfavourably low thermodynamic efficiency, the refrigeration plants 
for a particle accelerator have industrial dimensions. CERN is presently operating 
the world’s largest helium refrigeration plant, distributed over 8 sites, to cool the 
approximately 20 km of superconducting magnets in the LHC to a temperature of 
1.9 K. These plants have a high engineering complexity and they are usually con-
ceived and constructed in collaboration with specialised engineering firms.
Safety aspects concerning the construction of the compressors and refrigerators 
are taken account of by their manufacturer who constructs them following industrial 
standards. In the European Union, the mandatory application of the Machinery 
Directive (see 4.2.2) guarantees minimal health and safety standards across the 
member states and for imported products.
The noise level inside of a cryogenic service building can be overpowering and 
easily exceed the legal limits (Sect. 4.5). The manufacturers of compressors and 
turbines take all possible steps to reduce the emissions form their devices. Further 
attenuation of compressor noise is often impossible because additional insulating 
material would impede the heat exchange of the plant with its environment and 
lead to overheating. Cryogenic compressors and refrigerators are installed in spe-
cific buildings with isolated walls to reduce noise emission to the environment. The 
2 Risks and Hazards of Particle Accelerator Technologies
23
control rooms for these plants are preferably installed in a separate building, or at 
least isolated so well that the sound pressure level does not exceed a comfort-
able level.
2.3.2  Cryogenic Fluids
The most common cryogenic fluid used in particle accelerators is Helium. It has a 
low enough boiling temperature to remain liquid in the temperature range where 
most low-temperature superconductors operate. Another cryogen of technical 
importance is Nitrogen, whereas liquid Argon is used in some particle detectors. In 
the past, Hydrogen was used in bubble chambers, particle detectors which have 
been replaced by modern alternatives. Table 2.3 lists some physical properties of 
these fluids.
Cryogenic fluids have in common
• a very low temperature in the liquid state, and
• a high ratio of gaseous volume at ambient temperature to liquid volume 
ρl/ρSTP = (650–800).
Because of its low enthalpy of evaporation, Helium must be thermally isolated 
from all heat transfer by conduction, convection, or radiation to remain in the liquid 
state. This can be achieved with super-insulated cryostats, combining vacuum insu-
lation to interrupt convection, metallised mylar foils as radiation barrier and low- 
conduction mechanical supports from organic materials. If the insulation of a 
cryostat fails, two effects are the consequence:
• the heat flow in the cryogen will lead to its partial evaporation, increasing rapidly 
the internal pressure in the cryostat (overpressure),
• once the cryogenic fluid is released from the cryostat, persons may be exposed to 
cold and to oxygen deficiency.
Table 2.3 Properties of cryogenic fluids used in accelerators and particle detectors. M molar 
mass, Tb boiling temperature at 1013 hPa, ρl liquid density at Tb, ρg gaseous density at Tb, ρSTP 















Helium 4.003 4.2 124.9 16.9 0.178 702 20.3
Hydrogen 
(H2)
2.016 20.3 70.8 1.34 0.0899 788 446
Nitrogen 
(N2)
28.01 77.3 808 4.62 1.25 646 199




In case the thermal insulation of a cryostat fails, for example by a degradation 
of the insulation vacuum, thermal energy is transported from the surroundings 
to the cryogenic vessel by a combination of conduction and convection. A part 
of the cryogenic fluid evaporates, and by the relation for an ideal gas pV = const., 
the pressure in the fixed-volume vessel increases. From Table 2.3, the conver-
sion of liquid helium to gaseous helium at the boiling temperature leads to a 
pressure increase by a factor of 7.4. Further heating of the gas leads to higher 
pressure. Obviously, cryostats constitute pressure vessels, containers built and 
tested to withstand pressures higher than atmospheric pressure. The topic of 
pressure vessels is treated in more detail in Sect. 4.2. To avoid damage to the 
cryostat from the increasing internal pressure, they are equipped with so-called 
safety devices, in form of pressure relief valves. An international standard [22] 
describes the models and calculations to determine the correct dimension of the 
safety valves on cryogenic pressure vessels. For cryogenic liquids, these calcu-
lations are far from trivial because often the cryogenic fluid undergoes a phase 
change from liquid to gas during release, or a mixture of liquid and gaseous 
phases of the fluid is released.
2.3.2.2  Cold Burns
The exposure of skin to cold surfaces or cold fluids may lead to “cold burns”, named 
after the similarities of their effects on tissue to those by heat or flame. When 
exposed to temperatures well below 0 °C for longer than the temperature regulation 
mechanism of the body can cope, the skin develops in a first phase reddening and 
blisters, which may be painful but reversible (1st degree). The cold may penetrate 
layers below the skin and lead to tissue damage by the formation of ice crystals, 
leading to irreversible effects, like tissue necrosis. These effects are well-known to 
high-altitude mountaineers and arctic explorers but may as well occur in the work-
place when exposed to cryogenic liquids.
To prevent cold burns, one must prevent the exposure to extremely cold surfaces 
or fluids. Protection measures are:
• Orientation of cold gas relief devices (safety valves) away from passageways.
• Insulation of cryogenic vessels and pipes, so that no cold spots appear on the 
external surface.
• Wearing correct personal protective equipment when working on cold cryogenic 
systems. This consists of long-sleeved trousers and jackets, temperature- 
insulating gloves which remain flexible at low temperatures and a face shield or 
at least safety goggles.
• Never walk across the condensation cloud around a release of cryogenic fluids. 
The lack of visibility makes it impossible to avoid the jet of cold liquid and 
severe injury might result.
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2.3.3  Oxygen Deficiency Hazard from Cryogenic Fluids
Everybody can feel the effects of a reduced oxygen concentration in air during a 
visit in the high mountains. After leaving a cable car at an altitude of nearly 3900 m 
above sea level2 one may feel dizziness and headache. During longer stays at high 
altitude, for example when climbing a summit or staying overnight in a mountain 
refuge, tiredness and vomiting may add to the symptoms of what is called altitude 
sickness. This is the mildest form of the consequences of hypoxia or oxygen defi-
ciency, the term used in the occupational safety context. It is caused by the lower 
partial pressure of oxygen, which is 21% at sea level, but only 13% at 3900 m alti-
tude. The physiological effects of reduced oxygen concentration are listed in 
Table 2.4
Cryogenic fluids experience a volume expansion by a factor of 700 to 800 upon 
evaporation, and they can displace or dilute breathable air, creating an atmosphere 
depleted of oxygen. Therefore, a risk assessment must evaluate the likelihood and 
consequences of oxygen deficiency at workplaces where cryogenic liquids are used.
2.3.3.1  Oxygen Deficiency from Nitrogen Gas
Liquid Nitrogen (LN2) is employed in cryogenic shields, or to cool high- temperature 
superconductors. Once gaseous, it mixes perfectly with air of which it is the major 
constituent.
A first, coarse estimate of oxygen deficiency hazard in a closed room with 
volume Vo is obtained by assuming that the evaporated volume of the released LN2, 
VR,g, displaces an equivalent volume of air from the room and that the remaining air 
and cryogen mix perfectly (Fig. 2.11). In this case, the oxygen concentration of the 
mixture is:
2 In the Alps, this is possible on the summits of Aiguille du Midi (Chamonix, FR) and Klein 
Matterhorn (Zermatt, CH).
Table 2.4 Physiological effect of reduced oxygen concentration [21]
O2 (Vol 
%) Effects and Symptoms
18–21% No discernible symptoms can be detected by the individual.
A risk assessment must be undertaken to understand the causes and determine 
whether it is safe to continue working.
11–18% Reduction of physical and intellectual performance without the sufferer being aware.
8–11% Possibility of fainting within a few minutes without prior warning.
Risk of death below 11%
6–8% Fainting occurs after a short time.
Resuscitation possible if carried out immediately.


















If the oxygen concentration shall not drop below 18%, the lowest concentration 
which is universally regarded as safe for workers, then the volume of the room must 
be more than 7 times the volume of the evaporated gas:
 V V VR g R l0 7 5000> , ,  
This relation makes use of the typical volume ratio between the cryogenics gaseous 
state gas at 300 K and its liquid volume. This can be expressed as a rule of thumb: 
“No oxygen deficiency hazard in a room with volume in m3 exceeding the cryogenic 
liquid volume in L by at least a factor of five”.
A more realistic estimate can be obtained from the well-mixed room approximation. 
Figure 2.12 shows the schematic of a room into which a substance S is released with 
a volume flow R (m3 s−1) and with a relative concentration Cs,r (Volume-% or m3 
m−3). Fresh air is supplied with a ventilation flow Q (m3  s−1). It is assumed that 
pressure in the room remains constant. Therefore, no accumulation of air or gas can 
happen, and the outflow of the room is (Q + R).
The time dependent concentration of substance S in the room is denoted Cs(t). 






Fig. 2.12 Substance and 
air flows entering and 
leaving the room (or the 




Vair = Vo – VR,gVair = Vo
Fig. 2.11 Simplest model to assess oxygen deficiency in a room. Left panel: (liquefied) gas is 
streaming into a room with volume Vo. Right panel: the expanded cryogenic liquid or gas has 
displaced an equal volume of air. The oxygen concentration is calculated form the remaining air 
volume. (Copyright: the author)
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If the release of substance S stops after time T, then the solution for the time- 
dependent concentration of s, Cs(t) is during the release:
 






















After the release, the concentration of S develops as:
 









































During a release of LN2, the concentration of the released gas (the evaporated 
liquid) is 100%. One is interested in the remaining concentration of oxygen in air, 















































































If a minimum concentration of 18% O2 shall be preserved, one can evaluate the 
minimal ventilation flow Qmin required to cope with the worst-case release rate Rmax 











min max  
This equation can be solved for the result Qmin = 6 Rmax.
A numerical example shall illustrate this relation: a liquid nitrogen cooled circuit 
loses 10 mL s−1 LN2, evaporating to 6.5 L s−1 N2-gas at STP. To retain an oxygen 
concentration above 18%, the ventilation must supply 140 m3 fresh air per hour. In 
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a standard room one considers that air is exchanged between 2 and 3 times per hour. 
This means that the assumed leak rate of LN2 of 10 mL s−1 does not pose a problem 
in normally sized laboratories. It could however lead to oxygen deficiency in a small 
wall cabinet in which a leaking LN2-dewar is stored.
The well-mixed room approximation gives more reasonable estimates than the 
simple displacement hypothesis if the released gas is indeed well mixed. In not too 
large rooms, the turbulence created during the outflow and evaporation of cryogenic 
liquid suffice to promote mixing in the room. Refinements of the well-mixed room 
approximation can be found in [23]. A strong ventilation system supplying fresh air 
provides an effective protection against local pockets of oxygen deficiency in a 
room even for stronger releases that in the example above.
2.3.3.2  Oxygen Deficiency from Helium Gas
The most important cryogenic fluid for superconducting magnets is liquid Helium 
(LHe). The oxygen deficiency hazard which may arise after a release of LHe cannot 
be described with the well-mixed room approximation because of its low density 
once in gaseous state. Below a temperature of 40  K the density of Helium gas 
exceeds the density of air, 1.2 kg m−3. The heat capacity of Helium is very low and 
little energy is required to warm it up. Thus, liquid Helium or cold He gas released 
to air rapidly warms up by radiation and by turbulent convection. The gas density 
diminishes proportionally to 1/T.  Once the temperature of the outpouring gas 
exceeds 40 K, buoyancy drives the gas upwards. In closed rooms the warming-up 
Helium gas forms a layer under the ceiling. A quick estimate yields that the thick-
ness of the helium layer in a room with surface area A attains 5.6/A m for each kg of 
Helium released. In a standard laboratory room with a height of 3 m and a surface 
of 4 m by 7 m, 7.5 kg Helium (60 litres of LHe) would displace half the air from the 
room and form a layer from the ceiling extending until a height of 1.5 metres.
In laboratories housing experimental Helium cryostats, simple preventive 
measures can be taken: exhaust fans placed at a small distance under the ceiling 
expel the helium gas from the room, at the same time a vent at floor level supplies 
fresh air.
To evaluate the oxygen deficiency hazard in accelerator tunnels, a series of 
Helium release experiments have been performed in CERN’s LHC [19, 25]. 1000 
litres (125 kg) of liquid Helium were released into the LHC tunnel with three differ-
ent mass flows: 100 g/s, 320 g/s and 1 kg/s. The tunnel ventilation worked at its 
standard speed of about 1.5 m/s. Downwind from the release point, oxygen concen-
tration sensors were located at regular height and distance in the tunnel and the 
propagating Helium cloud was recorded at these points by video cameras. The 
results of these tests can be summarized as follows:
• For releases of mass flows with 100 g/s or 320 g/s, a turbulent zone with an 
extension of a few metres around the release point develops, in which the released 
cold helium is vigorously mixed with the surrounding air. In this zone, the 
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Helium warms up rapidly and raises by buoyancy to the ceiling. In some distance 
from the release point, a ceiling flow of helium is driven by the ventilation and 
by its own momentum towards the next shaft. Outside the turbulent zone, tem-
perature, and oxygen levels at the height of a walking person (h < 2.5 m) are 
close to normal and permit a safe evacuation of personnel.
• A release of Helium with a mass flow of 1 kg/s corresponds to a gaseous Helium 
volume of 5.6 m3/s at standard pressure and room temperature. The thermalized 
Helium gas displaces air in most of the tunnel cross section so that oxygen is 
rarefied over several hundred metres.
The Helium release experiments have yielded precious information for the 
operation of the LHC and for the safe design of future accelerator facilities. Few 
publications of theoretical/ numerical descriptions of cryogenic releases exist [25] 
and in general, this field is actively researched.
As protection measures it has been decided that personnel are not permitted to 
access the LHC tunnel in operational phases, where leakages may provoke helium 
releases of more than 320 g/s. This is the case during the powering of the supercon-
ducting magnets, when also electrical safety demands the exclusion of personnel 
form the tunnel area.
In periods when the magnet current is zero, a general risk assessment of the 
cryogenic system has shown that accidentally provoked helium releases cannot 
have a mass flow exceeding 100 g/s. In these phases, personnel are permitted to 
perform standard verifications and small maintenance after a specific risk assessment. 
This assessment is targeted to identify the risk of an accidental manipulation or 
damage of a cryogenic control device, potentially leading to a Helium release. 
Technical or organisational mitigation measures are prescribed in the risk assessment 
to reduce this probability.
2.3.3.3  Mitigation of Oxygen Deficiency Hazard
The following mitigation measures can be applied to reduce the risk that personnel 
are exposed to the oxygen deficiency hazard:
• Process changes: consider storing the bulk of cryogenic fluid outside of regularly 
occupied rooms and introduce only the immediately required quantity.
• Forced ventilation: in unventilated or poorly ventilated rooms, install a forced 
ventilation with sufficient flow to remove enough of the evaporated cryogenic 
liquid to remain at C(O2) > 18%
• Oxygen deficiency detectors: they determine C(O2) by an electrochemical 
reaction and raise an alarm when C(O2) decreases below a set point. In case of 
ODH alarm, personnel must leave the room immediately. Due to their larger 
volume, installed ODH detectors are more precise, on the other hand, portable 
personal ODH monitors are light-weight and less expensive, but less precise and 
prone to raise false alarms.
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If neither of the technical measures above can sufficiently reduce the risk of 
exposure to ODH, then the workers accessing the hazard areas must carry personal 
protective equipment in the form of personal oxygen generators. Adopted from 
underground mining, these devices supply O2 from a chemical reaction for approxi-
mately 30 min. They enable a safe evacuation in large facilities, such as accelerator 
tunnels, where the emergency exit may be far.
2.4  Radiofrequency Technologies
Radiofrequency technology is fundamental to the acceleration of particles  (Fig. 
2.13). An alternative, emerging technology is plasma wake field acceleration, which 
will be briefly touched in Sect. 2.5.1.
2.4.1  Principle of RF Acceleration
A charged particle can be accelerated by static voltage across a gap, but this simple 
acceleration principle is limited by the breakdown voltage of the electrical field in 
vacuum to a maximal voltage of a few MV. The fundamental idea of radiofrequency 
acceleration is to apply an alternating electrical field to a gap. The electrical field 
has the accelerating polarity when the charged particle passes the gap, and the par-
ticle is shielded from the decelerating polarity, for example in drift tubes in a linear 
accelerator, or simply by having left the gap in a circular accelerator. Figure 2.14 
illustrates this principle.
A particle moves in z-direction. If the electrical field was a constant across 
the gap g:
 
E E V gz z= =, ,0
0
 
A particle with electrical charge e would gain the kinetic energy ΔE = e V0. In 
reality, the electrical field oscillates with frequency ω:
Fig. 2.13 Warning sign 
against electromagnetic 
fields after [1]. (Image 
source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
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The field is at its maximum when the accelerated particle is in the centre of the 
gap. Then, the energy absorbed from the electrical field is:
 E eV T 0  
where T is the transit-time factor. For the simple example of a sinusoidal field varia-
tion across a gap, T = 0.637. The energy gain of the charged particle per passage 
through the gap is determined by
• The maximum Voltage V0
• The transit-time factor, which can be influenced by the geometry of the 
accelerating structure,
An accelerating gap is the simplest topology of an RF accelerating structure. 
Other topologies are drift-tube linacs (a succession of gaps, alternating with shield-
ing drift-tubes) or accelerating cavities, in which standing or travelling electromag-
netic waves impart kinetic energy on the particle.
2.4.2  Components of a RF Acceleration System
Figure 2.15 shows a block-diagram of an RF accelerating system. An amplifier 
converts DC input voltage into RF (high-frequency AC) output power. The power is 
transmitted by waveguides or coaxial cables to the accelerating cavity, where it is 
transferred to the beam particles.
Fig. 2.14 Schematic 





2.4.2.1  RF Amplifier
An RF amplifier converts electrical power from a DC source into radiofrequency 
output power. In Fig. 2.15, the amplifier converts a DC input to radiofrequency out-
put, modulated by the low-level RF signal at the amplifier’s control input. Frequency 
and phase of the RF output signal are determined by the low-level RF power, its 
amplitude and power are proportional to the current and voltage of the DC input. In 
the past, RF amplifiers were based on some type of vacuum tube. Today, technical 
solutions with solid-state amplifiers are possible.
In tetrode vacuum-tube RF amplifiers for CERN’s Super-Proton Synchrotron 
(SPS), packages of electrons were accelerated by anode voltages of 24  kV.  In a 
Klystrons, a DC electron beam modulated by the low-level RF is accelerated up to 
100 kV. When high-energy electrons collide with matter, they emit a Bremsstrahlung 
X-ray spectrum. In other words, vacuum tube-based RF amplifiers are sources of 
ionizing radiation
2.4.2.2  Waveguides
For operational reasons, the RF amplifiers are placed at a certain distance from the 
particle beam so that they can be monitored while the accelerator is working and 
serviced without having to enter a radiation area. The RF power from the amplifier 
is transported by waveguides or coaxial cables to the accelerating cavity in the 
accelerator tunnel. Above a frequency of a few 100 MHz and power exceeding some 
10 kW, hollow waveguides are the most efficient means to transport RF energy. 
Electromagnetic waves can travel in hollow, metallic guides with rectangular cross 
section, when certain relations between the wavelength and the dimensions of the 
guide are met. These relations are derived in standard textbooks of electrodynamics, 
e.g [31]. If waveguides are incorrectly mounted, leakage radiation may escape. This 
radiation is non-ionising, electromagnetic radiation (NIR) and, depending on its 
power, may have adverse effects on persons in the vicinity.
Fig. 2.15 Generic lay-out of an RF system, after [29]
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2.4.2.3  RF Cavity
The shape of the metallic RF cavity is designed to maintain a standing or travelling 
radiofrequency electromagnetic field of the required frequency. The surface resis-
tance of the metal constitutes a loss factor, and can be drastically reduced by making 
the cavity walls superconducting, for example by covering them with a thin 
layer of Nb.
2.4.3  Hazards from RF Systems
Radiofrequency systems may be the source of the following hazards which must be 
considered in a risk assessment:
• Electrical hazards from the power source (Sect. 4.1)
• Cryogenic hazards in superconducting RF systems (Sect. 2.3)
• X-rays from bremsstrahlung from the electron beam in vacuum tube RF 
amplifiers or from spuriously emitted and accelerated surface electrons
• Electromagnetic radiation leaking from radiofrequency systems, with frequencies 
too low to provoke ionisation: Non-Ionising Radiation.
2.4.3.1  Bremsstrahlung X-Rays
The X-ray bremsstrahlung spectrum from vacuum tube RF-amplifiers must be 
appropriately shielded. It has a terminal energy corresponding to the highest kinetic 
energy of the electrons in the vacuum tube, in some klystrons exceeding 
100 kV. Exposure to ionizing radiation from RF amplifiers made the headlines in 
2001  in Germany, when it was revealed that maintenance technicians of military 
RADAR devices in tanks and airplanes, fed by klystrons or magnetrons, showed a 
higher cancer incidence than the general population. This was traced back to their 
exposure to the partially unshielded radiation emitted by these devices during main-
tenance. Coincidentally, this occurred in both of the armed forces of former West- 
and East Germany. Vacuum tube RF amplifiers must be appropriately shielded to 
keep the emitted radiation below legal limits for non-designated areas. Klystrons 
bought from industry are delivered with shielding, and the radiation risk from them 
is low if the shielding is not compromised.
In accelerating cavities, electrons are emitted spuriously from the cavity surface 
at locations of high curvature, surface inhomogeneities or “dirt”. These electrons 
pick up a certain amount of the RF energy in the cavity and collide with its walls, 
emitting bremsstrahlung. The intensity of the emitted X-rays is the highest, when a 
cavity recently exposed to air is conditioned, a process where surface electrons are 
emitted purposefully to contribute to the removal of impurities from the surfaces. 
When RF cavities operate in the accelerator tunnel, these emissions do no present a 
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risk for personnel, protected by the accelerator shielding and excluded by the access 
safety system (Sect. 5.3.1). During commissioning of new or modified cavities in 
test areas, proper shielding must be built around the test stands to protect the person-
nel from harmful ionizing radiation. Figure 2.16 shows a simulated contour map of 
ambient dose equivalent rate around a test bunker during the commissioning of RF 
accelerating structures with a field gradient of 25 MV/m in Beijing University [31].
In a two-step process, first the emission and spurious acceleration of surface 
electrons was simulated, and then the generation of bremsstrahlung X-rays from the 
stopping electrons. The light blue colour on the dose rate map outside of the bunker 
signifies a dose rate between 10 and 50μSv/h. This value would lead to a classifica-
tion as a controlled radiation area under most European radiation protection 
regulations.
2.4.3.2  Electromagnetic Leakage Radiation
Non-ionising electromagnetic radiation leaking from RF structures and wave guides 
may have negative effects on human health. The subject of the next Sect. 2.4.4 are 
direct health effects of electromagnetic field exposure of the whole human body or 
of parts of it.
Fig. 2.16 Dose rate of ionizing radiation around a vertical test stand for RF accelerating cavities, 
from [31]. (Image reused with permission by Oxford University Press)
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Indirect health effects occur when electromagnetic radiation alters or impedes 
the function of electric devices. A heart pacemaker or an insulin pump are electrical 
or electro-mechanical devices, equipped with electronic control circuitry. Any of 
these components may fail if they are coming under the influence of electromag-
netic fields. The avoidance of such adverse effects is the subject of electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMC).
2.4.4  Health Effects of Electromagnetic Fields (EMF)
The field of non-ionising radiation covers a wide band of frequencies of 
electromagnetic radiation. The quantum energy of its photons is not high enough to 
provoke the ionisation of an atom in material struck by the radiation, therefore its 
name non- ionising radiation as compared to ionising radiation.
Nevertheless, the effect of exposure to non-ionising electromagnetic radiation 
can be as detrimental to health as that of ionising radiation.
The International Commission for Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, ICNIRP, 
has updated its recommendations for electromagnetic radiation in the frequency 
range between 100 kHz and 300 GHZ in 2020 [30]. ICNIRP bases its recommenda-
tions for intensity limits of electromagnetic radiation only on substantiated effects. 
These are harmful effects of EMF on health which have been repetitively observed 
and documented in the scientific literature and which do not contradict current sci-
entific understanding. The rigorous approach to rely on scientific evidence for 
adverse health effects of EMF ensures that ICNIRP recommendations do not follow 
unconfirmed claims.
2.4.4.1  Biophysical Effects of EMF
The biophysical effects of electromagnetic fields in the body can be classified in 
three groups:
• The most important effects of EMF in the body are thermal effects. The electrical 
field components of EMF act on polar molecules (water!) and on charge carriers 
(ions and electrons) and confers kinetic energy to their translational, rotational, 
and vibrational degrees of freedom. This kinetic energy dissipates in the tissue, 
leading to a temperature rise. The adverse health effects of a continuous rise of 
body temperature have been demonstrated, and intensity limitations of non- 
ionising radiation exposure protect against these effects.
• At frequencies around f ≈ 100 kHz, nerve stimulation which manifests itself in a 
“tingling” sensation has been described.
• Very high intensities of high-frequency EMF, which may occur in the Fourier- 
decomposition of electromagnetic pulses, may lead to an alteration of the perme-
ability of biological membranes. Such modifications in the body would lead to 
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consequential adverse health effects. The effect has been demonstrated in in- 
vitro experiments, but at an intensity which is prevented by the limits on tem-
perature effects.
As a summary, one can state that as of today, ICNIRP recognizes as the only 
substantiated adverse effect of non-ionising radiation on human health and safety 
the heating of exposed tissue. Spurious reports of electro sensitivity or the induction 
of cancer have not withstood epidemiological investigations.
2.4.4.2  Dosimetric Quantities for Non-ionising Radiation
To describe the biophysical effects from EMF leading to adverse health effects and 
to define limits, one needs dosimetric quantities. ICNIRP defines quantities for 
energy absorption from EMF in its report [30]. The quantities which are suitable for 
limiting emissions from RF fields at particle accelerators can be described as 
follows:
• SAR, Specific energy absorption rate, measured as a whole-body average in the 
unit W kg−1, to quantify whole body energy absorption rate, leading to a rise of 
body core temperature
• SAR10g, Specific local energy absorption rate over a 10 g tissue cube (with side 
length of 2.15 cm) to quantify local energy absorption rate, leading to local heating
• Sab Specific Absorbed energy density, measured in the unit W m−2, to quantify 
energy absorption rate to the skin from very high frequency EMF
2.4.5  Protection against NIR
2.4.5.1  Effect Levels and Basic Restrictions to Temperature Rise
When discussing body temperature rise, one distinguishes core temperature and 
local temperature. The core temperature is the temperature of the inner organs and 
amounts for a healthy adult to Tcore = 37 °C. Core temperature may rise in immune 
reactions (fever) to help the body fend off infections, but in absence of fever, a long- 
term temperature rise of more than ΔTcore = 1 °C can lead to adverse health effects. 
Locally, body tissues shall not be heated by more than 5 °C to prevent effects, such 
as burns.
ICNIRP defines an effect level, the magnitude of an EMF, expressed in a suitable 
dosimetric quantity, from which on health effects are reported in the literature.
Modelling the effect of EMF on body tissue shows that a specific energy 
absorption rate SAR = 4 W kg−1 over 30 minutes raises body core temperature by 
1 °C. This level of SAR is therefore the effect level for whole-body exposure. As a 
comparison, an average human generates 1 W kg−1 at rest, 2 W kg−1 standing and 
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12 W kg−1 when running. This heat loads are dealt with by the body’s temperature 
regulation system. Excess heat is transported to the skin, cooled by the surrounding 
air and, when this is not sufficient, by evaporation of sweat. The ICNIRP places a 
basic restriction on additional heat loads, which may overload the body’s regulation 
mechanism.
If only part of the body is exposed to EMF, then local effect levels for energy 
absorption rate apply. They are determined by the quantity SAR10g. The effect levels 
are SAR10g < 20 W kg−1 for head and torso and SAR10g < 40 W kg−1 for the limbs. As 
tissue has an assumed density of ρ = 1 g cm−3, the local power density must not 
exceed 20 mW cm−3 or 40 mW cm−3, respectively.
At frequencies above 6 GHz, the heating by EMF takes place mostly in the skin: 
at 6GHz, 86% of the power is absorbed within 8 mm of the body surface and leads 
to a rise of the local temperature. The suitable dosimetric quantity to describe 
energy absorption in this frequency range is specific absorbed energy density, Sab. 
Here, effects over a small (1 cm2) and a larger (4 cm2) patch of skin are investigated, 
leading to two different effect levels of 400 W m−2 and 200 W m−2.
To derive basic restrictions to exposure by EMF for workers, ICNIRP divides the 
effect levels by a safety factor of 2 or 10 (for whole-body SAR). For the public, basic 
restriction levels are reduced by another factor of 5 (Table 2.5).
2.4.5.2  Reference Quantities for Non-ionising Radiation
Basic restrictions are defined within the body or parts of it and cannot be measured. 
For the assessment of non-ionising radiation at the workplace or in the public, 
reference quantities are defined which are accessible to measurement. Reference 
Table 2.5 Basic restrictions to the effects of electromagnetic radiation [30]. The table shows the 
body part to be protected, the frequency range, the maximal allowed temperature rise over a 
distinct volume, the applicable dosimetric quantity, the level, of the quantity at which health effects 
are observed with certainty and the derived exposure limits for workers and the public. The thermal 
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quantities are the incident electric field strength Einc [V m−1], incident magnetic field 
strength Hinc [A m−1] and incident power density Sinc [W m−2]. The latter quantity is 
used for the determination of reference values for the skin.
ICNIRP has determined the field strengths which, under worst-case conditions, 
result in the limiting exposures to the whole body or specific tissues as expressed by 
the basic restrictions. The reference quantities depend on the frequency of the inci-
dent radiation and are shown for the occupational exposure of workers in Figs. 2.17 
and 2.18.
Fig. 2.17 Reference levels for occupational exposure to RF electromagnetic fields. Continuous 
lines: whole-body exposure, dashed lines: local exposure. (Data from Tables 5 and 6 in [30])
Fig. 2.18 Warning sign 
against laser beams, after 
[1]. (Image source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
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2.5  Lasers at Accelerators
Lasers emit narrow beams of coherent, monochromatic optical radiation from the 
far ultraviolet (UV) (180  nm) to the far infrared (IR) (3000μm) range of wave-
lengths  (Fig. 2.18). Lasers have wide-ranging applications in particle accelerator 
centres, both in the accelerator and in the adjacent laboratories and workshops.
2.5.1  Application of Lasers at Accelerators
The intense light emitted by Lasers has specific applications at accelerators, for 
example:
• Photo-cathodes illuminated by pulsed laser beams provide electron beams with 
a specified time structure, matched to the accelerating structures for linear accel-
erators [34].
• Gamma factories: inverse Compton scattering of laser-generated photons on 
relativistic electron beams [44] or ion beams [41] provide photons with extremely 
high energies.
• Laser wakefield acceleration (LWFA). An intense, short Laser pulse traversing a 
plasma cell-displaces the free electrons, creating an electrical wakefield (Fig. 2.19). 
Fig. 2.19 Principle of Laser Wakefield Acceleration: a short intense Laser pulse (Y) traverses a 
plasma. Electrons are displaced by radiation pressure; the Laser pulse creates a periodic wake field 
of positively charged ions. The blue line indicates the local positive charge density in the plasma. 
The electric field (not the ions!) is comoving with the Laser pulse and it accelerates the electrons 
in its extremely high field gradient. (From [33])
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Field gradients surpassing everything that is possible with RF cavities can be gen-
erated and electrons have been accelerated to 7.8 GeV over short distances [37]. 
The lasers used for LWFA have instantaneous powers in the Terawatt range.
• Laser ion source. The sharply defined wavelength of a Laser permits isotope- 
selective ionisation of exotic atoms in radioisotope facilities, for example 
ISOLDE at CERN [36]. Several excitation steps are necessary to bring an elec-
tron to a loosely bound Rydberg state and finally to remove it from the atom. 
Tuneable lasers based on toxic dyes are mounted with frequency-doubling crys-
tals and other optical elements on an optical bench (Fig. 2.20).
Unspecific, industrial applications of Lasers in particle accelerator centres are
• Metrology, for example distance measurement, surveying, aligning of accelerator 
components, laser velocimetry, laser vibrometers.
• Material processing, such as cutting, welding, drilling, photolithography, additive 
manufacturing (“3D printing”).
• Communication, with laser diodes and optical fibres
Fig. 2.20 Optical bench in the ISOLDE RILIS laser laboratory. Operators must protect themselves 
from direct and reflected laser beams with protection glasses. (Copyright CERN, reused with 
permission)
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2.5.2  Hazardous Effects of Lasers
The collimation of the laser light in narrow beams implies a high power density, 
expressed in the quantity irradiance E with the unit of surface power density 
[W m−2]. The time integral of irradiance is radiant exposure J, an energy surface 
density [J m−2]. The principal variable to determine the effects of laser light besides 
its wavelength is imparted energy. For pulsed lasers, radiant exposure is the relevant 
quantity because irradiance may assume misleadingly high values during the short 
pulse duration.
The relation between imparted energy and biological effects is strongly dependent 
on wavelength because different damage mechanisms are at play. The most critical 
organ for laser damage is the eye (Fig. 2.21). The eye has a physiological reaction 
to protect itself against intense light, the optical aversion reflex. It is effective for 
continuous-wave lasers of not too high irradiance. Powerful pulsed lasers may cause 
irreversible damage to the eye before the aversion reflex is even entering into action. 
The skin may also be affected when directly irradiated. The biophysical effects of 
laser radiation on the eye and skin are described in Table 2.6.
Injury thresholds of tissues after exposure to laser light were originally determined 
in animal experiments. Laboratory animals were exposed to laser beams with 
specific wavelength, duration, spot size and radiant exposure. After irradiation, 
damage to the critical parts of the eye (cornea, lens, or retina) was evaluated in an 
ophthalmological exam. The threshold value for damage is defined as the dose 
Fig. 2.21 Penetration of different wavelengths through the eye. (With permission, from [35])
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(radiant exposure) with a 50% probability for minimal injury. The animal data are 
supported by clinical data from human exposure, either of volunteers, accidental 
cases, or clinical patients. Today, lasers have many applications in medicine [43] 
and clinical data are available from ophthalmology and surgery. They are supported 
by biophysical models for the complex laser-tissue interactions [42]. Such models 
can be used to extrapolate injury thresholds to exposure conditions which are not 
experimentally investigated.
Other safety hazards of lasers are:
• Fire hazard from powerful lasers, as their light output can ignite flammable 
material;
• Chemical hazards from toxic and flammable dyes and solvents employed in the 
operation of tuneable lasers with adjustable wavelength;
• Electrical hazards from power sources and control systems of lasers.
2.5.3  Protection Against Laser Exposure
2.5.3.1  Maximum Permissible Exposure Limits
In the previous section, injury thresholds for laser exposure were introduced, they 
are determined from animal experiments, clinical data, and modelling. For opera-
tional protection against laser exposure, Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) 
limits are derived by applying reduction factors (typically a factor of 10) to the 
injury thresholds. Depending on the application for pulsed or continuous-wave 
Table 2.6 Biophysical effects associated with exposure to laser light beyond the injury thresholds, 
adapted from [39]
Optical wavelength 

























Cataract, retinal burn Skin burn
IR-B (1.4μm–3.0μm) Aqueous flare, cataract, 
corneal burn
IR-C (3.0μm–1 mm) Corneal burn
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lasers, MPE are expressed either in the quantity irradiance E (W m−2) or radiant 
exposure J (J m−2), and they are tabulated as a function of wavelength, exposure 
duration and spot size in the reference publication of ICNIRP (International 
Commission for Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection) [38]. Figure  2.22 shows a 
graphic rendition of the MPE expressed in radiant exposure for different wave-
lengths and pulse times [45]. The plot shows MPE values varying over several 
orders of magnitude in short wavelength intervals, reflecting the complex interplay 
between the laser, and the tissues’ physical and physiological reactions.
In a practical situation, a laser specialist must determine the possible exposure 
scenarios, determine irradiance or radiant exposure for each scenario by measure-
ment or calculation and compare these values with the applicable MPE. This pro-
cess is complicated but must nevertheless be applied in laser applications in research 
and development as for example in Fig. 2.20.
2.5.3.2  Laser Classification
For the application of the MPE limits stated by ICNIRP in standard situations, a 
different approach is chosen. Since one cannot expect that every Laser owner has 
the expertise to determine exposure values and compare them with the relevant 
MPE, one classifies Lasers based on their emission capabilities. Classes range from 
1 for the least dangerous to 4 for the most dangerous Lasers. Classes may be 
Fig. 2.22 Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) limits expressed as radiant exposure [J cm−2] 
versus wavelength for various exposure times (pulse durations). (From [45])
2.5 Lasers at Accelerators
44
subdivided to consider special situations. For each class, the maximal potential 
exposure risk is determined by measurement and calculation, and the Accessible 
Emission Limit (AEL) is determined for a few conservative exposure scenarios of 
the eye or the skin. The corresponding protective measures are applied to all lasers 
belonging to the same class. The classification of a laser is the duty of the manufac-
turer, who may refer to testing laboratories with the necessary expertise. 
Classification tests are designed to be rather “worst-case” and restrictive in order to 
ensure that a “low- class” (e.g. Class 1) laser does not present a hazard to the eye or 
skin even in reasonably foreseeable worst-case situations. The International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) publishes the series of standards “Safety of 
Laser Products “, IEC 60825. The first part of the series [39] introduces the said 
classification (Table 2.7) and specifies the emission limits for each class, as a func-
tion of wavelength and pulse duration. Once classified, a label is affixed visibly on 
the laser to indicate the class that it belongs to. (Fig. 2.23).
Table 2.7 Laser Safety Classification, adapted from [39] and [40]. Class 1C, for medical and 
cosmetic applications, has been omitted
Class Criterion Potential Health Effect Mitigation
1 Laser products that are 
safe during use, 
including long-term 
direct intrabeam 
viewing, even when 
exposure occurs while 
using telescopic optics.
Safe under reasonably 
foreseeable conditions
No measures required 
(“eye-safe”)
Class 1 also includes 
high power lasers that 
are fully enclosed so 
that no potentially 
hazardous radiation is 
accessible during use 
(embedded laser 
product).
Intrabeam viewing of Class 1 
laser products which emit 
visible radiant energy may still 
produce dazzling visual 
effects, particularly in low 
ambient light.
Follow manufacturer 
instruction for safe use
1 M Laser products that are 
safe, including 
long-term direct 
intrabeam viewing for 
the naked eye. The 
MPE can be exceeded 
following exposure 
with telescopic optics 
such as binoculars for a 
collimated beam.
Safe for naked eye, may be 
hazardous if the user employs 
optics.
Laser is localised or enclosed
The wavelength region 
for Class 1M lasers is 
restricted to the spectral 
region between 
302,5 nm and 4000 nm.
Intrabeam viewing of Class 
1M laser products which emit 
visible radiant energy may still 
produce dazzling visual 
effects, particularly in low 
ambient light.
User safety training 
recommended.
Prevent use of magnifying, 
focusing or collimating optics.
(continued)
2 Risks and Hazards of Particle Accelerator Technologies
Table 2.7 (continued)
Class Criterion Potential Health Effect Mitigation
2 Laser products that emit 
visible radiation in the 
wavelength range from 
400 nm to 700 nm that 
are safe for momentary 
exposures but can be 
hazardous for deliberate 
staring into the beam.
Safe for short exposures; eye 
protection is afforded by 
aversion response.
Follow manufacturer 
instruction for safe use.
Dazzle, flash-blindness, and 
afterimages may be caused by 
a beam from a Class 2 laser 
product, particularly under low 
ambient light conditions. This 
may have indirect general 
safety implications resulting 
from temporary disturbance of 
vision or from startle reactions.
Do not to stare into the beam.
2 M Laser products that emit 
visible laser beams and 
are safe for short time 
exposure only for the 
naked (unaided) eye. 
The MPE can be 
exceeded following 
exposure with 
telescopic optics such 
as binoculars for a 
collimated beam
Safe for naked eye for short 
exposures, may be hazardous 
if the user employs optics.
Laser is localised or enclosed.
User training recommended
Dazzle, flash-blindness, and 
afterimages may be caused by 
a beam from a Class 2M laser 
product.
Do not to stare into the beam.
Prevent use of magnifying, 
focusing or collimating optics.
3R Laser products that emit 
radiation that can 
exceed the MPE under 
direct intrabeam 
viewing.
Risk of injury is relatively low 
but may be dangerous for 




Subject to the findings of the 
risk assessment, personal 
protective equipment may be 
necessary
The risk of injury in most 
cases is relatively low. The risk 
of injury increases with 
exposure duration.
Prevent direct eye exposure.
3B Laser products that are 
normally hazardous 




Direct viewing is hazardous. Laser is enclosed and interlock 
protected.
Eye injury during intrabeam 
exposure
Key control for access to laser.
Personal protective equipment 
required.
Viewing diffuse 
reflections is normally 
safe.
Lasers which approach the 
AEL for Class 3B may 
produce minor skin injuries or 
even pose a risk of igniting 
flammable materials.
Prevent eye and skin exposure 
to the beam. Guard against 
unintentional reflections
Appoint competent person as 
Laser Safety Officer (LSO)
4 Laser products for 
which intrabeam 
viewing and skin 
exposure is hazardous 
and for which the 
viewing of diffuse 
reflections may be 
hazardous.
Eye and skin injury during 
intrabeam exposure and 
viewing of diffuse reflections.
Laser is enclosed and interlock 
protected.
Key control for access to laser.
Fire hazard Personal protective equipment 
required.
Prevent eye and skin exposure 
from direct and diffuse 
reflection of the beam.
Appoint LSO
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2.5.3.3  Practical Laser Safety
Following the Hierarchy of Controls (Sect. 5.1.5), the most effective prevention 
measure against accidents with lasers is isolation so that access to the light path is 
impossible during operation. Class 1 also includes lasers with higher irradiance or 
radiant exposure than the AEL, but with a fully encapsulated light path and built in 
a way that they can only operate if the protection is intact.
If the light path of a laser from a class higher than 2 M cannot be fully enclosed, 
it must be installed in a laser room in which the entrance door is interlocked with the 
power source of the laser or an optical shutter, so that the laser beam stops once the 
door is opened. For classes 3B and 4, a key control for the laser room or for laser 
operation must be installed, permitting access to and operation of the laser only by 
trained personnel.
In laser set-ups where the direct beam runs in the open for purposes of adjustment, 
personal protective equipment (PPE) is the last resort. Hands and forearms can be 
protected from UV radiation by leather gloves and long sleeves, and the eyesight 
with goggles, attenuating the characteristic wavelength of the laser.
Fig. 2.23 Warning labels to be affixed on lasers, according to class. The hazard mitigation 
measures are expressed in unmistakable symbols. (From [39]. (Copyright © 2014 IEC Geneva, 
Switzerland. www.iec.ch)
2 Risks and Hazards of Particle Accelerator Technologies
47
2.6  Beam-Intercepting Devices
As the name of this section indicates, it treats devices which interact directly with 
the particle beam by being placed in its path. Beam intercepting devices must be 
able to handle the energy transmitted to them, mostly in form of heat and ionising 
radiation. The principal occupational hazard of these devices is activation by inter-
action with particles (Sect. 3.1) and the resulting exposure of personnel to ionising 
radiation (Sect. 3.5.2), occurring during periods of maintenance and repair.
2.6.1  Collimators
In simple accelerator theory, an accelerated particle orbits in an accelerator or 
storage ring with no other interactions than with the electromagnetic guiding and 
accelerating fields. In reality, dissipative forces from collisions with rest-gas atoms 
and interactions  with other particles make the particles deviate from their ideal 
orbit. Other sources of orbit errors are the pulsed electromagnetic fields in kickers 
and septa used to steer the beam from one accelerator into another one. Particles 
which do not experience the full strength of the “kick” deviate from the ideal orbit. 
The result of these dissipative and deviating interactions is a growth of the beam-
size and an increased probability that beam particles collide with the accelerator 
components. These collisions are the source of the following adverse effects:
• In accelerators with normal conducting magnets the collisions lead to secondary 
particle cascades with numerous nuclear interactions and lead to activation of the 
accelerator components (Sect. 3.3.2).
• In accelerators with superconducting magnets the collisions of charged particles 
with the magnets lead to energy deposition outside the thermodynamic stability 
of the superconductor and lead to a quench (Sect. 2.2.2). The operational stabil-
ity and availability of the accelerator make the avoidance of such beam loss 
mandatory.
The answer to these two points is to concentrate beam loss in a few locations of 
the accelerator, where it does not damage equipment or quench magnets, and where 
secondary particle cascade and the resulting activated material can be shielded [48]. 
Collimators, consisting of massive absorber blocks, present artificial restrictions in 
the accelerator beam line to absorb particles steering off the ideal orbit. Very high 
energy particles are scattered in a large solid angle by the collimator material, thus 
diluting their damaging effects.
• Radioactivity after use. The dose rate levels around a collimator in a storage ring 
are in general so high – a few mSv/h in working distance – that the equipment 
cannot be maintained shortly after the stop of the accelerator beam.
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• Radioactive contamination. A collimator operates under high or ultrahigh 
vacuum conditions. During collimator maintenance the vacuum tank is opened 
and workers may be exposed to dust and debris from collimator materials which 
have become brittle by constant particle beam impact. Cooling water or hydraulic 
fluids in a collimator may be slightly activated, although by experience, this is 
rarely of concern.
• In a rigorous interpretation of the legislation, the actuators or motors make the 
collimator a “machine” which falls under the corresponding directives (see 
4.2.1). However, equipment for the use in fundamental research may be exempted 
from the prescriptions of the directive and the local prescriptions should be clari-
fied with the licensing authorities (Fig. 2.24).
One strategy to mitigate high personal radiation dose from activated collimators 
is to keep a damaged collimator in an intermediate storage and wait until the dose 
rate is acceptable before attempting a repair. The acceptable level depends on the 
planned duration of the work (Sect. 3.5). Alternatively, one may decide beforehand 
that collimators are expendable and not even try to repair them. The design of a col-
limator contributes also to the optimization of radiation protection: a plug-and- play 
assembly allowing rapid exchange of components saves time and dose.
Fig. 2.24 Collimator for extracted beamlines from the SPS at CERN. While not the latest design, 
this photo shows the metal collimator blocks which, in this model, can be moved to restrict the 
beam in two directions simultaneously. (Copyright CERN, reused with permission)
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2.6.2  Targets
One can distinguish between different types of targets at an accelerator: production 
targets, experimental targets, and stripping foils. They have in common that they are 
placed in the path of an accelerated particle beam to provoke beam-matter collisions.
2.6.2.1  Production Targets
Production targets serve to produce unstable particles in collisions with the primary 
beam. Examples are spallation targets from heavy metals to produce neutrons, or 
light metal targets to produce antiprotons. Production targets are usually massive 
objects to optimise the yield of the desired particles.
The yield of a production target is proportional to the number of reactions within 
the target, which is in turn the product of the beam intensity, the length of the primary 
particle’s path within the target and the production cross section of interest. Besides 
the reaction of interest, the primary charged particle will have numerous other inter-
actions within the target material, mediated by the electro-magnetic and the strong 
fundamental interactions. These processes are described with more detail in section 
3.2. As a bottom line, most of the energy deposited during the passage of charged 
particles through matter serves to heat the target material [47], ionisation and energy 
leaving the target in form of radiation and new particles are often negligible. In spall-
ation sources [5, 8], the neutron production targets cope with several MW of absorbed 
beam power. An aggravating factor is the pulsed time structure of the beam which 
leads to even higher instantaneous values of power during the beam impact. This 
places stringent requirements on the mechanical and thermal resistance of the targets.
2.6.2.2  Experimental Targets
Experimental targets are placed in the path of a particle beam, the properties of the 
reaction products of collisions (particle type, momentum, spin) are observed with 
detectors and provide insight to fundamental interaction mechanisms. As a rule, 
experimental targets are thin to let the reaction products escape without alteration of 
their properties in secondary collisions.
Experimental targets may consist of radioactive material: to produce superheavy 
isotopes one bombards targets enriched in unstable transuranium isotopes with 
beams of the heaviest possible stable or long-lived elements, lead, gold, or the 
Uranium-isotope 238U. The use of these radioactive targets is subject to authorisa-
tion procedures in national regulations. Their handling requires the application of 
strict administrative procedures. Most of the transuranium isotopes employed in 
production targets for superheavy isotopes are alpha emitters with a high radiotoxic-
ity. They must be handled with utmost care to prevent internal exposure of personnel.
A special type of experimental target is the instrumented beam dump. It is a thick 
target, surrounded and followed by detectors to investigate the debris from colli-
sions in the search of long-lived exotic particles.
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2.6.2.3  Stripping Foils
Stripping foils are very thin foils (in the range of micrometres) placed in the path of 
a negatively charged beam to remove orbital electrons. They are used to strip heavy 
ions from all electrons, or to remove two electrons from the H- ion in an efficient 
injection process in a synchrotron.
2.6.3  Beam Dumps
Particle beams carry high energy and can damage accelerator equipment by different 
interaction mechanisms (Sect. 3.2). This energy must be deposited safely once the 
beam has interacted in an experiment or has become too diluted to provide 
meaningful collision rates with the opposing beam in a collider. The beam is directed 
onto a massive absorber where most of its energy is absorbed or dissipated. The 
high beam energy poses challenges to cooling and mechanical stability of the dumps.
One distinguishes between external and internal beam dumps. External beam 
dumps are constructed at the end of a transfer beam line. When the signal for dump-
ing the beam is given, kicker magnets deflect it out of its normal orbit into the trans-
fer beam line. The extraction kicker and transfer beam line are optimised for the 
transport of particles within a narrow energy band. The LHC is equipped with two 
external dumps and transfer lines optimised for the terminal energy of LHC, 7 TeV.
If particles with many different energies must be absorbed in a synchrotron (for 
example, particles shortly after injection and at different terminal energies), an 
internal dump is the best choice. Internal dumps resemble collimators [46]. Particles 
can pass through an internal dump by a large beam space without interacting or even 
being deviated from their orbit (Fig.  2.25). Upstream of the dump, a kicker is 
mounted which can deflect the particles into the absorber block, where part of their 
Fig. 2.25 Internal beam-dump of the SPS at CERN. Left: Assembly of the dump core. In the 
copper cylinder (for mechanical stability and cooling) one distinguishes the absorber block on the 
bottom and the free space for the particle beam above it. Right: assembly of the dump’s radiation 
shielding in a surface building for test purposes. (Copyright CERN, reused with permission)
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energy is absorbed, and part dispersed as a secondary particle cascade. The combi-
nation of a kicker followed shortly by an internal dump has a large acceptance for 
particle energies. An internal dump is mounted in the SPS synchrotron at CERN, 
where protons are accelerated from 20 GeV to 450 GeV. The internal dump allows 
beam aborts at any energy.
The hazards of beam dumps are similar to those of collimators. Due to the high 
number of absorbed particles, the radioactivity of a dump is so high that personnel 
can only work for a limited time in their vicinity. Internal dumps are surrounded by 
massive radiation shielding to protect personnel who must pass the dump location or 
work in its vicinity, external dumps are located in blind tunnels where no other access 
is required. Because the repair of a dump is possible only after storage for radioactive 
decay for a few years, one must have spares in store to replace the failed dump.
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Chapter 3
Beam Hazards and Ionising Radiation
Abstract This chapter treats hazards originating from particle beams. The interac-
tion of charged particle beams with matter is described. Beam loss can cause mate-
rial damage in structural and electronic components. Ionising radiation is introduced 
by a description of the different types of radiation. Then, the sources of ionising 
radiation at accelerators are defined: beam loss is the origin of prompt ionising 
radiation. Material activated by the passage of particle cascades is a long-lived 
source of ionising radiation. The chapter is closed with a description of radiation 
dosimetry and radiation protection at accelerators.
3.1  Beam Loss in Particle Accelerators
Ideally, a particle accelerator works with 100% efficiency, transporting all charged 
particles from a source to a target while giving them the required total energy. In 
reality, collisions between beam particles and matter are mostly unwanted, but 
unavoidable. With increasing energy and intensity of the particle beams delivered, 
the effects of particle losses (“beam loss”) are becoming more pronounced. As an 
example, the CERN Proton Synchrotron (PS) accelerated in the early 1960s proton 
beams with an intensity of 1012 particles per pulse. In the years around 2000, the 
beam loss at the extraction septum towards the Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) 
exceeded this value by a factor of 2–3 [1].
Sources of unwanted beam-matter interactions, leading as a result to deviations 
from the ideal orbit, are [9]:
• Imperfect beam line vacuum making beam particles collide with rest gas mole-
cules. This interaction deviates the beam particle from its longitudinal course and 
may break-up the rest gas particle.
• Electromagnetic fields induced by high-intensity beams increase the transverse 
momentum of beam particles, and lead to their eventual loss by collision with the 
beam tube.
• Beam steering elements, such as kickers and septa. Some particles inevitably 
impinge on the blade, a thin foil in a septum defining the electric field which 
brings the particles on a new course. Another loss mechanism is misfiring of a 
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kicker’s electromagnetic circuits, the “kicked” particles will go astray and col-
lide with the beam line at positions which can be predicted from beam dynamics.
• Close encounters of colliding beams in the centre of a physics detector, inducing 
transversal momentum, leading to small deviations from the “perfect” particle 
orbit. In circular colliders, these minute deviations may lead to the loss of the 
particles many turns after the interaction.
In Sect. 2.6, controlled interactions with the beam were introduced:
• Collimators, skimming particles with transversal excursions at predefined 
locations.
• Beam-dumps, absorbing the particle beam after the target or after it has become 
too diluted to be useful for further exploitation in a collider.
• Finally, fixed targets in physics detectors for extracted beams are obviously 
sources of beam-matter interactions.
The first two beam loss mechanisms are distributed over the whole length of the 
accelerator while all others are localised.
A rare hazard is the direct exposure of personnel to the particle beam. In modern 
accelerator facilities the risk of this happening is reduced to near zero by accelerator 
safety systems and access control systems, described in Sect. 5.3. These systems 
make it near-impossible for a person to enter the accelerator area when particle 
beams are produced.
3.2  Beam-Matter Interaction
Particles lost from the beam collide with material from the accelerator. Given suf-
ficient energy, they traverse the beam line vacuum tube, the magnets and other 
equipment. Their path ends in the shielding walls or in the ground or air surrounding 
the accelerator. This section describes the passage of particles through matter. The 
multiple interactions between beam and matter generate the radiation fields at an 
accelerator during operation. They are also responsible for activation of the mate-
rial. Here, a qualitative overview of this complex subject is given, without going in 
the physical details and their mathematical description. For more detailed descrip-
tions, one can refer to [3, 6, 7].
3.2.1  Electrons and Positrons
The following interaction mechanisms contribute to the energy loss of electrons and 
positrons in matter, and to the emission of ionising radiation.
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• Ionisation. An inelastic collision of the incoming electron with a bound electron 
mobilises the latter as a so-called δ-electron. The δ-electrons can in turn ionise 
further atoms on their path.
• Bremsstrahlung. The electron emits X-ray photons during  deceleration or 
deviation.
• Pair production (PP). A photon with an energy E > 2 m0c2 = 1.022 MeV can 
convert to an electron-positron pair in the electric field of an atom.
• Positrons at rest annihilate with an electron into two or three photons.
Low-energy electrons interact predominantly by ionisation. At the critical energy 
Ec, the probability for ionization and Bremsstrahlung are equal, at higher energy, 
Bremsstrahlung prevails. The value of critical energy is approximately
Ec(MeV)  = 
800
1 2Z + . , where Z is the atomic number of the target material [10].
Radiation length Xo is the depth in matter in which Bremsstrahlung has reduced the 
energy of a high-energy electron (E >> Ec) to 1/e of the original value. The energy 
dependence of the different interaction mechanisms is illustrated for lead in Fig. 3.1.
In thick absorbers, electrons or photons with an energy well above the critical 
energy Ec initiate an electromagnetic (EM) shower or cascade. In an EM cascade, 
the interaction mechanisms of compton scattering, pair production and 
bremsstrahlung alternate and lead to several generations of electrons, electron  – 
positron pairs and high-energy photons. The kinetic energy of the particles decreases 
Fig. 3.1 Fractional energy loss per radiation length in lead for each of the interaction mechanisms 
as a function of electron or positron energy. The critical energy Ec is situated where the curves for 
Ionization and for Bremsstrahlung cross. (From [8])
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in each generation. The cascade stops propagating once the average energy of the 
electrons has fallen below the critical energy Ec. From this moment on, the probabil-
ity that the electrons ionise atoms is higher than that of Bremsstrahlung emission. 
The cascade loses one of its driving particles because the electrons now dissipate 
their energy preferably by ionisation and come quickly to rest. A schematic illustra-
tion of an EM cascade is given in Fig. 3.2.
3.2.2  Protons and Charged Heavy Particles
Protons and charged ions traversing matter are subject to the following interaction 
mechanisms:
• Electromagnetic interaction with target electrons. Charged particles interact 
with the atomic electrons and nuclei of the target material. Electronic energy loss 
is the most probable mechanism, because of the mass difference between the 
projectiles only small amounts of energy in the range of eV can be transferred. 
This energy leads to excitation of the target atoms and electrons in rotational and 
vibrational states and finally to heating of the material. Target atoms may also be 
ionised by the ejection of a δ-electron.
• Electromagnetic interaction with target nuclei. These interactions are less fre-
quent than with electrons, but more energy is transmitted. The results of these 
collisions are a change of direction of the projectile and possibly a displacement 
of the target atom.
Fig. 3.2 Schematic development of an electromagnetic cascade from a high-energy electron 
(E> > Ec). Electron tracks are blue, positrons red and photons green. Interactions: B Bremsstrahlung 
emission, P pair production, C Compton scattering. (Image by the author, after [10])
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• Nuclear interactions with target nuclei. Once a positively charged projectile 
overcomes the Coulomb-barrier of the nucleus, (typically with a kinetic energy 
of a few MeV) it can penetrate the nucleus and trigger nuclear interactions lead-
ing to a rearrangement of its constituents. Excess energy is carried away by pro-
tons, neutrons, or small nuclear fragments (nuclei of 2H, 3H, 3He, 4He, …) leaving 
the nucleus. This is called the spallation process. The kinetic energy of the spall-
ation nuclei and fragments depends on the kinetic energy of the projectile and the 
released binding energy of the nucleus. Energetic spallation nuclides trigger 
 further electromagnetic and nuclear reactions and a hadronic cascade may be 
the result.
• Hadronic interactions in target nuclei. When the energy of the projectile is high 
enough, new particles can be generated in nuclei. Pions are produced at energies 
from 290 MeV on, other, heavier hadrons require correspondingly more energy. 
The generated particles are unstable, and they decay into stable particles. Charged 
pions decay to muons and neutrinos and neutral pions to photons. Together with 
the spallation nuclei and fragments, all these particles form part of the hadronic 
cascade.
3.2.3  Neutrons
Neutrons are produced at accelerators in two processes:
• Nuclear and hadronic interactions of charged particles. As seen above, neutrons 
are emitted in the spallation process and from hadronic interactions in tar-
get nuclei.
• Photonuclear reactions. As the name suggests, photons can trigger nuclear reac-
tions, which often result in the emission of a photoneutron. The effect is enhanced 
for heavy target materials with high atomic number Z. In hadronic cascades, and 
thus in proton or ion accelerators, their rate is negligible against neutron produc-
tion in the hadronic cascade. In electron accelerators with primary energy above 
15  MeV, the production of photoneutrons cannot be neglected. This includes 
electron linacs for radiotherapy, where heavy metal beam collimators are a 
source of photoneutrons. They must be considered in the shielding design of 
such accelerators and they contribute to the unwanted dose in the patient, which 
is not directed to the tumour.
Free neutrons have a lifetime of about 15 min, they are neutral and can traverse 
thick shielding walls, and they have a spectrum of effects which spans many orders 
of magnitude in neutron energy. While charged particles and photons are efficiently 
attenuated by heavy materials, neutrons are dominating radiation dose and effects 
outside of particle accelerator shielding (Fig. 3.3).
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Fig. 3.3 Components of a secondary particle cascade developing in concrete. The primary parti-
cles are electrons of 1 GeV, triggering an EM cascade (left column) or protons of 1 GeV, triggering 
a hadronic cascade (right column). The plot shows the fluence of secondary particles released by 
109 primary particles hitting the wall from the left. Note that the fluence of secondary particles in a 
hadronic cascade is several orders of magnitude higher than in an EM cascade. (Image by the author)
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3.2.4  Radiation Damage
Radiation damage summarises several effects which are changing the properties of 
material struck and traversed by radiation or particle beams [2, 5]:
• Electromagnetic interactions of projectiles with the target nucleus can lead to 
atomic displacement. In solid materials atomic displacements lead to crystal 
defects. A high density of displacements may lead to embrittlement, altering the 
mechanical resistance of the material. This is of primary concern in high- intensity 
production targets (Sect. 2.6.2).
• Nuclear interactions with target nuclei lead to its nuclear transmutation. The 
electronic structure of the produced atom does no longer match the crystal lattice 
and represents another type of lattice defect.
• Heating occurs in target materials struck by a particle beam, because the kinetic 
energy deposited by interactions of the projectile with the target electrons cannot 
be removed immediately. In extreme cases, local melting may occur, leading 
eventually to the destruction of the equipment struck by the beam.
These effects are noticeable at places in the particle accelerator where beam loss 
is prominent: in beam dumps, targets and collimators (Sect. 2.6). Other equipment 
are the electromagnetic septa used to change the direction of particle beams. These 
components must be built robust enough to withstand the effects of particle impact. 
Sometimes, they are built to survive a certain amount of beam before they are pre-
ventively exchanged.
Electronic components suffer from three effects mediated by particle beams and 
hadronic or EM cascades [11]:
• Single event effects have their origin in the deposition of a minute amount of 
charge in an integrated circuit (IC). The charge may flip a logical gate in the IC 
and provoke an unexpected behaviour. This is a stochastic effect and its probabil-
ity is proportional to the fluence of secondary particles. Single-event effects are 
prominent in highly integrated microelectronics, where very small amounts of 
charge are sufficient to provoke a change.
• Total Ionisation dose is the continuous accumulation of absorbed dose in semi-
conductor materials. Ionisation leads to the creation of electron-hole pairs. In 
conducting materials, they rapidly recombine, but in the insulating oxides of a 
semiconductor, holes may persist and, at higher density, permanently change the 
electronic characteristics of the material.
• Displacement damage in silicon, mainly provoked by neutrons. Displaced sili-
con atoms leave gaps in the crystal lattice, changing its electronic properties.
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3.2.5  Activation of Matter
Energetic protons cause spallation reactions, having as products nucleons, light 
nuclear fragments, and a remaining rest nucleus, unstable most of the time. Electron 
beams can activate matter by photonuclear reactions. The previously non- radioactive 
material has become radioactive by the exposure to the particle beam.
Estimates for activation are difficult to make, they depend on the energy of the 
projectile, and the composition of the target material. Rules-of- thumb and approxi-
mate formulas are given for electron accelerators by [10] and for proton- accelera-
tors by [34] and [33]. Activity estimates with higher precision are possible with 
Monte-Carlo radiation transport programs coupled to a nuclear model. Their activa-
tion estimates compare with experiment within a factor of two for “good cases” [4] 
and may be off by an order of magnitude for other nuclei. The prediction of dose 
rates from activated material by this method is often acceptable because of cancel-
lation effects between nuclei with over- and under-estimated activity.
A frequently repeated rule-of-thumb states that “hands-on” maintenance at a par-
ticle accelerator is possible, if the power of beam loss (the product of particle energy 
and current of lost particles) does not exceed the value of 1 W per metre. This “rule” 
for which the original source could not be identified, must be applied with care. It 
originates in the 1960s or 1970s and experience shows that the resulting activation 
and dose equivalent rate of the material is frequently too high according to modern 
standards.
3.3  Ionising Radiation
The term “ionising radiation” assembles several physical phenomena that have in 
common that they can ionise matter. The warning signs against ionising radiation 
contain a stylised image of a radioactive source (Fig. 3.4).
Fig. 3.4 Warning sign against 
ionizing radiation and marking  
of radioactive material transport, 
after [13], [29]. (Image source: 
https://publicdomainvectors.org)
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3.3.1  Types of Ionising Radiation
Two main families of ionising radiation can be distinguished: directly ionising radi-
ation, mediated by charged particles, and indirectly ionising radiation, by neutral 
particles and photons.
3.3.1.1  Directly Ionising Radiation
Directly ionising radiation consists of charged particles. They collide with atoms 
and ionise them by the electromagnetic interaction. One characteristic of directly 
ionising radiation is that they have a definitive range in matter. Directly ionising 
radiation may consist of
• alpha (α) radiation, helium nuclei emitted by heavy radioactive nuclei,
• beta (β) radiation is a manifestation of the weak interaction in unstable nuclei, 
which de-excite under emission of an energetic electron or positron.
• In particle accelerators, other directly ionising particles are produced in colli-
sions between particles and matter, for example muons, pions and protons.
3.3.1.2  Indirectly Ionising Radiation
Indirectly ionising radiation does not interact directly with the atomic electrons. In 
an intermediate step a charged particle is generated (often a secondary electron) 
which in turn ionises matter. Due to this interaction mechanism, indirectly ionising 
radiation is exponentially attenuated in matter and has no finite range. One distin-
guishes between two fundamental families:
• X- and gamma (γ) rays are energetic photons, quanta of the electromagnetic 
radiation with energy E > 1 keV. Photons interact with atoms by the photoelectric 
effect and the Compton effect, releasing a secondary electron. This secondary 
particle imparts its energy by electron-atom collisions to matter. Photons with 
very high energy (E > 6 MeV) can interact with the atomic nucleus (photonuclear 
effect). The excited nucleus will de-excite by emitting either other photons or 
particles or, for heavy elements, undergo a fission reaction (photofission).
• Neutrons (n) are neutral, nuclear particles emitted by some heavy nuclei, or 
released in particle – matter interactions. Neutrons interact with atomic nuclei, 
either scattering elastically (preservation of total kinetic energy, i.e. the internal 
state of the target nucleus remains unaffected) or inelastically (nuclear reactions 
take place in the target nucleus). Charged secondary particles are emitted by the 
excited target nucleus, and a recoil nucleus remains, moving with an energy 
determined by the reaction kinetics. Recoil protons can take a large fraction of 
the neutron’s energy, because they have nearly the same mass. Certain nuclides 
absorb thermal neutrons having energies below 0.025  eV.  They become acti-




3.3.2  Sources of Ionising Radiation at Accelerators
Due to the high concentration of energy available in accelerated particles, a large 
variety of ionising radiation types with wide energy distributions can occur at accel-
erators. This distinguishes accelerators from facilities in the nuclear power genera-
tion cycle, from non-destructive testing and from (most) medical applications.
Two phases can be distinguished with respect to ionising radiation in a particle 
accelerator:
• During accelerator operation, beam loss, beam-target and beam-beam collisions 
lead to radiation spectra with an exceptionally wide range of particles and ener-
gies, elsewhere encountered only in cosmic radiation. Ionising radiation pro-
duced in particle-matter interactions during accelerator operation is also named 
prompt radiation.
• During maintenance phases, personnel may be exposed to activated material and, 
exceptionally, to radioactive contamination.
3.3.2.1  Prompt Radiation
At electron accelerators, prompt radiation originates from the electromagnetic cas-
cade, consisting of electrons, positrons, and photons. If the energy of the primary 
electron is below E < 10 MeV, then only these particles contribute to the radiation 
field. This is the case in medical linacs in diagnostics and therapy in a low-energy 
setting. Once the threshold of approximately 10 MeV is passed, Bremsstrahlung 
photons can trigger reactions in nuclei in the so-called photonuclear effect, with 
production of neutrons. At higher energies, hadrons accompany the EM cascade.
In proton accelerators, the prompt radiation field is described by hadronic cas-
cade, with protons, neutrons, photons, electrons, and positrons as the prevalent 
components of the radiation field.
An important characteristic of prompt radiation is, that it ceases with the stop of 
the accelerator. In a properly built accelerator facility, the prompt radiation is cor-
rectly shielded by constructing the accelerator underground, or by protecting it with 
shielding walls made from iron and concrete. It represents in general no risk for 
workers or the population.
3.3.2.2  Radiation from Activated Material
Ionising radiation emitted from activated material is characteristic for the radionu-
clides generated, it consists mainly of photons and electrons, with kinetic energies 
below a few MeV. Different from prompt radiation at accelerators, it does not cease 
with the stop of the accelerator. Since prompt radiation from an operating particle 
accelerator is well shielded, exposure to ionising radiation emitted by activated 
material constitutes the largest contribution to personal dose at an accelerator.
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Radiation dosimetry and radiation protection against the exposition to activated 
material use the same detectors, dosimeters, and procedures as the well-developed 
field of radiation protection in nuclear or medical facilities.
A particular type of activated material are radiopharmaceuticals, which are pro-
duced in small accelerators from stable isotopes by proton bombardment. The pro-
duced radionuclides are collected within targets or on foils and they often represent 
a radioactive contamination hazard. This describes the danger of transferring loose 
radioactive materials from surfaces to the body and of eventually ingesting or inhal-
ing them. This hazard can be prevented by application of industrial hygiene mea-
sures, as they are also employed in workplaces with chemical hazards: protective 
clothing, Respiratory protection with filters or active air supply. The relative advan-
tage of radioactive contamination over chemical hazards is, that ionising radiation 
can be detected more easy than chemical contamination.
3.4  Radiation Dosimetry at Accelerators
3.4.1  Dose and Dose Equivalent
The measurement of the detrimental effect of ionising radiation is based on a physi-
cal quantity, absorbed dose D. It is defined as the ionising energy imparted on a 









In the SI system, the quantity absorbed dose D is measured in the unit J kg−1, 
which receives the special name Gray (Gy).
One can distinguish two effects of ionising radiation on humans:
• Tissue reactions were previously called deterministic effects [15] because they 
appear once a subject has been exposed to an absorbed dose above a threshold. 
The mildest form is reddening of the skin (erythema), from approximately 
0.5 Gy applied to a limited portion of the skin. The thresholds for tissue effects 
are rather high and they play a secondary role in occupational radiation protection.
• Stochastic effects of ionising radiation: these are caused by modifications of the 
genetic material in cells, either by direct interaction with ionising radiation, or by 
changes in the cell medium impacting. The probability of developing cancer 
increases with the radiation dose received, without lower threshold for the effect. 
The effect is cumulative for chronic exposure.
After World War 2, systematic health studies of survivors of the nuclear bomb 
explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki started, complemented by the follow-up 
of patients having received radiation treatment. The epidemiological observations 
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are combined with continuously refined biophysical models of exposure to ionising 
radiation. This work culminated in the recommendations of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), with ICRP Publication 103 [14] 
the most recent in the series.
In the present discussion, tissue effects are neglected, their occurrence at accel-
erators is extremely rare. In its recommendations, ICRP defines a protection quan-
tity for stochastic effects of ionising radiation. It is based on absorbed dose D, but it 
takes into account the difference in radiation sensitivity of tissues and organs in the 
body, and the effectiveness of different radiation types to cause cancer. This leads to 
the quantity effective dose E. Effective dose E is not a purely physical quantity, but 
it includes a measure of the probability to develop cancer after being exposed to 
ionizing radiation:
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In this formula, DT,R is the absorbed dose in averaged over a tissue (organ) T by 
radiation type R. wR and wT are the radiation- and tissue weighting factors, respec-
tively. Effective dose, by definition, is an average of dose over the whole body and 
cannot be measured directly.
The sum ∑
R
R T Rw D ,  is called equivalent dose, it accounts for the radiation effect 
on a single tissue (organ) T. The physical quantity to express equivalent dose and 
effective dose is J kg−1. To distinguish it from absorbed dose, it receives the special 
name Sievert (Sv).
The paradigm of radiation protection is, that the probability of radiation detri-
ment to a subject is proportional to the amount of effective dose E received, without 
a lower threshold. Radiation detriment includes the probability of developing can-
cer and the ensuing loss of years of life and quality of life. Effective dose limits, 
limiting the probability of the occurrence of stochastic effects, are determined by 
comparison with the risk of incapacitating or fatal accidents in other industries. An 
acceptable level of risk is determined and expressed in effective dose E, which is 
periodically reviewed by the ICRP. Limits are also set to prevent tissue reactions, 
with a large safety margin below the threshold dose for reactions (Table 3.1).
To provide measurable quantities, the International Commission on Radiological 
Units and Measurements (ICRU) has defined so-called operational quantities, 
approximating effective dose. They receive the generic name dose equivalent with 
symbol H and, like effective dose, are quantified in the SI system with the unit J kg−1 
with the special name Sievert (Sv). The ICRU introduced several operational quan-
tities with specific definitions to cover different exposure situations, for example of 
the eye lens or the skin. The most commonly used operational quantities are those 
for the exposure of the full body with Hp(10) (spelled “H-p-10”) for the calibration 
of personal dosimeters and H*(10) (“H-star-10”) for survey instruments.
In contrast to effective dose E, dose equivalent quantities are defined in such a 
way that they can be realized in standard laboratories and measured with calibrated 
instruments, within uncertainties.
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3.4.2  Practical Radiation Dosimetry at Accelerators
The radiation fields around a working particle accelerator are consisting of different 
types of ionising radiation, extending over broad ranges of energies. This makes 
dose equivalent measurements at accelerators challenging, and special instruments 
have been developed over the years to cope with the characteristics of these fields. 
In shutdown periods, when the accelerator is stopped, the origin of radiation is acti-
vated material, containing relatively long-lived radioactive nuclei (with half-lives of 
days to years), created in beam-matter interactions during the preceding operation 
periods of the accelerator. These nuclei emit gamma (photon) and beta (electron/
positron) radiation. Dose equivalent of these radiations can be measured with stan-
dard radiation protection dosimeters and survey instruments, as developed for 
dosimetry in nuclear and medical radiation facilities.
In a radiation protection program at an accelerator facility, radiation measure-
ment is essential for the following tasks
• measuring dose equivalent at workplaces to make a prospective assessment of 
working conditions, and to demonstrate the adequacy of the radiation shielding 
put in place;
• monitoring the dose equivalent to personnel, to demonstrate compliance with 
legal dose limits;
• monitoring radiation emitted to the environment, to demonstrate compliance 
with emission and immission limits (Sect. 4.6.1).
Dosimeters are used to measure dose or dose equivalent. In this section, the term 
dosimeter is used likewise for passive and active devices whose purpose is the mea-
surement of dose equivalent. Based on their area of usage, they are may be personal 
dosimeters, radiation survey instrument or radiation monitors.
One distinguishes between passive and active dosimeters.
• Passive dosimeters are based on a physical effect which is (roughly) proportional 
to dose equivalent. The magnitude of the physical effect creates a proportional 
signal once they are read-out after a defined period of exposure. They are used 
when the immediate display of a result is not essential, for example for personal 
Table 3.1 Dose limits for ionizing radiation [14]
Type of limit Occupational Public
Effective dose 20 mSv per year, averaged over a period of 5 years 1 mSv in a 
year
Annual equivalent dose in:
Lens of the eye 20 mSv per year, averaged over a period of 5 years 
[15]
15 mSv
Skin (averaged over 
1 cm2)
500 mSv 50 mSv
Hands and feet 500 mSv –
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dosimetry at workplaces with a moderate dose equivalent rate, or for long-term 
monitoring of the environment.
• Active dosimeters have a detection mechanism which can be directly converted 
to an electrical signal. Active dosimeters have the advantage to give an immedi-
ate display of the dose equivalent, but they are usually larger and more expensive 
than passive dosimeters. They are used in the form of electronic personal dosim-
eters to monitor workers at workplaces where the dose equivalent rate is so high 
that they could accumulate a significant fraction of the dose limit in a short time. 
Active dosimeters are also used for radiation surveys, and as alarm monitors 
where sudden increases of the radiation intensity are possible and Survey instru-
ments and active radiation monitors usually indicate the instantaneous dose 
equivalent rate H dH dt= .
Many detectors based on different physical principles exist for the quantification 
of ionising radiation. Only few of them can be employed as a radiation dosimeter. 
To make a good dosimeter, the energy-dependent response of the detector to a phys-
ical quantity describing the radiation field (for example, particle fluence) must be 
approximately proportional to the energy dependence of the operational quantity to 
be measured, for example H*(10). Hardly any physical radiation detector shows 
spontaneously the required proportionality of the physical effect to dose equivalent 
to be used as a radiation dosimeter. It is necessary to modify the energy response of 
the physical detector to mimic the energy dependence of the dose equivalent quan-
tity to be measured.
This section can only give a very short overview about radiation detection and 
dosimetry. [20] or [19] give a more detailed treatment of radiation detection, 
whereas [22] is still a standard reference for radiation dosimetry. [12] gives a mod-
ern account of this subject.
3.4.2.1  Photon (Gamma) Dosimeters
The largest fraction of dose equivalent to which workers are exposed in accelerator 
facilities comes from photons and is accumulated during shutdown periods when 
the accelerators are maintained. The source of the photons is material activated by 
interactions with particles during the preceding operational periods. The isotope 
content of activation products in accelerator facilities is different from those in the 
nuclear industry by type and concentration, but the same methods of detection and 
measurement can be employed. Long-lived activation products emit gamma (pho-
ton) and beta (electron or positron) radiation.
Photons are indirectly ionising particles, as a first step to detection a secondary 
electron must be created by the photoelectric effect or by Compton scattering. Most 
active photon dosimeters rely on one of two detection mechanisms: gas ionisation 
and creation of free charges in semiconductors. Passive photon dosimeters use ther-
moluminescence (TL) and optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) as detection 
principles. Photographic film has been replaced by these technologies in most 
applications.
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Gas-Filled Photon Detectors
Three different types of gas-filled detectors for photons are used in radiation protec-
tion: ionisation chambers, proportional counters, and Geiger-Müller counters. The 
commercially available types have in common a cylindrical geometry with a collec-
tion anode in the centre (in proportional counters and GM counters, an anode wire) 
(Fig. 3.5). Secondary electrons are created in the detector wall and registered in the 
filling gas by ionisation. The average energy to create an electron-ion pair in gases, 
the ionisation energy, lies between 20  eV and 40  eV, for air it is approximately 
32 eV. The charges are separated by an electrical field between the anode and the 
chamber wall, and electrons drift to the central anode. The chamber constitutes a 
cylindrical capacitor for which the radial component peaks at the anode wire.
The three types of gaseous detectors can be distinguished by applied voltage V0 
between chamber wall (cathode) and central anode:
• Ionisation chambers for radiation protection operate usually in DC mode, with a 
low-pass filter connected to the anode. The applied voltage V0 is in the leftmost 
region in Fig. 3.6, high enough to separate the created electron-ion pairs before 
they can recombine. The ionisation current comes from the electron-ion pairs 
created by the secondary electron along its path and is proportional to the energy 
deposited in the gas by the incident radiation.
• In proportional counters, the field strength E(r) close to the wire is high enough 
to ionise additional atoms by the secondary electrons. A charge avalanche with 
an amplification factor A ≈  102⋯106 will result. In a certain voltage range, 
depending on the gas type and pressure and chamber geometry, the amplification 
factor A is independent of the energy of the incoming particle, and the thus signal 
amplitude proportional to particle energy. This is the proportional regime.
• In a Geiger-Müller counter, the electrical field close to the anode wire is so high 
that the charge avalanche triggers further avalanches all along the wire and 
depletes the counting gas from neutral atoms. In this regime, the amplification 
factor is A ≈ 1010 and independent from the energy of the incoming particle.
Fig. 3.5 Schematic construction of a gas-filled detector for ionising radiation. (Adapted from 
[20]. Here, the signal is coupled out with a high-pass filter, in DC ionisation chambers, a low-pass 
filter would be employed, by changing the position of capacity and resistor to ground)
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The energy dependence of the three gaseous detector types is mainly determined 
by the probability that a photon interacts in the wall and emits secondary electrons 
into the counting gas. Ionisation chambers with walls made from tissue equivalent 
(TE) plastic and filled with TE gas give a signal proportional to absorbed dose in 
tissue, which is a good approximation of dose equivalent for photons and electrons. 
For other particles, a so-called quality factor must be applied. In instruments based 
on Geiger-Müller and proportional counters, metallic filters are placed around the 
counter chamber to influence the energy dependence of their response to photons. 
This strategy is successful in a limited energy range, usually between 50 keV and 
1.3 MeV or 3 MeV. Below this interval, the dosimeters are insensitive (low energy 
photons are absorbed ion the detector wall), above they have a strong overresponse.
Fig. 3.6 Signal height collected versus applied voltage in gas-filled radiation detectors with cen-
tral wire. (After [20])
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Proportional counters and Geiger-Müller counters are light and small, their sen-
sitivity is ideally suited to assess photon radiation from activated accelerator com-
ponents. Ionisation chambers can be used to monitor the radiation emitted by an 
accelerator in operation. For this, their factory calibration to reference photon 
sources, must be adapted to take account of the mixed radiation field.
Thermoluminescence and Optically Stimulated Luminescence
Thermoluminescence (TL) and optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) are based 
on a similar physical effect. Detectors based on this effect are at the basis of most 
modern passive photon and electron dosimeters. TL and OSL are made from crys-
talline materials with defined energy bands for electrons, for practical applications 
they are ground to powder and pressed in tablets or rods (Fig. 3.7). Ionising radia-
tion creates free charges in the crystal’s conduction band. Instead of immediately 
returning to the valence band under emission of light, some electrons are “captured” 
in so-called trap levels, situated energetically below the conduction band. The trap- 
levels are metastable states with a long lifetime, and thus capable to store informa-
tion about the radiation: the number of occupied trap levels is proportional to the 
dose absorbed in the TL or OSL crystal.
To read out the stored information, one stimulates the electrons in the trap levels 
either thermally by the application of heat (TL), or optically with a laser of a defined 
wavelength (OSL). The excitation energy moves electrons from the trap levels to the 
conduction band, from where they return rapidly to the valence band under emission 
of light. The photons emitted by the TL or OSL material are amplified by a photo-
multiplier, the integrated light intensity is proportional to the dose absorbed in the 
material.
Fig. 3.7 Thermoluminescence 
material crystal powder,  
disks and rods of different  
size, with permission from [21]
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A commonly employed TL material is LiF. Its average atomic number is tissue 
equivalent. TL detectors from LiF in which the isotope 6Li is enhanced are used as 
thermal neutron detectors in passive neutron dosimeters (Fig. 3.8).
Semiconductor Detectors
A semiconductor is a crystalline solid from Silicon (Si) or Germanium (Ge), in 
which the atoms are arranged in a regular, spatially repetitive pattern. The base 
materials are usually doped with elements in the neighbouring columns of the peri-
odic table of elements. In semiconductor crystals, the highest energy level of the 
valence band is separated from the conduction band by a gap with a width of a few 
eV. At room temperature, a few electrons occupy the conduction band and the semi-
conductor exhibits a small dark current. This can be eliminated by cooling the 
detector with liquid nitrogen to T = 77 K.
The working principle of a semiconductor detector is to release an electron from 
the valence band and transfer it to the conduction band. The energy required for this 
process, the ionisation energy is composed of the energy to create an electron-hole 
pair and the energy required to traverse the band gap. It is of the order of a few 
eV. The hole signifies an empty place in the valence band. The ionisation energy of 
a semiconductor diode is much smaller than the ionisation energy in a gas-filled 
detector and for an identical photon energy, more charges are produced in a semi-
conductor detector than in a gaseous detector. This results in a better energy resolu-
tion. The detector also has a higher atomic number (Si: Z = 14; Ge: Z = 32) and a 
higher density than gases, these two factors increase the cross section for the photo- 
and Compton effects and thus the chance to absorb a considerable part of the gamma 
photon’s energy. Such detectors from pure Germanium or, more rarely, pure Silicon 
Fig. 3.8 Different TLD 
holders to be inserted in a 
filter cassette, providing 
the correct energy 
response, with permission 
from [21]
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are used in radiation protection as spectrometers for the identification of radionu-
clides by their characteristic emissions.
For the application as a dosimeter, positively and negatively doped semiconduc-
tor layers enclose a layer of intrinsic (undoped) material to form a PIN diode. A 
voltage is applied across the PIN junction to empty the intrinsic layer from all 
charge carriers (reverse bias). When ionising radiation traverses the intrinsic layer, 
electron-hole pairs are created and separated by the bias voltage, generating a small 
charge pulse which is amplified for detection.
The small size of PIN diodes and the possibility to power the bias voltage and the 
detection circuit with small batteries have made PIN diodes the detectors of choice 
for personal electronic dosimeters, and many variants of such devices are on 
the market.
3.4.2.2  Neutron Dosimeters
Like photons, neutrons are indirectly ionising particles. Two physical processes are 
employed in neutron dosimeters for the detection of thermal neutrons and energetic 
neutrons.
Thermal Neutron Detectors and Rem-Counters
Thermal neutrons (by convention, neutrons with a kinetic energy of less than 
0.025 eV) can be captured by specific nuclei, such as 3He, 6Li, 10B, and 113Cd. After 
absorbing the thermal neutron, these nuclei become unstable and disintegrate into 
several easily detectable charged particles. Passive thermal neutron detectors are 
LiF TL detectors enriched in the isotope 6Li. A second detector of the same size, 
enriched in 7Li, can be used to estimate the photon component in the radiation field 
for background subtraction. Active detectors are proportional gas counters filled 
with either 3He or 10BF3 (a molecule containing boron, and gaseous under normal 
conditions). Neutrons with higher than thermal energies t must be slowed down in a 
moderator to be captured with good efficiency in a thermal neutron detector.
Neutron moderators are made from materials which are rich in hydrogen, mostly 
polyethylene (PE, CH2). In this material, fast neutrons are slowed down in multiple 
scattering events with protons. In a rem-counter, (from Rem–Roentgen equivalent 
man, an obsolete unit for an equally obsolete, pre-1990 dose equivalent quantity), 
the 3He or 10BF3 counter is surrounded by a composite moderator, consisting of PE 
to moderate and borated plastic to absorb surplus thermal neutrons. (Fig. 3.9). The 
moderator layers are arranged in a way to model the energy dependent response of 
the instrument as closely as possible to the fluence-to-dose rate conversion coeffi-
cient for neutrons. A rem-counter loses sensitivity for neutrons with energies of 
more than a few MeV. They are insufficiently moderated by the PE layer and have a 
small detection cross section in the thermal neutron detector. These rem-counters 
can nevertheless be used in locations where one has previously performed an in-situ 
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calibration: one determines dose equivalent from high-energy neutrons with an 
independent method and modifies the calibration coefficient of the standard rem- 
counter so that is shows the same result. This method requires that the ratio of low- 
to high-energy neutrons in the radiation field remains approximately independent of 
the details of accelerator operation, which must be verified independently. As a rule 
of thumb, a standard rem-counter shows approximately half of the correct dose 
equivalent when used to verify the shielding of high-energy accelerators.
An independent measurement of the full neutron dose equivalent can be made by 
a so-called extended range rem-counter. In this instrument, heavy metal layers com-
plement PE and borated plastic. They increase high-energy sensitivity by neutron 
spallation. The first documented exemplar of an extended range rem-counter can be 
found in [17], today a few companies manufacture commercial versions of this or 
similar dosimeters. Extended rem-counters are both heavier and more expensive 
than standard instruments.
Bonner Sphere Spectrometer
A Bonner sphere spectrometer is a few-channel neutron spectrometer, consisting of 
up to 15 spherical moderator spheres made from PE, some with metallic inserts to 
extend the energy range beyond an energy of a few MeV (Fig. 3.10).
Each sphere has a characteristic, energy dependent response curve for neutrons 
(Fig. 3.11). The count rates for a thermal detector in each of the spheres can be 
unfolded (a mathematical inversion procedure) to yield an estimate of the energy- 
dependent neutron fluence spectrum. The dose equivalent can then be determined 
from the spectrum by multiplying it channel by channel with the corresponding 
fluence-to-dose equivalent conversion coefficient [25]. The application of a Bonner 
sphere spectrometer to neutrons from accelerators has been described in [26]. This 
procedure is time consuming and needs the additional step of spectrum unfolding. 
It is only employed in research projects when a good knowledge of the spectrum is 
necessary.
Fig. 3.9 Different commercially available rem-counters. (From [16])
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Fig. 3.10 A Bonner-sphere spectrometer consisting of 10 different spheres with amplifiers and 
data acquisition. [18]
Fig. 3.11 Energy-dependent response functions of spheres constituting a Bonner-sphere neutron 
spectrometer with 12 different spheres. The diameter of the spheres is given in inch. (1  in 
= 2.54 cm). (From [25]. Figure reproduced with permission from Elsevier Science & Technology 
Journals)
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Proton Recoil-Based Neutron Detectors
In collisions, energetic neutrons can transfer a large part of their kinetic energy to 
protons. The recoil proton deposits the kinetic energy by charged particle interac-
tions. Building on this principle, some neutron dosimeters for energies of more than 
100 keV consist of a neutron-to-proton converter made from a hydrogen-rich mate-
rial, combined with a charged particle detector.
An active personal dosimeter combining Si diodes with 6Li converter for thermal 
neutrons, PE converter for fast neutrons and uncovered diodes for photon detection 
is described in [27, 28].
As an alternative to a Bonner sphere neutron spectrometer, the proton recoil 
spectrometer can be employed for neutron energies of more than one MeV [23]. 
They consist of a proportional counter in which the pulse-height, proportional to the 
energy of the recoil proton, is registered. After unfolding, the pulse height spectrum 
yields the energy-dependent neutron fluence spectrum. The advantage over a Bonner 
sphere spectrometer is, that the pulse height spectrum has more channels, which 
makes the unfolding process more robust and results in a better energy resolution. 
In a radiation field where low-energy neutrons make an important contribution to 
dose equivalent the proton recoil spectrometer can be combined with a few Bonner 
spheres for energies up to the MeV-range.
The functions of recoil and detection are combined in an ionisation chamber 
filled with hydrogen gas. This chamber measures the absorbed energy of neutrons 
by registering their recoil protons released from hydrogen molecules. It is also sen-
sitive to photons and electrons and must be calibrated with a field-specific calibra-
tion coefficient. This technique has been employed to measure dose equivalent in 
radiation fields generated by particle accelerators [24].
3.5  Radiation Protection at Accelerators
At high doses, the exposure to ionising radiation may lead to tissue effects, at low 
doses and dose rates, stochastic health effects are possible and become more prob-
able with increasing effective dose received. To protect accelerator personnel and 
members of the public, living in the vicinity of the accelerator, from the detrimental 
effects of ionising radiation, multiple radiation protection strategies are employed:
First, one strides to reduce one of the main sources of ionising radiation at an 
accelerator, beam loss. Where this is not possible for physical or operational rea-
sons, beam loss is concentrated at a few locations with the help of collimators 
(Sect. 2.6.1). These are surrounded with shielding to absorb the generated particle 
cascades.
The remaining radiation environment at an accelerator consists of radiation pen-
etrating the shielding or released from the accelerator area by way of activated air or 
cooling water. The largest hazard activated material because many workers are 
exposed to its decay radiation during repair and maintenance of accelerator 
components.
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3.5.1  Shielding Against Prompt Radiation
In contemporary particle accelerators with high beam energy and intensity, the level 
of ionising radiation from beam loss during accelerator operation is generally severe 
enough to present a danger for health and life. Consequently, accelerators are 
installed either underground, or behind shielding walls from iron, concrete and 
earth, to dilute and absorb the secondary particle cascades following beam-matter 
interactions.
Methods and results for the design of accelerator radiation shielding fill numer-
ous scientific publications, summarised in [3, 7, 10, 31, 34]. An estimate of the 
required shielding can be obtained by estimating the flux of secondary particles 
emerging from a primary beam collision, to determine the attenuation of this flux by 
shielding material and to convert it into dose equivalent outside of the shielding. 
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Here, H is the expected dose equivalent rate outside of a shielding with a thick-
ness of d under the emission angle θ from the beam loss point or target. H0 is the 
energy- dependent emission of secondary particles from the target, conveniently 
expressed as dose equivalent, and g(θ) is the angular dependence of the emission. 
The product H0 g(θ) is called the “source term”. λ stands for the attenuation length 
of radiation in the shielding material. The parameters in the equation depend on the 
type of accelerated particle because the secondary particle spectra differ strongly 
between electron-, proton- and heavy-ion accelerators. In Table 3.2, a widely used 
set of parameters for the shielding of proton accelerators is reproduced from [7].
From Table 3.2 one can see that the attenuation length λ =50 cm for concrete, 
attenuating a hadronic cascade laterally to the beam direction to 1/e (36%).
Approximate shielding models deliver order-of-magnitude estimates of dose 
equivalent rates, from which the required thickness of simple concrete and iron 
shielding walls can be estimated within an uncertainty of one attenuation length. 
Their simplicity allows to evaluate them with a pocket calculator or a spreadsheet, 
but they cannot cover more complex accelerator layouts, with openings, access lab-
yrinths, connected galleries and distributed locations of beam loss. For complex 
shielding arrangements one must resort to Monte-Carlo radiation transport pro-
grams such as FLUKA [31, 35] or MCNP [32]. The basic idea behind these pro-
grams is to describe the development of the secondary particle cascade, by following 
the “history” of test particles. At every interaction step, the numerical values of the 
energy and angle-dependent interaction cross sections are drawn randomly from the 
respective probability distribution functions. Many thousands or millions of particle 
histories are followed to yield average results of particle fluence, absorbed dose and 
activation. By multiplying the estimated fluence with conversion coefficients, one 
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can derive operational radiation protection quantities like dose equivalent. An 
example of the result of a Monte-Carlo transport calculation for radiation shielding 
is seen in Figure 2.16.
These simulation programs have been developed over decades by collaborations 
of scientists and they are regularly validated by comparison with actual dose mea-
surements at existing facilities. Their scope goes beyond the calculation of dose 
equivalent outside of shielding structures, they also allow the estimation of material 
damage by accelerator beams, or the dose equivalent from activated materials.
3.5.2  Protection Against Ionising Radiation from Activation
In all types of accelerators, low-energy radiation is emitted in form of photons and 
electrons by activated accelerator components and structural material. Personnel 
enters in contact with these radiation fields when accelerator components need 
maintenance, repair, or have to be exchanged during planned or unplanned shut-
downs of the accelerator. In these periods, accelerator personnel accumulate the 
major part of annual personal doses.
The methods of radiation protection against low-energy radiation are similar to 
those applied in nuclear facilities, or medical environments: One tries use distance 
to the source, radiation shielding and limitation of the exposure time to keep the 
personal doses as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA).
• Establishing sufficient distance to the source of radiation is nearly impossible if 
the personnel must intervene on activated accelerator material. A possibility for 
optimisation is the use of teleguided manipulators or robots to accomplish some 
of the mechanical work. The financial cost and the required additional time make 
robotic solutions interesting only in those cases where very high dose rates are 
prevalent, for example on targets and beam dumps.
• Where possible, shielding against photon radiation is employed, in form of lead- 
equivalent blankets or mobile walls made from heavy metals. This proves often 
as unpractical, especially when the source of radiation is widely distributed, for 
example activated, large accelerator components or the walls of the accelera-
tor tunnel.
• Given the difficulties to apply distance and shielding, the most effective method 
for the optimisation of personal dose during particle accelerator maintenance is 
Table 3.2 Parameters of a 
frequently used shielding 
formulas for proton 
accelerators
NCRP Report 144 [7]
Ho(Ep) (Ep in GeV) 2.8 10−13 Ep0.76 Sv m2 proton−1
g(θ) (θ in degrees) exp(−0.040 θ)
λ (g cm−2) 42.8 A1/3
  concrete (cm) 50
  iron (cm) 22
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usually the reduction of exposure time. This can be achieved by well-trained 
personnel, who may have previously rehearsed the operations in the radiation 
field on non-radioactive mock-ups. Many nuclear establishments have made the 
experience that the rigorous preparation of work in a radiation field benefits the 
reliability of the operation, and that the time and money spent for the minimisa-
tion of the radiation dose is paid back by an increased efficiency of the 
intervention.
3.5.3  Control of Radioactive Material
Owners of radioactive material are obliged to exercise close control over the mate-
rial, to prevent its loss or dissemination in the public. Activated material falls under 
these regulations as soon as its activity exceeds a legal threshold, the exemption 
level. If the activity or activity concentration for one isotope exceeds the corre-
sponding exemption level, the material is considered as radioactive. For the 
European Union, the exemption levels are published in the EURATOM Basic Safety 
Standards [30]. Radioactive material cannot be traded freely (for example as scrap 
metal or as filler material in constructions, but it must be stored in intermediate or 
final radioactive waste depositories. These are operated by organisms authorised by 
national authorities, and the storage of the material must be paid for.
The transport of radioactive material is also strictly regulated. In Europe, an 
agreement for the road transport of dangerous goods was concluded in 1957. Its 
original title in French reads “Accord européen relatif au transport international des 
marchandises Dangereuses par Route “and it is best known under its acronym 
“ADR” [29]. Radioactive materials fall in the class 7 of dangerous goods. Depending 
on the activity concentration, total activity, and dose equivalent rate on the outside 
of the packaging, shipping of radioactive material must meet several requirements. 
In the worst case, it can only be transported in special containers by authorised 
companies.
The price to be paid for the storage and transport of radioactive material make 
that minimisation of its quantity and its movements is not only a safety consider-
ation, but may also have a positive financial effect.
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Chapter 4
Industrial Safety at Particle Accelerators
Abstract The construction and operation of particle accelerators implies the use of 
numerous technologies and trades which are well-known from the manufacturing 
and construction industries. Consequently, their safety hazards are described in the 
literature and standard best practice solutions exist for controlling the risks emerg-
ing from these activities. In this section, the occupational hazards of electricity, 
mechanical equipment and pressure vessels are illustrated with examples from par-
ticle accelerator facilities. Further sections are dedicated to accelerator-specific pro-
tection against fire, occupational noise, and environmental damage.
4.1  Electrical Safety
The fundamental principle of accelerator operation is the movement of charged 
particles by electro-magnetic forces. Electrical current generates magnetic fields 
and high frequency electrical power drives RF cavities, the two technologies at the 
heart of every accelerator. Electrical hazards from accelerator equipment are 
described in the relevant sections (Safety Aspects of Magnets, 2.2.3 and Hazards 
from RF systems, 2.4.3).
Electrical energy is also  often the most convenient form of transmitting and 
using energy. It is found wherever objects must be moved, or matter converted. This 
justifies highlighting electrical safety in this section from a general point of view 
(Fig. 4.1).
4.1.1  Electrical Hazards
If electrical energy is released in an uncontrolled way, different types of harm may 
result. One or more of the following electrical hazards may occur:
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4.1.1.1  Electric Shock and Burns
Electric shock may arise from direct contact with current-carrying parts, for example 
when a person touches a live conductor that has become exposed because of damage 
to the insulation of an electric cable. Alternatively, it may result from indirect contact 
if, for example, an internal fault results in the exposed metalwork of an electrical 
appliance, or even other metalwork such as a sink or plumbing system, becoming live.
In either case there is a risk of an electric current flowing to earth through the 
body of a person who touches the live conductor or live metalwork. The severity of 
the electrical shock is determined by electrical voltage and current. The resistance 
of the body depends on the applied voltage and on environmental factors, foremost 
humidity. As a rule of thumb, dry skin isolates against voltages below 50 V. Higher 
voltages can overcome higher electrical resistance, for example of insulating tool 
handles, gloves, and at very high voltages even the resistance of air. Once the body 
connects electrical current to ground, the magnitude of electrical current flowing 
through the body determines the extent of the damage (Table 4.1).
For voltages above a few hundred volts, the resistance across the body between 
hand and foot or between both hands amounts to about 1 kΩ. Connecting the stan-
dard voltage of 230 V to ground could therefore lead to a current of 230 mA travers-
ing the body. Accidental contacts with the 230  V mains are not always deadly 
because the accident victims may have a higher-than-average skin resistance, carry 
shoes with insulating soles, or their unconscious reflex of pulling back the hand is 
fast and strong enough to safe their live.
As a consequence of the muscular contractions of a non-lethal electrical shock, 
the victim may be thrown off balance and fall, for example from a ladder, with 
severe consequences. Non-lethal electrical shocks can also lead to potentially 
deadly heart arrhythmia.
Fig. 4.1 Warning sign 
against electrical risk, after 
[1]. (Image source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
Table 4.1 Physiological effects of electrical current traversing the body
Current flowing through 
the body (mA) Physiological effect
0.5–2 Sensation threshold for most individuals
2–10 Tingling sensation, muscle tremor, onset of pain
10–60 Muscle contractions, inability to let go, breathing difficulties
>60 Ventricular fibrillation, cardiac arrest, extreme muscle contraction, 
burns at contact points and in deep tissues
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4.1.1.2  Fire
Electrical current leads to heating of ohmic resistances or may cause sparks at badly 
executed electrical connections. Both phenomena can ignite surrounding material 
and lead to a fire. Approximately 25% of domestic and industrial fires have their 
origin in electrical malfunctions, for example faulty equipment or overloaded cir-
cuits. An additional hazard exists in environments where flammable liquids or gases 
are stored and where excessive heat or sparks can lead to an explosion. Finally, an 
electrical arc (see next paragraph) may ignite a fire.
4.1.1.3  Electrical Arc
Multiple causes can provoke an electrical arc (arc flash):
• At high voltage, an electrical spark can jump over an air gap. The distance it can 
traverse increases with the applied voltage. The initial spark ionises air mole-
cules along its path which become conducting for a short amount of time.
• A short circuit between two conductors, for example by connecting them 
accidentally by a metallic object, suddenly lowers the electrical resistance to a 
very small value and allows a high current to flow, which can melt the object 
causing the short-circuit.
• Condensation or water projection can cause the breakdown of electrical 
insulations, making a path for electricity to connect two conductors or to ground.
In an electrical arc, a large amount of energy is released in a short time interval. 
The temperature in the arc may attain several thousand degrees, leading to the emis-
sion of a broad spectrum of electromagnetic radiation between ultraviolet and heat 
radiation, and a sudden expansion of the surrounding air, causing a shock wave.
The consequences for a person struck by an electrical arc are similar to being 
struck by a lightning (a naturally occurring electrical arc) and potentially lethal: 
electrical shock, burns by the electrical current and radiant heat, exposure to UV 
radiation and noise, impact of projected high-speed hot or molten fragments.
4.1.2  Electrical Safety
4.1.2.1  Electrical Conformity
One aspect of electrical safety is the sound design and construction of electrical 
devices. Correctly dimensioned electrical installations minimise the risk of electri-
cal faults during standard operation and provide protection to users if faults should 
nevertheless occur. In the European Union, the Low Voltage Directive 2014/35/EU 
[3] sets the frame for conformity of electrical equipment with operating voltages of 
up to 1000 V (AC) or 1500 V (DC), but, in contrast to other directives, the “Principal 
4.1 Electrical Safety
86
safety objectives for electrical equipment” in Annex I are not detailed prescriptions 
but only a declaration of broad goals. One of the declared aims of the European 
directive is to protect persons of harm from electrical hazards if the electrical equip-
ment is used according to its intended purpose.
Detailed technical requirements for the construction and testing of electrical 
equipment are found in the harmonised standards to the directive, listed by the 
European Commission [2]. This document is regularly updated and contains refer-
ences to approximately 700 standards published by CEN and CENELEC (see 
Annex B) regulating all aspects of design and construction of low-voltage electrical 
equipment for use in the European Union. Should no harmonised standard exist for 
a specific safety aspect, then the Directive states that the relevant standards of the 
International Electrotechnical Commission shall be used. An important prerequisite 
for obtaining a conformity certificate is a complete and accessible documentation of 
the equipment, not only for its use but also for repair and maintenance.
The declaration of conformity with the Directive and its harmonised standards is 
a self-declaration by the manufacturer, who engages his full responsibility. 
Certification by an independent testing laboratory is not required for the declara-
tion, but it is advisable to consult specialists from electrical testing laboratories on 
the relevance and application of the various standards. This applies also to electrical 
devices which are purpose-built in one or a few exemplars for specific needs in a 
particle accelerator, and which cannot be found by a commercial supplier.
High voltage equipment is not covered by a European directive but standards for 
such equipment are published by IEC and CENELEC.
Standards for electrical equipment with a global scope are published by the 
International Electrotechnical Commission IEC.
4.1.2.2  Practical Electrical Safety
The consequences of an electrical accident can be severe, even lethal, and suitable 
means for protection against the electrical hazard must be taken. Electrical equip-
ment and assemblies meeting the requirements of conformity do not present electri-
cal hazards when they are used in accordance with manufacturers directives. Critical 
phases in the life cycle of electrical equipment are maintenance, repair, and modifi-
cation. In these phases, protections are removed from the equipment and electrical 
conductors become accessible for direct contact.
Workers engaged in maintenance, repair and modification of electrical equipment 
must have a professional competence in electricity or electronics and specific 
knowledge of the equipment that they are asked to work on. The professional com-
petence is obtained during vocational training, higher education, and courses in the 
frame of continuous education. In France it must be periodically complemented by 
specific, electrical safety-oriented training courses as required by law [4], which 
singles out the French approach within the European Union. Equipment-specific 
knowledge is gained from user- and maintenance manuals, complemented by 
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electrical circuit diagrams. This underlines the importance of proper documentation 
in the process for obtaining conformity.
Before engaging work on electrical equipment, workers must make certain that 
it is no longer connected to the supply voltage, and that it cannot be reconnected 
during the work. For small equipment this is simply achieved by pulling the power 
cord. For installed equipment supplied by fixed cables coming directly from a trans-
former, a process called lockout is applied. This process is an example of a safe 
system of work (Sect. 5.2.2).
The lock-out process follows five steps which must be executed in order, and 
without omission, to create a safe working environment:
 1. Identification of the connection: the worker must identify the output of the 
transformer or a switchboard which powers the equipment under question. This 
is very important in large installations where multiple equipment is connected 
via switchboards to the same source of electrical power.
 2. Separation from the source: the identified connection is separated from the 
power source. This separation is secured by the worker, for example with a per-
sonal padlock. This step gives the whole procedure its name, lockout.
 3. The operator leaves a signed note that (s)he has performed the lockout, this is 
called tag-out.
 4. Then, the operator verifies on the equipment that it is indeed disconnected 
from the electrical power source and that all capacitors and impedances, able to 
store energy, are short-circuited. He uses standard electrical measurement instru-
ments for this.
 5. Finally, the operator connects the equipment safely to ground, making all 
attempts of repowering impossible.
In its simplest realisation a single worker is in charge of the whole lockout 
process. It is unrealistic to assume this to be possible in all but the smallest 
accelerator facilities. Usually, the responsibility for the components of the 
accelerator chain is shared between different entities, and the power sources may be 
geographically far from the equipment fed by them. These facts complicate the 
simple lock-out process with padlocks, as in the following example:
Before a normal-conducting magnet is maintained, it must be brought in a safe 
state by disconnecting it from its power source. The magnet expert requests from 
the electrical power group the separation of the specific magnet from the current 
source. A member of the electrical power group will separate the connection feed-
ing the indicated magnet from the current source. He may secure the separation with 
his personal lock. He will inform the magnet expert of the separation. Multiple 
errors may occur at this stage:
• the electrical expert misreads the identification of the requested magnet or he 
accidentally locks out a different magnet.
• the electrical expert reconnects the magnet before the work on it has terminated
4.1 Electrical Safety
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Note that in a process with distributed responsibilities the magnet expert cannot 
apply a personal padlock to secure the separation of the power source. In general, he 
lacks the competence to identify the power sources.
This makes the independent verification of the absence of electrical power and 
the connection the magnet to ground essential and virtually life-saving for the mag-
net expert.
The evolution of the lock-out process to complex scenarios with distributed 
responsibilities is treated in a general way in Sect. 5.2.2 under the headline “Safe 
Systems of Work”.
The best performing system of electrical lockout cannot prevent accidents in the 
cases where workers must approach electrical equipment while it is powered. These 
workers must be equipped with personal protective equipment (PPE) protecting 
against electrocution and arc flash (Fig. 4.2):
• Insulating gloves, with appropriate voltage rating. These gloves may have a short 
shelf-life and must be exchanged regularly.
• Safety shoes with an isolating sole
• A helmet with a face-shield, both resistant to heat and to projected fragments 
during an arc flash
• A jacket or shirt from non-ignitable fabric
Fig. 4.2 Electrician equipped with PPE: Helmet, arc-flash resistant visor, insulating gloves, fire- 
resistant jacket. Not visible: shoes with isolating soles. (Image credit: SUVA)
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4.2  Mechanical Safety
Mechanical hazards occur when masses are moved or altered. The functional 
elements of an accelerator, often with a mass of many tons, are produced and 
maintained in mechanical workshops, must be moved into place by cranes and 
transport vehicles and connected with each other electrically and mechanically. This 
section starts with a view on machines and then focusses on transport hazards.
4.2.1  Machines at Particle Accelerators
Machines, defined as mechanisms animated by other than human forces [5], are 
ubiquitous in a particle accelerator during all phases of the life cycle:
• Production: an accelerator centre does not have the capacity to produce the 
elements for kilometre-long facilities, and the components for large particle 
accelerators are built in industry. The centre will still have workshops to produce 
prototypes or small series of specialised items. These workshops are equipped 
with standard machine tools (milling-, drilling- and turning machines). Special 
machines have functions like winding magnet coils, polymerising them and 
assembling whole magnets in mechanical presses. These machines are tailor- 
made for purpose.
• Operation: some elements of a particle accelerator are moved by motors or 
actuators and constitute “machines” according to the strict definition above: 
vacuum valves, beam intercepting devices and elements of beam instrumentation. 
For the next generation of particle accelerators with very small beam sizes, 
remotely operated, motorised systems for aligning the accelerator components 
are under discussion.
• Maintenance: the maintenance of accelerator elements is sometimes performed 
in-situ with portable machines, more extensive revisions are done in workshops 
equipped to disassemble and re-assemble magnets, cryostats, and other 
equipment.
• Decommissioning: accelerator components which have failed or have reached 
the end of their lifetime are disposed of. The separation of the radioactive com-
ponents must be sorted by activity level and by nature of the material, requiring 
mechanical tools. Certain waste categories can be compacted with help of 
mechanical presses.




4.2.2  Machine Safety
Most of the time, the function of a machine can be reduced to the movement of 
masses: a rotating drill, the cutting tool of a milling machine, the movement of the 
ram in a mechanical press require forces which may cause injury when directed 
against a person. This is expressed in the mechanical hazard triangle (Fig. 4.4).
Extensive guidance exists for the control of mechanical hazards in the 
manufacturing industry, covering the use of all types of machine tools and of hand-
held power tools [8, 11].
4.2.2.1  The European Machinery Directive
In the European Union, safety aspects of machinery are regulated in the Directive 
2006/42/EC of 17 May 2006 on machinery [5, 6]. Under EU regulations, the content 
of directives must be adopted by the member states into national law within a rea-
sonable delay. The purpose of the directives with focus on safety is twofold: on one 
hand, all EU members states shall apply the same safety standards on products, so 
that manufacturers can sell them unhindered in the territory of the EU. On the other 
hand, the directives are an instrument to guarantee minimal safety standards for the 
workers and the public for products imported from countries outside the EU.
The directive lists in its Annex 1 the essential health and safety requirements that 
machinery must meet before it can be introduced to the European Market. The 2006 
Fig. 4.3 Warning signs against hazards from machines: hand injury, entrainment, crushing, after 
[1]. (Image source: https://publicdomainvectors.org)
Mechanical Element
Fig. 4.4 Mechanical 
hazard triangle. The 
adverse interaction of a 
mechanical element its 
energy and the operator 
may lead to an 
accident. After [11]
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edition of the directive also counts the construction of machines for one’s own use 
as introduction to the market, so that these devices must meet the same standards as 
goods for sale. This is obviously in the interest of protecting health and safety of the 
workers and operators. A machine conforming to the standard may bear the 
CE-marking, described in detail in Annex III of the directive and reproduced in 
Fig. 4.5.
A voluminous application guide to the Machinery Directive is available from the 
European Commission [6] as well as numerous titles of secondary literature, for 
example [12].
4.2.2.2  Conformity with the EU Directive
The straightforward way to obtain conformity with the European Directive is to 
construct a machine following a harmonised standard. Machinery constructed 
under respect of the technical requirements in a harmonised standard is presumed to 
conform to the legally binding European Directive. The list of harmonised standards 
is published by the European Commission [7].
In the European Union, it is advisable to buy standard machines from established 
manufacturers who will deliver a CE-certified machine, either from a EU member 
state or from countries with a long-standing commercial relationship with the EU.
The demonstration of conformity with the European Directive is more time- 
consuming and possibly costly for modified, entirely self-built, or imported 
machines. In international research centres, such as particle accelerator facilities, it 
is common that collaborators make in-kind contributions. These may come in form 
of a machine in the broad definition of the EU, and then conformity with the 
European Directive must be sought. A starting point for a self-built machine would 
be to follow a harmonised standard for conception and construction. Foreign 
machines or modified, old machines one must be document in a technical file, as 
Fig. 4.5 CE-Marking, after [5]. (Image source: https://publicdomainvectors.org)
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described in Annex VII of the Directive. This process is called “assessment with 
internal checks” and is generally sufficient to attest the conformity of a “machine” 
installed in a particle accelerator, such as movable collimators or elements of beam 
instrumentation.
The prescriptions of the directive are not mandatory for machinery specially 
designed and constructed for research purposes for temporary use in laboratories 
(Article 1.2(h) of the Directive). This leaves a certain margin for very specific, self- 
built machinery in particle accelerators. In case this provision shall be used, it is 
advisable that a complete technical documentation, user manual and a risk assess-
ment of the equipment is drawn up be able to mitigate any obvious safety risks. The 
risk assessment can take account of workers’ training in the use of a specific 
machine.
These remarks are valid, in slightly modified form, for obtaining the conformity 
for other categories of regulated products in the European Union (Annex B).
4.2.3  Transport at Particle Accelerators
Depending on the size of a particle accelerator, transport of persons and goods is an 
activity consuming time and resources. Warning signs for transport hazards are illus-
trated in (Fig. 4.6). The presently largest particle accelerator in the world, CERN’s 
Large Hadron Collider, has a circumference of 27 km. It touches the main site of the 
organisation in Meyrin (Canton of Geneva, Switzerland) at one point, from where 
the farthest point is at 8.6 km as the bird flies. Depending on traffic density, the 
transfer by car may take between 20 and 30 min between the access points on the 
perimeter. Personnel and material are transported on public roads with conventional 
vehicles. Accelerator magnets, 15 m long and with a mass of 15 tons, are lowered by 
overhead cranes into a tunnel connecting to the LHC and are moved on a special 
magnet transporter (Fig. 4.7). The largest distance to be covered undereground is 
30  km. The transporter advances automatically along the tunnel with an optical 
guidance system at a speed of 3 km/h, an operator is on board for emergency action.
Overhead cranes play an important role in transport for a particle accelerator: 
heavy, bulky items are lowered into the underground areas with cranes, and they 
serve to move equipment in the accelerators (Fig. 4.8), in workshops and in test-
ing areas.
4.2.4  Safety of Transport and Handling
As in machines, mechanical forces are employed to transport objects. These forces 
and the inertia of the loads are increasing with the mass and the speed of the moved 
objects. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show typical transport situations in a large accelerator, 
they have a high potential for accidents if not handled correctly.
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For road transport, one can rely on vans and lorries driven by professional, 
certified drivers. National regulations define minimal safety standards for road 
vehicles, they must be checked periodically by certified bodies. All lifting gear 
(cranes, chains, ropes, slings, hooks) must be regularly inspected for signs of ageing.
In the European Union, special transport vehicles, such as those operating in 
accelerator tunnels, fall under the Machinery directive [5], with additional require-
ments in Chap. 3 of Annex I.
Fig. 4.6 Warning signs against transport hazards: overhead load, industrial vehicle, after [1]. 
(Image source: https://publicdomainvectors.org)
Fig. 4.7 Special vehicle for the transport of superconducting magnets in CERN’s LHC tunnel. 
The vehicle draws electrical energy by the orange catenary from an overhead rail. The vehicle 
advances by an optical guidance system, following the white line painted on the floor. The white 
structure to the left is the cryogenic supply line for the superconducting magnets. Copyright 
CERN, reused with permission
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The employer is responsible to supply conforming and tested transport equipment 
to his employees. To prevent transport accidents, a few core rules should be applied:
• Transport operators and vehicle drivers must be trained in the use of their 
equipment, including the safety aspects. Under certain national legislations, 
professional certificates are required to use mechanical transport and lifting 
equipment, elsewhere an instruction by the employer is sufficient.
• Operators and drivers must be well rested and concentrated before their shift.
• Transport and lifting operations shall be scheduled at moments where no other 
activities take place in the area. This avoids putting bystanders in danger and 
gives the operators the liberty to choose the optimal path of transport. For exam-
ple, the magnet transport through CERN’s LHC tunnel (Fig.  4.7) takes place 
from 17:00 h on, after normal working hours.
• The transport/lifting equipment must be suitable for the task. Questions to be 
asked before every use are: is the capacity sufficient for the masses to be moved? 
Is it in good shape, no deformation or excessive traces of wear and tear?
Lifting and transport operators shall wear personal protective equipment:
Fig. 4.8 Handling of an LHC dipole magnet with an overhead crane in the LHC tunnel. Copyright 
CERN, reused with permission
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• Safety shoes, to prevent slipping and to provide a limited protection of the toes 
against heavy loads.
• A safety helmet, in Europe according to standard EN 397, to prevent head injury 
from small pieces falling off from the load.
• Handling gloves, to protect the hands from bruises, cuts and abrasions while 
guiding and directing the load.
• High-visibility clothing, to provide optimal visibility by the other operators.
• If necessary, this equipment must be complemented by hearing protection or 
respiratory protection.
Guidelines for safe transport at the workplace can be found for example in [9].
4.2.4.1  Manual Handling
Despite being at the forefront of science and technology, and of having a parc of 
sophisticated transport and handling devices, manual handling is some-
times unavoidable at particle accelerators. On the last metre of a transport path, 
where an equipment must be hauled into its position, manual handling is often the 
last resort, for lack of adapted mechanical means or for lack of space for applying 
them. Manual handling bears the risk of injury from sharp edges, rough surfaces 
and from heavy loads getting out of control from the handlers. The risk of occupa-
tional illness such as back pain and other musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) is high, 
and these illnesses can become permanently disabling. Manual handling of heavy 
loads more than 25 kg shall be avoided wherever possible, mechanical handling 
aids shall be used, and only when this is impossible, the load must be shared among 
several workers.
Manual handling guidelines, especially with respect to avoiding occupational 
illness are given in [10]. In addition to authoritative information, this website pro-
vides tools for handling risk assessment.
4.3  Pressure Vessels
Recipients containing fluids (liquids or gases) at a pressure higher than atmospheric 
pressure are termed pressure vessels. The mechanical energy stored in the pres-
surised fluid is equal to the product of pressure and volume:
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If this energy is released instantaneously, severe damage to personnel and 
equipment may result. In addition, the hazards of the pressurised fluids must be 
considered, for example cryogenic, flammable, or toxic fluids (Fig. 4.9).
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4.3.1  Pressure Vessels at Accelerators
A typical field of application for pressure vessels at particle accelerators is as a part 
of cryogenic systems (see Sect. 2.3). They are used for containing the cooling 
medium of superconducting devices, and to contain cryogenic liquid particle detec-
tors (Argon, Krypton and Xenon calorimeters). Gases and fluids under pressure are 
used for cooling detectors at temperatures close to 0 °C. Conventional applications 
of pressurised fluids include pressurised air, sometimes used in workshops as a 
power-transmitter for driving tools without electricity. Pressurised air is also used to 
move actuators, for example in vacuum valves.
The components for conventional applications can be bought from manufacturers 
who build the equipment according to legal prescription, for example to the 
European Directive and harmonised standards in the EU. The institutions develop-
ing superconducting or particle detector systems with pressure vessels are respon-
sible for meeting the applicable legislation and standards.
4.3.2  Pressure Vessel Safety
Pressure vessels are ubiquitous in the processing industry and they may present a 
considerable accident risk with severe consequences [39]. The rupture of a pressure 
vessel results in the following accident hazards:
• Release of the fluid at high pressure by the leakage, leading to mechanical injury.
• Other than the risk from a pressure jet, the released fluid may be flammable or 
have chemical or cryogenic hazards, exposing workers and bystanders to addi-
tional risks after the release has terminated.
• Disintegration of the whole vessel by explosion, followed by projection of 
fragments and pressurised fluid.
Badly designed pressure vessels can be the source of severe accidents leading to 
loss of property and possibly of life.
Two principles in pressure vessel design protect against accidental rupture and 
release of the contents:
Fig. 4.9 Warning sign: 
Bottle under pressure, after 
[1]. (Image source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
4 Industrial Safety at Particle Accelerators
97
• First, a solid construction of the vessel following current engineering practice 
and described in national or international standards. The mechanical resistance 
of the construction materials (usually steel, sometimes other metals for special 
applications) and their assembly balances the expected pressure variations of the 
contents up to a maximal operational pressure or service pressure Ps.
• Second, for the case that pressure in the vessel rises accidentally to values higher 
than Ps, pressure relief devices are foreseen to release some fluid and thus lower 
the pressure. These valves or burst-discs open at a predefined set-pressure and 
vent the contents of the vessel in a controlled way. Pressure relief devices are 
mounted in pairs, a relief valve which opens at a pressure Pv1, is combined with 
a burst-disc with set-pressure Pv2 > Pv1. The burst-disc opens in two failure cases:
 – the relief-valve fails mechanically, or
 – the sudden mass flow to be evacuated surpasses the valve’s capacity.
It is a single-use device and must be replaced after opening. The pressure relief 
devices must have a sufficiently large opening surface to release the overpressure. 
The calculation of safety devices is treated in international standards for ordinary 
[14] and for cryogenic pressure vessels [13]. For cryogenic pressure relief devices, 
the calculations consider the heat influx to the cryostat, the temperature- dependent 
thermodynamic parameters of the fluid and phase changes from liquid to gaseous. 
In the regime where the operator of the pressure vessels works with a notified body, 
the existence and performance of safety devices becomes an important part of the 
safety assessment.
4.3.3  The European Directive on Pressure Vessels
Legislation in all countries takes account of the dangers of pressure vessels by 
prescribing minimal safety standards. In member states of the European Union, the 
Pressure Vessel Directive [40] regulates the manufacturing and use of pressure ves-
sels. The deadline for transferring its principles into national law in the member 
states was mid-2016. With this directive, the European Commission aims to harmo-
nize safety standards in the Union, so that goods containing pressure vessels can be 
freely exchanged on the internal market while at the same time minimal safety stan-
dards for workers and consumers are respected.
Annex 1 of the directive lists the essential safety requirements (ESR) which must 
be met by pressure vessels which are placed on the market, i.e. made available to 
customers. For inert gases, as helium, the ESR are mandatory if the service pressure 
PS of the vessel exceeds 1000 bar (the directive still quotes pressures in bar, as in 
engineering practice) or the volume V exceeds 1 litre (L) and the product PS V is 
larger than 50 bar L.
Then, vessels are subdivided in those carrying dangerous fluids (for example 
flammable, oxidising, or acutely toxic gases and liquids), generally not of concern 
at accelerators, and those for other fluids. They are further classified in 4 categories 
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by the product of service pressure PS and volume V. The categories determine the 
procedure according to which the manufacturer must demonstrate conformity with 
the ESR. For vessels in the lowest category I (PS V < 200 bar L), the mechanism of 
“internal production control” is deemed sufficient to prove that the ESR are ful-
filled. This requires the drawing up of detailed technical documentation and a risk 
assessment. During production, internal controls shall be made to ascertain that the 
technical documentation is followed.
From category III onwards (PS V > 1000 bar L), a notified body must be consulted 
during the conformity assessment process. Notified bodies are entities accredited by 
a Member State of the EU to assess whether a product meets certain standards. 
Familiar examples are the associations or companies entitled to periodically check 
the traffic-worthiness of a car. As for machines (see Sect 4.2.2), the construction of 
pressure vessels for proper use falls under the application of the directive [40]. 
Consequently, the consultation of a notified body must be considered in cost- and 
schedule estimates for the construction of pressure vessels of categories III or IV for 
an accelerator facility.
4.4  Fire Safety
Fire hazard is found at workplaces and in homes likewise. Accelerator facilities and 
their associated workshops, test areas and offices make no difference, and fire pre-
vention is an important point in a safety prevention programme. In this section, the 
conditions for a fire to break out are enumerated, the potentially devastating effects 
of a fire described, and prevention measures derived (Fig. 4.10).
4.4.1  The Fire Triangle
Three ingredients are necessary to start a fire and make it grow, they are often 
represented in form of the “Fire Triangle” (Fig. 4.11):
Fig. 4.10 Warning signs against fire hazards: flammable substance, explosive substance, oxidant 
substance, after [1]. (Image source: https://publicdomainvectors.org)
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 1. Fuel: burnable substances are fuel for a fire. They can be solids (for example 
wood, paper, cardboard, packing materials, plastics), liquids (for example sol-
vents, paint and varnish, petrol) or gases (for example butane, propane, acety-
lene, hydrogen).
 2. Oxygen: from the chemical point of view, at the heart of a fire are exothermal 
oxidation reactions, therefore no fire without oxygen. The oxygen content in air 
is often enough for keeping a fire going, it may be enhanced by a ventilation 
system, carrying fresh air in a burning area, or by oxygen in cylinders for weld-
ing or for experimental purposes.
 3. Ignition source: the presence of fuel and oxygen is not enough to ignite a fire; an 
ignition source is necessary to provide the energy to start the exothermic reac-
tion. Ignition sources may be naked flames, or smouldering ashes (from smoking 
materials, in laboratories), sparks (from grinding, welding and faulty electrical 
equipment or static electricity), hot surfaces (from insufficiently ventilated or 
cooled electrical and mechanical equipment, lighting, heating).
A fire may start when an ignition source comes close to fuel in a well-ventilated 
atmosphere. Easy flammable fuels (characterised by a low temperature of ignition) 
often start the fire, which can spread to other, less flammable materials. Once started, 
a fire will continue to burn and spread as long as fuel and oxygen are available.
4.4.2  Fire Hazards at Accelerators
A fire hazard exists at those locations, where the three elements of the Fire Triangle 
(Sect. 4.4.1) come together. Oxygen in air is ubiquitous, and it is enough to consider 
ignition sources and flammable materials (fuel).
The availability of ignition sources for a fire depends on the operational state of 
the accelerator:
• During accelerator operation, all electrical systems are powered. Electrical 
resistances, short circuits or sparks can generate enough heat to set neighbouring 
material at fire.
• During periods where the accelerator is stopped, many of the accidental ignition 
sources from electricity are turned off. In these phases the focus is on work 
Fuel
Fig. 4.11 The fire triangle: 
The combination of fuel, 
oxygen (or another 
oxidizing substance) and 
heat, or more general an 
ignition source may lead to 
the outbreak of a fire
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 activities using open flames, hot points or producing sparks, like welding, braz-
ing, and grinding. When fire prevention measures during this work are neglected, 
flammable materials close to the work site may be ignited.
Various types of flammable material can be found in an accelerator facility:
• Cable insulations and other organic materials may burn readily once lit up. An 
electrical fire can start by igniting a small quantity of insulating organic material 
and then spread over to the contents of an electrical rack. Cable insulations are 
often rated for fire resistance, but with enough heat energy from a fire close by, 
they will eventually start to burn.
• Recently, metal-ion electrical storage batteries are gaining importance, for 
example Li-ion batteries. They consist of Lithium- and carbon electrodes, 
separated by an electrolyte made from an organic, flammable substance. Short 
circuits in these batteries may ignite the electrolyte and lead to a runaway reaction 
with very high flame temperatures from the oxidation of the alkali metal. Li-ion 
battery fires in electrical vehicles have been reported to destroy the battery and 
igniting flammable material in its vicinity [19].
• Another source of fuel is packing material, like carton and wood. Packing often 
contains fillers made from polystyrene, which is easy to ignite. These materials 
are brought to the accelerator area with new equipment, and they may accumu-
late if no regular housekeeping is performed.
• Some detectors for particle physics use flammable gases in ionising radiation 
detectors, or flammable solvents for certain types of scintillation detectors.
• Flammable solvents are also found in laboratories with frequency-tuneable dye 
lasers, and in workshops, where they are used for many applications.
4.4.3  Tunnel Fires
Tunnel fires came into the light of public attention with the tragic events in the 
Mont-Blanc road tunnel between France and Italy in 1999, the Kitzsteinhorn funic-
ular, Austria in 2000, and the underground metro station fire in Daegu, South Korea 
in 2003. The enclosed nature of tunnels gives rise to special fire phenomena in 
conjunction with the ventilation. Escape of personnel and access for emergency 
forces is more perilous and can become impossible if temperatures rise too high or 
smoke obstructs the pathways. A comprehensive reference for tunnel fires is [15].
The potential causes of fire in accelerator tunnels are different from road or rail 
tunnels, but the dynamics of fire development and fire spread, and its consequences 
are similar.
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4.4.3.1  Fire Dynamics in Tunnels
Fires in open air radiate heat in all directions and receive a nearly unlimited oxygen 
supply. In compartments (closed environments), the walls reflect a part of the fires 
heat energy and lead to more intensive burning. Also, the supply of oxygen is lim-
ited. One commonly used parameter to describe the size of a fire is the Heat Release 
Rate (HRR).
One speaks of a fuel-controlled or oxygen-rich fire when the rate of combustion 
and the HRR are dominated by the availability of combustible materials. Oxygen is 
available in sufficient quantity. In fuel-controlled conditions, the HRR of the fire 
grows until all fuel is consumed.
In a ventilation-controlled or oxygen-starved fire, there is not enough oxygen to 
burn all the fuel available. Oxygen supply is limited by the enclosure of the fire 
zone. The heat of the fire releases flammable gases from the fuel, but these are 
incompletely combusted. In ventilation-controlled conditions, the HRR of the fire 
stagnates. The air flowing out of the fire zone is entirely depleted of oxygen and 
loaded with toxic carbon monoxide and partially combusted fire gases. If a 
ventilation- controlled fire is suddenly supplied with oxygen (by opening a door or 
window in a compartment, or by activating mechanical ventilation in a tunnel), the 
hot, unburned fire gases ignite spontaneously and lead to the phenomenon of “back-
draft”, a sudden development of fire engulfing a large area, radiating a lot of heat, 
and dangerous for evacuating persons and fire fighters.
Ventilation-controlled fires are a concern in compartments such as electrical 
substations or chemical storages. Generally, in tunnels, the oxygen supply is high 
enough for a full combustion of the fuel. The onset of a ventilation-controlled fire 
can be estimated by putting the available combustible material in relation to the 
amount of oxygen required to consume them entirely, by evaluating the chemical 
combustion reactions in the fire. Methods for this are explained in detail in [15, 20].
4.4.3.2  Smoke Control by Ventilation
A fire releases heat, toxic gases, and smoke. Smoke, microscopic particles suspended 
in air, is carried by hot air and combustion gases and will raise by buoyancy to the 
tunnel ceiling in a fuel-controlled fire. At the location of the fire, turbulence mixes 
air, gases and smoke, and in some distance, from the fire, a layered structure is 
established (Fig. 4.12). With increasing distance from the fire, the smoke and gases 
will eventually cool and fill the whole tunnel cross section. Tunnel ventilation with 
a speed equal or higher than a specific “critical velocity” can keep the part of the 
tunnel which is upstream from the fire essentially smoke free and allow safe 
evacuation and access by fire fighters from this direction.
The critical velocity depends on the tunnel geometry (cross sectional area) and 
on the characteristics of the fire, principally its heat release rate, which can be evalu-
ated from the amount of combustible material and a fire development scenario.
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The design of the tunnel ventilation can be considered as an important part of the 
fire prevention strategy in an accelerator tunnel. Nowadays the engineering process 
is supported by numerical fire simulation programs. In simple cases, a so-called 
compartment model may be sufficient, for more complicated situations a computa-
tional fluid dynamics (CFD) code is necessary. The “industry standard” of fire and 
smoke propagation CFD codes is the Fire Dynamics Simulator from the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology NIST [23].
4.4.4  Fire Prevention
Going back to the fire triangle, fire prevention focusses on limiting the amount of 
combustible material and on controlling ignition sources. Only exceptionally, the 
oxygen content of air can be reduced to prevent fires, for example in archive- or 
computer buildings. Fire prevention consists of evaluating the fire risk, taking miti-
gating measures, detecting a fire, and securing the evacuation of personnel.
4.4.4.1  Fire Risk Assessment
The prevention of fires starts with a fire risk assessment. During this exercise the 
assessment team, which ideally consists of safety experts, personnel familiar with 
the facility and line managers, the presence of flammable materials and of ignition 
Fig. 4.12 Sketches of smoke stratification during a tunnel fire. Top: low ventilation velocity 
(0–0.5 m/s). Bottom ventilation speed close to the critical value. From [21]
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sources is determined. This is a specialised from of the hazard register for general 
risk assessments (Sect. 5.1.2).
In a second step, the probability of fire scenarios from the conjunction of ignition 
sources and fuel are evaluated. While the probability of electrical failures leading to 
fires can be taken from industry statistics, the estimation of a probability for human 
failure is more approximate.
In the last step, the consequences of the most probable fires must be evaluated. 
Heat release curves for the identified flammable materials inform about energy 
released in during the fire, this must be put into relation with the fire resistance 
classes of the building materials. An elaborate consequence analysis can make use 
of fire and smoke propagation CFD programs [23].
Fire risk analysis is the topic of a series of international standards [22], its third 
part consists a worked example for an industrial facility. This is the closest one 
comes in the literature to an accelerator facility.
4.4.4.2  Fire Risk Mitigation
The fire risk assessment informs about the most probable fire scenarios, in relation 
with the presence of ignition sources and flammable materials. The logical steps of 
mitigation are
• Elimination of ignition sources
• Removal of flammable material
It has been outlined (Sect. 4.4.2) that the principal ignition sources in accelerators 
are of electrical and human nature.
Electrical ignition sources are overheating, sparking, and arcing of electrical 
components. These can be eliminated already at the design stage of an equipment 
by a sound design of the electrical circuits, and by enclosing the equipment in spark- 
proof cabinets. The latter step is mandatory in locations where an explosive atmo-
sphere may potentially form, for example where large quantities of liquid fuels or 
solvents are stored or used. The technical term is ATEX area (from the French 
ATmosphère EXplosive). In the European Union, these situations are regulated in 
the ATEX Workplace directive [17] and the ATEX Equipment directive [18].
During operation, defective components are identified either by a malfunctioning 
device, or can be detected with infrared cameras which show excessive heating.
Human error as an ignition source is combatted with a system of administrative 
controls, i.e. regulations, procedures and permits. After a local fire risk assessment, 
concentrating on the absence of flammable material and the availability of extin-
guishing means, a fire permit is given to a worker to perform hot work (welding, 
brazing, grinding). Workers in these trades must be made aware of the fire risk they 
may provoke and trained in methods to extinguish a small fire before it spreads out 
of control. The discipline of the fire permit process is important, only if it is regu-
larly reminded and enforced one can effectively reduce the number of cases of fire 
caused by human error.
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Control of the characteristics and the amount of flammable materials is the 
second path to minimisation of fire risk. Easy flammable materials shall be replaced 
with materials which are difficult to ignite. This measure can be applied for example 
to electrical cables, where ignition resistant insulations exist today. Old cables 
should be replaced with such newer types when they arrive at the end of their useful 
lifetime. The same measure applies to a range of other organic materials. Another 
example are insulating fluids in high-voltage switchgear. They are mineral oils with 
a low flashpoint, defined as the temperature where the vapour layer over the flam-
mable liquid spontaneously ignites, and should be  replaced with synthetic ester- 
based fluids with higher flashpoint.
The amount of flammable materials in premises, especially where ignition 
sources are present, shall be regularly controlled. Only materials necessary for the 
operation of the facility must remain, everything else, for example packaging mate-
rials, goods stored in operational area, and waste, must be cleared out to reduce the 
probability of a fire.
4.4.4.3  Fire Detection and Evacuation
If a fire emerges it is important to detect it as early as possible, to secure the 
evacuation of personnel, and to start firefighting before the fire is fully developed. 
Fire detection systems work by two principles, either smoke detection by measuring 
the opacity by light absorption, or heat detection with infrared detectors. Smoke 
detectors with 241Am radioactive α-emitters are no longer considered good practice, 
because of the long half-life of the radionuclide (t1/2 = 432 years), which made them 
hazardous waste once the smoke detectors had exceeded their useful lifetime.
In large facilities, multiple fire detectors are combined in a network with a 
computer- based monitoring application and with local alarm panels, giving an indi-
cation of the fire location based on the detector(s) which have been triggered. When 
a fire alarm is confirmed, usually by the triggering of two independent detectors, the 
fire brigade is alerted, and an evacuation of the affected building or area started.
The provision of evacuation pathways is prescribed in local regulations, defining 
the maximum length, minimal width and standardised signposting of paths leading 
to emergency exits. These regulations are integrated in the contemporary design of 
surface buildings (offices, laboratories, workshops), but they are often impossible to 
implement in large accelerator areas, especially when built underground.
Since construction of any building depends on the obtention of a construction 
permit by the local authorities, the application process is the right moment to 
develop exceptional measures for the evacuation of personnel from facilities which 
cannot be built according to the standards.
The exceptional measures will be based on the fire risk assessment of the facility, 
which must be completed by an evacuation study. The studies must demonstrate the 
possibility for personnel to evacuate safely from any accessible part of the facility 
in case of fire. Technical measures to ensure evacuation are:
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• Construction of the facility with structural elements resisting the fire heat for a 
minimal amount of time. Construction materials are classified in fire resistance 
classes between 30 min and 2 h for normalised design fires.
• Installation of fire and smoke resistant doors along the evacuation pathway, to 
bring workers already in relative safety before reaching free air. Like the con-
struction materials, these doors are rated for their resistance capabilities.
• Installation of a fire detection system for early warning of personnel and alerting 
of emergency forces.
• Clearly visible signage of the emergency pathway with standardised signs. In the 
European Union, signage of hazards and of emergency paths is regulated in a 
council directive [1] (Fig. 4.13). Entirely based on pictograms, this signage is 
understood by personnel of any native language.
Simulation codes for fire and smoke propagation codes can help to design an 
efficient fire detection system and to demonstrate that the evacuation of personnel is 
possible without exposing them to excessive heat or smoke.
4.5  Occupational Noise
Exposure to high levels of noise has been recognized as an adverse factor for 
occupational health and personnel must be protected from it (Fig. 4.14). Short-term 
effects are acute acoustic trauma, affecting the eardrum or the bones in the middle- 
ear, temporary threshold shift (a reduced sensitivity to certain frequencies of the 
audible spectrum) and temporary tinnitus (a ringing in the ears which may continue 
for extended periods after noise exposure). After long-term exposure, threshold 
shift and tinnitus may become chronic affections. A long-term exposure to noise 
may also cause stress with the accompanying symptoms of high blood pressure and 
bad sleep. Noise is also a concern for the public living in the vicinity of research 
establishments (Sect. 4.6.1).




4.5.1  Noise Measurement
Noise, or sound in general is transmitted by an acoustic pressure wave. The ear is 









ρ is the density of air and c the speed of sound. Young healthy adults can 
distinguish minute pressure changes of p0 = 20 μPa, just above the level of thermal 
noise in air. The pain threshold of hearing is situated at about 60 Pa. Like other 
human senses, hearing has a logarithmic sensitivity scale.
To characterise noise at the workplace or in the environment, sound pressure 
level (Lp) is measured. Lp is a logarithmic measure of the sound intensity and is the 



















Sound level meters are weighting the frequency spectrum with a sensitivity 
function mimicking the human ear, the standard weighting function is designated 
“A” in the reference document IEC 60651 and thus sound level is expressed in units 
of dB(A). Sound pressure levels of a few sources are indicated in Table 4.2.
From the definition of Lp follows that an increase of 10 dB corresponds to a ten- 
fold sound pressure level, and 3 dB are approximately doubling sound intensity. 
Care must be taken when noise from different sources is added, the correct way is 
to add the respective values of prms
2 . The addition of two noise sources with equal 
sound pressure level at the location of measurement increases the total Lp by 
3 dB(A).
A simple method to obtain a rough estimate of instantaneous sound pressure 
level is described in Table 4.3. Its purpose is to trigger precise measurements with a 
calibrated sound pressure meter if one of the thresholds is likely to be crossed.
Fig. 4.14 Obligation sign 
to use ear protection, after 
[1], (Image source: https://
publicdomainvectors.org)
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At the workplace, not only the instantaneous noise level, but also the time- 
integral of sound pressure level is of interest. The total noise exposure is normalized 
to an 8-h working day LEX,8h. [30]. A worker exposed to 85 dB(A) during an activity 
lasting 4 h and then working in a silent environment for the rest of the day has an 
8-h exposure level of 82  dB(A). The evaluation of LEX,8h for a specific worker 
requires a detailed analysis of his activities, each of which must be accompanied by 
a measurement of sound pressure level Lp. Finally, the contributions of the different 
activities must be added and normalized to 8  h. The necessary remedial action 
depends on the calculated 8 h-sound pressure level (Table 4.4).
Further information about occupational noise, its sources, effects, and prevention 
can be found in [30]. The calculations described in ISO 9612:2009 are facilitated 
by a spreadsheet which can be downloaded from UK Health and Safety 
Executive [27].
Table 4.2 Selected sound 
pressure levels. From 
[28], [31]
Activity or environment




Milling machine at 1.2 m 85
Vacuum cleaner 70
Conversation at 1 m, business office 60
Quiet room 40
Hearing threshold 0




Conduct risk assessment if noise level is 
like this for more than:
The noise is intrusive but normal 
conversation is possible
80 dB 6 h
You must shout to talk to someone 
2 m away
85 dB 2 h
You must shout to talk to someone 
1 m away
90 dB 45 min
Table 4.4 Required Mitigation for Noise in the European Union [24]
8-h sound exposure level LEX,8h (dB(A)) Mitigation measure
LEX,8h < 77 dB(A) No health risk from noise
77 dB(A) < LEX,8h < 80 dB(A) Optimise sound exposure
80 dB(A) < LEX,8h < 85 dB(A) Protection against noise recommended
85 dB(A) < LEX,8h < 87 dB(A) Protection against noise obligatory
LEX,8h = 87 dB(A) Legal limit of sound exposure for workers
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4.5.2  Protection Measures Against Noise
From an 8  h-exposure level of LEX,8h  =  80  dB(A) on, protection measures are 
recommended to prevent adverse effects of noise exposition for the worker. They 
become obligatory at LEX,8h = 85 dB(A). One distinguishes technical measures and 
personal protection. Technical measures are preferable, they protect all workers 
indiscriminately:
• Replace the equipment at the origin of noise with a newer, less noisy type.
• Isolate the noise source by encasing it with noise-absorbing materials.
• Isolate the vibrations of the source transmitted to other structures by placing it on 
isolating floor mats or by using absorbers.
Only where technical measures are impossible or too costly, or where access to 
the noisy environment is infrequent, workers must be protected with personal pro-
tective equipment and clear instructions. The use of this equipment depends on the 
level of sound pressure that must be reduced to meet the legal requirements. The 
attenuation of the protector should reduce the sound pressure level perceived by the 
employee to about 72  dB(A). Overprotection is counterproductive because the 
worker can no longer communicate or perceive warning signals. Different options 
are shown in Fig. 4.15.
In environments where sound pressure level exceeds 110 dB(A), more than one 
protection can be worn to reduce the sound pressure level at the ear to below 
85 dB(A). In the EU, all hearing protection should carry the CE mark as an indica-
tion that it meets the essential requirements of the Personal Protective Equipment 
Regulations [25]. The reference [26] contains a detailed guide for the selection of 
personal hearing protection.
Fig. 4.15 Personal protection equipment against noise. From left: earplugs, individually moulded 
earplugs, earmuffs. From [26] with permission 
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4.6  Environmental Impact
Today, technical projects cannot be realised without a strong consideration of 
environmental protection. Both the public opinion and the legislator demand 
accelerator facilities where damaging effects on the environment are minimised or 
compensated for (Fig. 4.16).
Climate change and the fact that the globe has only limited resources must be 
considered in the design and development of new accelerator facilities. Initiatives 
have started to reduce the energetic footprint of particle accelerators.
4.6.1  Releases to the Environment
Accelerator centres, as other technical plant, release various substances to the 
environment, either planned and within authorised quantities, or accidentally, with 
potentially damaging consequences. An accelerator facility is not a closed system, 
but it is open to its environment. Effluents can be either liquid and solid, released 
with water, or gaseous and aerosols released with air. Noise can be a nuisance for 
the public living in the vicinity of the accelerator’s plants.
4.6.1.1  Liquid Effluents
The operation of CERN’s LHC for example produces 160 MW heat in the cryogenic 
plants, normal conducting magnets, and the air-conditioning system. This heat must 
be removed continuously. A primary cooling water circuit transports the heat energy 
by heat exchangers from the secondary, equipment specific circuits. The primary 
cooling water is then circulated to cooling towers where the heat is shed to the 
environment.
The secondary cooling circuits are in contact with the accelerator equipment. In 
radiation areas, cooling water can become slightly activated. The activation prod-
ucts of distilled water are short lived with exception of tritium (3H), with a half-life 
of 12 years but a very low radiological effect on living organisms. Cooling water 
occasionally transports activated metal corrosion products, with longer half-lives 
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and higher activity concentrations. Before cooling water circuits are drained for 
maintenance a sample from the circuit is taken and measured for residual radioac-
tivity. It can only be release to the public network when the activity concentration 
lies below the legally fixed release limit.
Run-off from building roofs, streets and places can be collected in a separate 
drainage network connecting to natural surface waters (streams and rivers). 
Accidental pollution of the drainage network is possible by the accidental rupture of 
tanks or pipes for polluting liquids, often chemical products. A second source for 
surface water pollution is the inattention of personnel, cleaning polluted tools or 
vessels and shedding the cleaning water simply outside of the building.
4.6.1.2  Air-Borne Effluents
Environmentally polluting products can be released by air from a particle 
accelerator centre.
Under certain weather conditions, the steam plumes from cooling towers can be 
clearly distinguished even from a distant vantage point, and while this may not 
please the spectator, it does not represent a danger in itself. However, the cooling 
towers must be regularly treated against legionella. Bacteria from this family thrive 
in stagnating, lukewarm and represent a hazard for the causation of serious respira-
tory illness.
The air from accelerator tunnels is activated by secondary particle cascades 
(Sect. 3.2) and the products from the spallation process are transported to the envi-
ronment. Most spallation products of pure air are short-lived, with the exception of 
7Be with a half-life of 57 days and 3H with 12.3 years. If activated molecules are 
attached to aerosols, then they can be retained by filters, but gaseous activity cannot 
be retained. The environmental impact of radioactive releases is estimated with 
environmental screening models [35], making conservative assumptions about the 
migration of radionuclides in plants and livestock and the eating habits of the popu-
lation. In such models the impact CERN’s accelerators on persons living in its vicin-
ity has been calculated to be a factor of 10 below the legal limit of 300μSv/year.
Some technical gases have a high potential to either damage the atmosphere’s 
ozone layer (e.g. fluorinated gases) or they have a high climate potential (e.g. meth-
ane). Ozone–layer damaging gases are controlled under the Montreal protocol [37] 
and they are used under exceptional permission, with the aim to remove them 
entirely. The use of climate-active gases should be reduced with the efforts to make 
the industrialised economies CO2-neutral in a time-span of 20 to 30 years.
4.6.1.3  Environmental Noise
Environmental noise is a by-product of industrial processes which may cause 
distress and even illness to persons exposed to it [38]. The World Health Organisation 
recommends an environmental noise level of less than 35 dB in the night to guarantee 
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a reposing sleep. Legally binding limits for environmental noise are decided on 
national level.
At accelerator facilities, sources of environmental noise are cooling and 
ventilation plants (fans, blowers), cryogenic plants (compressors), transformers and 
other power electrical equipment (transformer noise). When these plants are 
properly designed and protected, environmental noise should not cause problems. 
As for occupational noise, sources must be isolated from the environment so that 
vibration and sound cannot propagate. Transformer parks, which cannot be placed 
in a building, must be surrounded by sound-proof walls.
Many accelerator facilities in Europe were originally built as green-field projects, 
reasonably far from towns and villages. The growth of urban areas had the 
consequence that densely inhabited quarters were developed in the vicinity of the 
accelerator sites. Their inhabitants are exposed to environmental noise from the 
facility. In these cases, compromises between the local governments, the inhabitants 
and the accelerator plant’s management must be negotiated to achieve a solution 
which satisfies all parties.
4.6.1.4  Environmental Monitoring
Environmental monitoring serves to demonstrate that the unavoidable release of 
pollutants from a technical plant is well below the legal limits.
Environmental monitoring takes place at two locations: at the source, where the 
effluents leave the plant (emission measurement), and in the environment, where 
one tries to measure the concentration of the substance which has been deposited in 
the environment (immission measurement).
At the source,
• the activity of radioactive isotopes in released air is measured with special 
ionisation chambers for gases, and with gamma- or beta-spectrometric methods 
for the deposits of aerosols on filters in the ventilation release;
• radioactive effluents in water are registered with scintillation detectors immersed 
in the outflowing water;
• the pollution of water with hydrocarbons can be assessed on-line by catalytic 
oxidisation or by optical measurements.
In the environment,
• the level of stray radiation escaping the accelerator shielding is measured by 
ionisation chambers and passive thermo-luminescence dosimeters;
• a potentially radioactive pollution of the biosphere is excluded by spectrometric 
measurements of media like soil and water and produce like fodder and grain;
• aerosol samplers are placed in some distance to the monitored plant, they aspire 
large quantities of air which passes a filter, which is measured for radioactive 
substances after a fixed collection time;
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• environmental noise is assessed with sound detectors which are ruggedized for 
environmental, all-weather use.
4.6.2  Reducing the Energetic Footprint
In the last decade, society became increasingly aware of the negative impact of 
fossil energy consumption on the environment and the climate. High-energy 
accelerators and colliders built for applied and fundamental research consume large 
amounts of electrical energy and it becomes imperative to minimise their energetic 
and climatic impact.
In Europe, major particle accelerator centres have pooled their resources and 
collaborate in the framework of EU research programmes on the development of 
strategies to reduce the energetic footprint of accelerator facilities. A series of 
workshops summarises the results of this research and development efforts. 
[33, 34], in the proceedings of these workshops more details are found to the fol-
lowing examples.
4.6.2.1  Energy Supply from Sustainable Sources
The European Spallation Source ESS in Lund (SE) plans to use only energy from 
renewable resources (water, wind, solar) bought on the Swedish electricity market, 
on which more than half of the offer is sustainable (mostly water-powered 
electricity).
4.6.2.2  Energy Recovery
Accelerator facilities use large amounts of energy for cooling (cryogenic plants, 
electromagnets, data centres, air conditioning). Conventionally, the excess heat 
from these processes is shed to the environment by heat exchangers and cooling 
towers. The excess heat from cooling applications is available at a low tempera-
ture level. Heat pumps can convert it to high-temperature heat energy with little 
additional energy input. The overall efficiency of such systems is positive. ESS 
collaborates with an international energy supplier to build a heat network, supply-
ing parts of the city of Lund with excess heat from the accelerator and target. 
CERN will supply excess heat from one of LHC’s cryogenic plants to an Eco-
quarter in the nearby town of Ferney-Voltaire. Part of the energy generated 
through summer will be injected in a geological storage so that it is available in 
the heating period.
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4.6.2.3  Accelerator Technology
Elements of the particle accelerator can be optimised to a lower energy consumption.
Under certain conditions, electromagnets can be replaced by permanent magnets. 
Owing to their fixed magnetic flux density, they are useful in portions of accelerators 
or beamlines where the energy does not change. In a new linear proton accelerator 
at CERN (LINAC 4), permanent magnet blocks are used to build a quadrupole 
magnet in a reduced available space [36]. Adjustable tuning blocks from magnetic 
steel permit an adjustment of its field gradient within 20% of the nominal value. 
While space-saving was the technology driver, this application of permanent 
magnets demonstrates their potential in accelerator technology.
FASER, a forward spectrometer in the LHC tunnel in the for the search for exotic 
particles [32] employs dipole magnets assembled from permanent magnets to sepa-
rate charged and neutral particles.
RF cavities can make large gains in energy efficiency when their walls are made 
from superconducting material for their walls. In a comparison of a hypothetical 
linear accelerator for a terminal energy of 10 GeV with conventional Cu cavities or 
s.c. cavities from Nb, R. Porter [in 34] finds that the superconducting solution would 
use more than 100 times less power than the conventional, and it would be 20 times 
shorter. Most of the power in the s.c. accelerator goes in the cooling of the cavities 
to 2 K. Switching to the novel s.c. material of Nb3Sn, which can work at 4.2 K, 
would allow a power gain of a factor 400.
As a conclusion to this section of energy efficiency one may remark that particle 
accelerator technology is a field at the forefront of research and development. It is 
expected that energy-efficient technologies developed for accelerators will rapidly 
make their way to applications in other fields of society, as has happened previously 
with accelerator-related technologies for industry and medicine.
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Chapter 5
Safety Organisation at Particle 
Accelerators
Abstract Particle accelerator centres and research institutions, as other branches of 
industry and business, bear hazards and risks for accidents and occupational illness for 
workers. On a larger scale, professional activities may harm the environment and the 
public living in the vicinity of the plant. After this book has highlighted some of the 
scientific and technical challenges of occupational safety at accelerators, this clos-
ing chapter describes how the safety process works, and how and by which means safety 
is organised in complex structures. The chapter closes with beam safety and functional 
safety, two areas where technical hazards are controlled by organisational processes.
5.1  The Occupational Safety Process
Occupational safety shall guarantee the safety of workers, the public and the envi-
ronment from harm. Harm can manifest itself in form of occupational accidents and 
occupational illness for the workers, nuisance, and potentially illness for members 
of the public, and as environmental damage. The prevention of these harmful effects 
takes the form of
• Reduction of the probability that a harmful event occurs;
• Reduction of the severity of consequences if the harmful event occurs.
For standard industries and services many best-practice solutions for occupa-
tional safety exist, based on decades of experience with harmful effects and their 
mitigation. The management of these facilities can apply proven solutions from 
similar plants. This is only partially possible in an accelerator facility with complex 
technical installations making use of leading-edge technology. Frequently, no com-
parative industry exists from where ready-made solutions for occupational safety 
can be adopted.
Instead, to develop suitable methods of risk control, as a first step the hazards and 
risks from a particle accelerator or one of its components or operating procedures 
must be addressed with help of a seven-step occupational safety process:
 1. Definition of scope
 2. Hazard register
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 3. Application of Standard Best Practice
 4. Risk assessment
 5. Definition and implementation of controls
 6. Documentation
 7. Review
Phases one to five constitute the occupational safety assessment, the last phase 
inserts occupational safety in the lifecycle of the facility, equipment, or procedure 
by demanding periodic reviews of the validity of the original assessment. An impor-
tant result of the safety process is the description of hazards and risks at the accel-
erator facility, in steps 2 and 4. This permits to identify similar harmful situations in 
“standard” industries, and to adopt their mitigation strategies, suitably modified 
where necessary, to the accelerator facility.
The occupational safety process can be conducted in the planning stage after the 
decision for a new facility, component or operational procedure has been taken. It 
should also be applied when legacy equipment is taken back into operation, which 
occurs sometimes in research establishments. The earlier the process is begun, the 
better are the chances to control hazards by design. A safety process team is formed 
by engineers, physicists and other experts from the design or operational team, com-
plemented by one or more specialists in occupation health and safety.
5.1.1  Definition of Scope
The starting point of each occupational safety assessment is a clear definition of its 
scope. This can be a single workplace (a mechanical workshop, a chemical labora-
tory), an equipment (a magnet, a machine tool) or an activity (installing an accelera-
tor magnet, testing a radiofrequency device). In some cases, the safety process 
covers a whole project, for example a new accelerator facility in the planning stage. 
Most appropriately, the safety assessment for a large project follows a project break-
down structure and progresses by work packages and their contributions to the 
whole endeavour.
5.1.2  Hazard Register
The second step of the occupational safety process is the establishment of a haz-
ard register. A hazard register is the result of a systematic identification of activi-
ties, equipment, and substances with their associated hazards for workers, public 
or environment. A systematic list of hazards serves as a reminder to not overlook 
any danger and unifies the terminology among different assessors. Such lists are 
available from different occupational safety organisms [e.g. [11]] or can be down-
loaded from the internet. As they are targeted to manufacturing industries and 
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services, they must be enlarged for particle accelerators, or for research establish-
ments in general, to include hazards unique to these environments. Table  5.1 
shows the headlines of a hazard register for particle accelerators and Annex A 
gives a detailed hazard list, tailored to particle accelerators. The adaptation of the 
hazard list to the local workplace, by adding hazards specific to equipment, activi-
ties, or substances in use, or suppressing superfluous hazards, precedes establish-
ing the register.
Depending on the phase of a project in its lifecycle, a hazard register will assess 
different subjects. In the planning stage, one will look for hazards which can be 
controlled by design, for example by adopting standards. In the operational phase, 
workplace hazards will become more important, for example related to the organ-
isation of work or to physiological constraints. A specific hazard register may be 
called for if vulnerable persons are employed, for example apprentices with little 
experience, or physically handicapped individuals. In the end, no two finalised haz-
ard registers for a specific activity or equipment will look the same, and only the 
identified hazards will be written; the register will thus be more specific and shorter 
than the full list in the Annex.
5.1.3  Application of Standard Best Practice
For many occupational hazards, standard best practice exists to effectively protect 
persons, the public and the environment. The measures under this heading are often 
borne from common sense and they may be easy to apply, making further risk 
assessment superfluous. Sometimes, national legislation requests the 
Table 5.1 Hazard domains for a hazard register, with examples. A detailed hazard list is given in 
the Annex.
Hazard Domain Examples
External Earthquake, climate, and weather
Environmental Release of pollutants, energy consumption
Physical Temperature, noise, electromagnetic fields
Ionising Radiation Particle beam, stray radiation, activation
Non-ionising radiation UV light, microwaves, lasers
Noxious substances Chemically or biologically harmful substances
Fire Ignition sources, flammable materials
Mechanical Cutting, crushing, collision, fall of object,
Electrical Electrical shock, electrical arc
Working conditions Temperature, lighting,
Physiological Working posture, vibration, manual handling
Unexpected events Loss of control, loss of power
Organisation Constraining schedule, lack of information
Psycho-social Incomplete and monotonous activities
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implementation of protective measures once a certain hazard is incurred. Other 
sources for standard best practice are product documentation from manufacturers, 
recommendations in international standards and the websites and publications of 
occupational safety organisms [2, 5, 6]. Finally, every organisation will build up 
over time a wealth of Return of experience from accidents and incidents, helping to 
avoid similar occurrences. The material constituting standard best practice can be 
systematically collected and classified in a Safety management system.
An important source of Standard Best Practice, and often obligatory to apply, are 
legal regulations for hazardous equipment, activities, and practices. They may be 
codified in national labour law, in regulations from professional bodies or in manda-
tory requirements from insurance companies. A hazard is often considered “under 
control” when such obligatory regulations are implemented and applied.
In the European Union, an important body of obligatory regulations are pub-
lished in the form of European Directives. Numerous types of consumer and indus-
trial products are subject to European Directives, including chapters on Essential 
Health- and Safety Requirements (EHSR). Their purpose is to guarantee equal 
safety standards for workers and for consumers (buying and using products) 
throughout the 27 member states of the Union. Only under this condition, goods can 
be freely traded among the members. Suppliers from third countries who introduce 
their products to the common market must also apply the European safety stan-
dards. These regulations probably make the EU member states the area on the globe 
with the highest developed safety conformity regulations. Annex B gives an over-
view of the European Directives pertaining to technologies and products pertaining 
to the construction and operation of particle accelerators.
5.1.4  Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the next refinement stage in the occupational safety process.
It becomes necessary when technologies are employed carrying hazards not cov-
ered by standard best practice. In a particle accelerator facility, using built-to- 
purpose high-tech equipment, this is frequently the case. Parts of accelerator 
hardware may be designed and built in-house or they are a legacy from a time before 
the applicability of present-day international standards or directives. In special 
cases, the application of non-compulsory standard best practice may turn out to be 
too complicated, or too costly. In all these cases a proper risk assessment must be 
conducted, including an estimation of the likelihood of the hazard causing harm, 
and of the severity of the consequences.
A second use of a risk assessment is the management of resources. The safety 
budget for a facility is spent most effectively at those places, where risks can be 
either eliminated or mitigated with the highest cost-to-benefit ratio by taking appro-
priate control measures. A correctly conducted risk assessment will identify the 
areas where the safety budget is spent with the highest effect.
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Depending on the complexity of the hazard’s source, a risk assessment can vary 
from a simple judgement of risk on a scale with three or more levels to a full proba-
bilistic risk assessment, requiring man-years of work by experts and recorded on 
thousands of pages.
5.1.4.1  Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment
A semi-quantitative risk assessment gauges the size of risk by using a two- 
dimensional risk matrix. Risk is quantified by grading both the probability of a 
hazardous event and the severity of its consequences on scales with three to five 
levels. A simple example is given in Table 5.2.
Risk matrices seem straightforward to apply when one has found agreement with 
the colleagues participating in the process on a common interpretation of the 
descriptive terms for the probability and potential severity.
Drawbacks of the semi-empirical method with risk matrices are that unexperi-
enced assessors may find it difficult to judge the level of probability or severity of a 
hazardous event where no statistical accident data exist. This may lead to a sche-
matic application of the risk matrix, giving the impression of scientific accuracy, 
while the resulting measure of risk is biased by bad input estimates, leading to 
under- or overestimation [1].
Since the scales of probability and severity in semi-quantitative risk assessment 
are non-numeric, they must be adapted to the domain from where the hazard comes. 
The scale of probabilities for an accident with a standard tool may range from “once 
a day” for frequent occurrences to “once a year” for unlikely events, whereas the 
probability scale for accidental releases of environmentally hazardous products may 













































Table 5.2 Example of a risk matrix (adapted from [3]). Probability of occurrence and severity of 
harm are graded on a 3-level scale, the product yields a quantified risk, which is symbolised by the 
degree of shading.
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range over much longer periods, from 1 per year to 10−4 per year and even 10−6 
per year for accidents in hazardous industries with lethal effects in the general popu-
lation. In practice, one will use a different matrix for each domain of application 
with adapted scales of probability and severity, which leaves the question how their 
results compare with each other and how they can be combined.
The difficulties of obtaining reliable estimates of the frequency of adverse events 
and judging their severity of consequences limits the usefulness of risk matrices and 
it may turn out to be simpler and more reliable to simply apply standard best prac-
tice to control a specific hazard.
5.1.4.2  Quantitative Risk Assessment
In some cases, quantitative risk assessments, quoting failure probabilities and result-
ing in combined probabilities of accident scenarios are required by law. This is the 
case in chemical facilities classified as “Seveso III” (after the north-Italian town 
where 1975 a release of dioxin from a chemical plant contaminated the surrounding 
towns and villages [4] and in facilities belonging to the nuclear fuel cycle.
A widely introduced method of quantitative risk assessment is Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA). This method is based on a functional description of the 
system which is analysed in form of fault- and event tree diagrams.
A Fault-tree (Fig. 5.1) places a system fault (a state in which the system no lon-
ger fulfils its purpose) at the top of the diagram. The causes of the fault extend to the 
bottom, until the diagram stops at the root causes, which cannot be further reduced. 
In some cases, two causes have to occur simultaneously to trigger a fault (AND 
relationship), in other cases they act independently from each other (OR relation-
ship) By assigning a failure probability to every element in the fault tree and by 
applying the rules of Boolean algebra one can evaluate the overall probability of the 
fault at the top of the diagram.
Event trees (Fig. 5.2) are similar to fault trees. They are used to analyse the con-
sequences of an event (which may be a fault identified in a preceding analysis). The 
probability of the root event is given as a probability of occurrence per time unit. 
Each new branching of the event tree, customarily drawn from left to right, repre-
sents an alternative between two scenarios. If the relative probabilities for one or the 
other outcome are indicated for each branching, then the final consequences have 
the same dimension as the initiating event.
With complex facility layouts and interdependencies of elements the method is 
tractable only with help of specialised computers programs, able to perform the 
bookkeeping of thousands of critical elements, each with an individual failure 
model and frequency.
A second difficulty lies in the provision of failure probabilities for the elements 
referenced in an accelerator facility. Such data are published for standard electronic 
components, and may be available for process equipment which is also used in 
nuclear or chemical processing plants, but must be estimated for purpose-built 
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hardware components. Special computer programs can evaluate the failure proba-
bility pf electronic circuits based on the failure data of the individual components.
Given the limited potential of particle accelerators to harm persons and the envi-
ronment in a scale similar to a nuclear power plant or a chemical processing plant, 
the difficulties obtaining reliable data, and the effort required to set up a full PSA for 
a complex facility, the method is generally not required for accelerator facilities. 
Exceptions are accelerators used in nuclear fuel cycle applications, like the trans-
mutation of actinides in the Belgian MYRRHA project [8, 10]. It may also be useful 
to assess the probability or the consequence of failures of specific, expensive com-
ponents of an accelerator, for the purpose of protecting it from failures. An introduc-
tory treatment of the method with references to further literature is given in [7]
Fig. 5.1 Example for a fault-tree: causes for a motor overheating [7]. (Figure reproduced with 
permission by Elsevier Science)
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5.1.5  Definition and Implementation of Controls
Once the hazards are identified and their associated risk level estimated, one must 
decide about controls for these hazards or risks. With control one designates mitiga-
tion measures which, once implemented either eliminate a hazard, or render it inof-
fensive, or at least reduce the risk emanating from it to an acceptable level. After 
applying controls, a residual risk may remain, which shall be acceptable by the 
workers and the society.
In the case where compulsory laws or regulations apply, the operator cannot take 
the decision over the controls, but must conform to the law. Furthermore, if standard 
best practice is available for the identified hazard, it is often the most efficient way 
of mitigation.
Often one can identify more than one mitigation measure which would reduce 
residual risk to an acceptable level, with different effectiveness and cost. Here, the 
hierarchy of controls, going back to the U.S. National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), gives a decision aid by establishing a hierarchy of miti-
gation measures, from the most desirable to the just acceptable (Fig. 5.3) [9].
In this hierarchy, personal protective equipment (PPE), and administrative barri-
ers, including safety training, occupy the two lowest levels. This means that they 
should rarely be the main vector of risk reduction, but they can be useful to control 
the residual risk after other, more effective controls have been implements, such as 
elimination and substitution of the risk, or technical protective measures (engineer-
ing controls).
Fig. 5.2 Example for an event tree: consequences of a release of liquid petrol gas [7]. (Figure 
reproduced with permission by Elsevier Science)
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5.1.6  Documentation
The collected safety-related documentation constitutes part of the memory of the 
organisation operating the accelerator. It allows to retrace the assessments, judge-
ments and decisions taken. It will ease the construction of similar equipment, for 
which the same mitigation may be employed. The safety-related documentation 
may become important to prove the good faith of the organisation, should 
it  be  accused of supposed or real damage to workers or to the environment. 
Documentation forms a core part of the Safety management system.
Safety documentation contains also Return of Experience (REX). These are the 
records of inspections, of equipment failures and of accidents, together with a cause 
analysis. Over time, a body of experience will accumulate and constitute precious 
information for new facilities or upgrades of the existing ones. The collection of 
reports concerning failures of accelerator-specific equipment or activities with con-
sequences for safety is particularly important because they are not available from 
national statistics or accident registers.
Large bodies of documentation should be organised in a document management 
system to ease future retrieval. If the organisation already uses such a system for the 
technical documentation of the accelerator facilities, it represents the most suitable 
location for safety documentation. One can profit from established principles for 
document classification, and from review, approval, and release procedures. Safety 
documents relating to a certain piece of equipment should be stored together with 
technical documentation of this item, simplifying future searches in the archives.
If the organisation has no document management system, then the safety docu-
mentation system may proceed by different ways: relative to the equipment, to the 
organisational subunit, or to the accelerator facility. The important issue is to stick 
to the choice once made, so that a coherent safety documentation is successively 
built up.
Discontinue use of lead-
containing solder
Examples
Replace acetone as a solvent with
ethanol 
Install an access control system to
an accelerator tunnel; 
Edit a document describing a
low-risk procedure and
accordingly train workers; 
Safety shoes, helmet, handling
gloves, hearing protection, …
Fig. 5.3 Hierarchy of controls. (Figure according to [9])
5.1 The Occupational Safety Process
126
5.1.7  Review
With hazard and risk assessments completed and mitigation measures implemented, 
an equipment or a process may start operating and delivering results. In the lifetime 
of an equipment or a process, there are good reasons to review the safety measures 
decided previously:
• In case of changes on the equipment/in the process. Here one must assure that the 
risk assessment remains valid despite the changes, in the contrary case, a revision 
of the risk assessments and of the resulting mitigation measures is necessary.
• In case of an accident or near miss occurring with the equipment or in the pro-
cess. This may be a sign that something was overlooked in the original risk 
assessment or that the mitigation measures were not adequate or not correctly 
applied.
• The occurrence of accidents in similar facilities or with similar equipment should 
trigger a re-evaluation of the proper equipment and processes.
• Changed legislation may force to re-assess risks and mitigation measures.
• Finally, a periodic review of all risk assessments which were not reviewed for the 
reasons above is useful to keep all assessments and mitigation measures updated 
and adhering to the same standards, even for equipment which never failed 
within decades of operation.
Reviews inscribe the safety process into the life-cycle of the organisation and are 
part of its Safety Management System.
5.2  Safety Organisation and Management
Institutions operating particle accelerators tend to be large organisations with a hun-
dred or more employees and other collaborators, for example contract workers or 
research scientists from other institutions. At this organisational scale it is important 
to clearly define the responsibilities and duties for Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) of every person working on the premises of the institution. A Safety 
Organisation, based on simple principles and clear rules, gives all concerned parties, 
managers, employees, contractors and external researchers, guidelines on how to 
ensure safe working conditions for themselves and others and how to react in case 
of accidents.
5.2.1  Employer- and Hierarchical Safety Responsibility
A founding principle of OHS is the employer’s responsibility for safe and healthy 
working conditions. This principle is codified in the Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, No. 155 [14], to which the member states of the International Labour 
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Organisation (ILO) mutually agreed in 1981. The ILO has been founded in 1919 as 
a tripartite organisation with representatives of governments, employers, and work-
ers, with the aim of promoting social justice and internationally recognized human 
and labour rights. In 1946 it became a specialised agency of the United Nations, it 
has 187 member states and has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
Article 16 of ILO Convention 155 stipulates that employers must ensure the 
safety of workplaces, machinery, equipment, and processes. They must also ensure 
the absence of risk from chemical, physical, and biological agents when appropriate 
protection measures are taken, and they must supply the necessary protective equip-
ment to the workers.
In a small enterprise, the employer is readily identifiable, but in a larger organi-
zation with a hierarchical management structure, the employer responsibility is usu-
ally extended to a model of hierarchical safety responsibility. This means that in 
matters of occupational health and safety, each member of the hierarchy (“man-
ager”) acts at his level of responsibility as if he was the employer. At the lowest level 
of the hierarchy, each worker is responsible for his own safety and of those who may 
be directly harmed by his activity.
Translated to an accelerator centre the principle means that, for example, a man-
ager in charge of maintenance assures that the workers under his control (employees 
and contract workers alike) have received the necessary safety instructions and 
equipment and apply them in the intended way while performing their duties. The 
workers themselves are required to follow any instructions given to them and to use 
the protective equipment provided to them by the manager.
In application of the principle of hierarchical responsibility, the higher levels of 
the hierarchy must provide the necessary means to the lower levels so that these can 
fulfil their obligations in matter of safety. These means comprise
• Budget and manpower to plan, finance, and implement safety-relevant measures;
• Authority to take decisions;
• Internal safety regulations for situations not covered by standard industrial safety 
rules and;
• An allowance of time and budget for safety training and information for all man-
agers and workers.
A sensitive subject is the organization of OHS for contract labour and for 
scientists from other institutions. Both groups are external labour with employ-
ers from outside of the institution where they exercise a part of their activities. 
These employers bear a part of the responsibility for their occupational health 
and safety. The authoritative ILO document on Safety Management Systems, 
ILO-OSH-2001 [15] recommends, that the organization receiving external 
labour shall ensure that its safety and health requirements, or at least the equiva-
lent, are applied to contractors and their workers. This may be achieved by com-
munication and coordination between the appropriate levels of the organization 
and the contractor prior to commencing and during execution of work and 
should include provisions for communicating hazards and the measures to pre-
vent and control them. The organization may also be required to provide 
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relevant workplace safety and health hazard awareness and training to external 
labour if they may encounter specific hazards during their activity. Examples at 
particle accelerators are safety awareness sessions for electrical hazards or ion-
izing radiation, hazards which are not customarily encountered by most profes-
sionals in “conventional” industries.
5.2.1.1  Safety Policy
The International Labour Organization ILO recommends in [15] that the employer, 
in consultation with the workers and their representatives, should set out in writing 
a safety policy. This policy should include as a minimum a statement that the orga-
nization commits to the following principles and objectives:
• protecting the safety and health of all members of the organization by preventing 
work-related injuries, ill health, diseases, and incidents;
• complying with relevant national OHS laws and regulations, voluntary pro-
grammes, collective agreements on OHS and other requirements to which the 
organization subscribes;
• ensuring that workers and their representatives are consulted and encouraged to 
participate actively in all elements of the OHS management system;
• and continually improving the performance of the OHS management system.
The policy shall contain
• a description of the organization of health and safety, with the names and posi-
tions of the responsible managers;
• a reminder of the duties and rights of employees, including contractors and tem-
porary personnel;
• the organization’s duties towards the wider public, living in the vicinity of the 
plant, and the environment in general;
• health and safety performance targets which shall be attained by the organization 
within a set time span.
The safety policy should be specific to the organization and appropriate to its size 
and its activities. In a particle accelerator centre, the following statements may 
become part of the safety policy:
• a commitment to equal rights and duties in matters of health and safety for 
employees, contract labour, students, and guest researchers
• the priority of health and safety objectives over the availability of the beam, be it 
for commercial, medical or research purposes;
• a commitment to rigorous handling and elimination of the special waste pro-
duced by the facility (chemical, radioactive).
The safety policy should not be a dead document filed in an archive, but an 
expression of the living commitment of the organization to health and safety. It is 
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important that the principles of the policy are lived by the management, as an exam-
ple to the employees and other personnel on the site.
5.2.1.2  Safety Support Unit
Occupational Safety and Health is a wide field requiring competencies of scientific, 
technical, organisational, and regulatory nature. In large organizations such as a 
high-energy particle accelerator centre it has shown useful to bundle the required 
competencies in a dedicated safety support unit which reports directly to the highest 
level of management. Alternatively, for a small accelerator, for example a cyclotron 
for radioisotope production for medical diagnostics, safety support can be given by 
specialised consultants.
The purpose of a safety support unit is to reinforce the hierarchical line of respon-
sibility by providing the necessary expertise in occupational health and safety to the 
different levels of management and to the workers. Areas of expertise include 
for example
• knowledge of international and national regulations and other Standard Best 
Practice;
• use of hazard- and risk-assessment techniques;
• scientific or technical competencies in specialised areas of OSH, such as fire 
prevention, ionising radiation protection or chemical safety;
• competencies in the application of national regulations, such as transport of dan-
gerous goods or elimination of waste.
Members of this unit should have a background in the different technical and 
scientific professions employed in the organization, completed by training and cer-
tification in occupational health and safety. Previous  working experience in the 
accelerator or its supporting laboratories and workshops assures a good under-
standing of the needs and limits of the clients, i.e. all levels of the organization’s 
hierarchy.
5.2.2  Administrative Safety Controls
In the hierarchy of controls (Sect. 5.1.5), administrative controls occupy one of the 
last places in the ranking. In the overall safety management system of an accelerator 
facility they have two important roles:
• they set the scene of the implementation of safety with regulations, procedures, 
and safety training;
• they guarantee safety during exceptional circumstances when the technical safety 
controls are overridden, with safe systems of work.
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5.2.2.1  Internal Safety Regulations
One task of OHS experts in a safety support unit is the drafting of internal safety 
regulations. These publications comprise, first, the safety policy of the organization, 
and the principles of its safety organization. Further regulations fall in two categories:
• Specific implementation of international directives, national laws, or other pieces 
of standard best practice in the organization;
• Regulations to protect workers, the environment and the public from specific 
hazards which are not covered by any standard best practice.
Internal regulations shall be clearly written and presented in a way that is under-
stood by those who must use them. It is not recommended to publish safety docu-
ments in the style of European Directives or national laws. This would not only 
reproduce the work by the public bodies who edited these regulatory documents, but 
their style is also not readily understandable by the target audience.
For workers coming from global collaborations, as in international accelerator 
centres, the use of illustrations and cartoons may be suitable to pass safety advice. 
The draft of an internal regulation by the OHS experts shall be reviewed by the 
organization’s management and by worker’s representatives before being autho-
rized by the general manager or director and published, for example on a dedicated 
web site of the internal network.
5.2.2.2  Safety Awareness and Training
Safety policy and safety regulations are only effective if they are known and adopted 
by the employees on all levels of the hierarchy. A channel for the communicating of 
safety messages are compulsory safety awareness sessions. Their purpose is to 
familiarise personnel with the safety policy, or with regulations for specific techni-
cal domains. In an awareness session, no hands-on practical training is given, and 
usually no comprehension test is required from the participants Such sessions can 
be given to all employees of a small unit in persona, either by the supervisor, or a 
safety specialist. A toolbox talk, as these sessions are also called, can be part of 
regular staff meetings. In large accelerator centres, the awareness sessions for gen-
eral safety topics can be given as a computer-based content which employees can 
follow at a suitable moment in time.
Other means of creating safety awareness are poster campaigns, the organisation 
a safety day, and placing safety messages in a prominent place in internal commu-
nication media
Safety awareness cannot replace formal safety training for the prevention of acci-
dents and protection of workers. Examples for classroom courses with practical 
exercises are
• Use of personal protective equipment for work at height (climbing harness, secu-
rity with ropes);
• Use of personal masks for chemical protection, including a fit-test of the mask;
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• Use of fire extinguishers;
• Measurement of ionising radiation at the workplace, for example to control sur-
face contamination in a laboratory for radioactive substances
• Use of the electrical lock-out procedure.
Safety training must be given on a level which is accessible to all categories of 
personnel in a facility. This brings the problem that workers with higher technical 
education may feel that the level of the training is too low for them. However, this 
is often a false problem: safety training for ionising radiation protection does not 
need to explain the physics of the atomic nucleus, as much as training for work at 
height does not repeat Newton’s laws to explain free fall. As long as safety training 
is focussed on the safety aspects of a topic it can be made interesting and engaging 
for all participants, no matter their background.
5.2.2.3  Safe System of Work
In the hierarchy of safety controls (Sect. 5.1.5), technical safety measures are 
favoured: machine covers protect against mechanical accidents and electrical shock, 
an access safety system (Sect. 5.3.1) prevents unauthorised entrance to potentially 
hazardous areas. Most technical safety measures are designed for the normal opera-
tion of an equipment. They lose their protective function during maintenance and 
repair. In the above examples, machine covers are removed when a machine fault is 
investigated, or standard maintenance executed. In this phase, the worker in contact 
with the dangerous parts must be protected against sudden energisation of the 
machine, which would expose him to the risk of a mechanical or electrical accident. 
In Sect. 4.1.2.2 a solution to this problem in the domain of electrical safety has been 
presented in form of the lock-out process. It draws its name from the procedure to 
physically lock-out the energy source with a personal padlock. The five steps of a 
lock-out procedure are:
 1. Identification of the power source;
 2. Separation from the power source;
 3. Locking the separation with a personal padlock;
 4. Verification that the equipment is without power;
 5. Securing the equipment, to make its re-start impossible.
The technical means to accomplish each step are different between e.g. electrical 
appliances and mechanical equipment, but the purpose remains the same: prevent 
the accidental start of the equipment while workers are in contact with it.
In large plants, to which many particle accelerators belong, the five steps cannot 
be executed by the maintenance worker alone. Here, a safe system of work with 
permits to work [12, 13] takes the relay. It is an administrative process which com-
plements the lock-out procedure where a single person does not control each of its 
five steps. In a distributed electrical powering scheme, where the power sources are 
far from the equipment powered, and different units in control of source and 
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equipment, the steps 1–3 are usually executed by a member of the powering unit, 
while 4 and 5 are the tasks of the worker on the equipment.
Before opening the protective covers of an electrical equipment, the maintenance 
worker will request its separation from the power source. He uses a standardised 
form for this request, on paper or by a network-based messaging system. After com-
pleting steps 1–3, an appointed person in the powering unit certifies to the mainte-
nance worker, using the same standardised form, that the power source has been 
locked out and secured. Now the maintenance worker can accomplish steps 4 and 5, 
which ascertain to him that the correct equipment was separated from power, and 
that it cannot be started accidentally. When the work on the equipment is termi-
nated, the worker must inform the powering unit and only then they may lift the 
lock-out and re-energise the equipment.
The information of the powering unit to the maintenance worker is sometimes 
called a work permit, and sometimes the maintenance worker may give a subsidiary 
work permit to a colleague who is engaged on the same equipment. In either case, 
all issued permits must be annulled by returning them to their source before the 
equipment can be powered again.
This process, which is literally preserving integrity and life of the maintenance 
worker, must be based on a clear, written, safety procedure, known to all partici-
pants. Persons must be appointed in written by their supervisors to the key roles in 
the safe system of work, and they must have received training on the overall proce-
dure and specific to their role. The requests for separation form the source, the cer-
tification for lock-out, and the information about the end-of-work must be stated 
without ambiguity, using pre-printed forms or a network-based messaging system. 
A well-thought and rigorously maintained safe system of work represents an effi-
cient safety mechanism to protect against accidents during periods where the tech-
nical controls are out of order.
5.3  Beam Safety
Several hazards are related to a particle accelerator operating with beam: magnetic 
fields (associated to high electrical currents), fluids under pressure (generating 
an oxygen deficiency hazard if released), and ionising and non-ionising radiation. 
Depending on energy and intensity of the particle beam, some or all of these hazards 
may have an intolerably high level of risk. Consequently, access is forbidden to the 
accelerator area and its operation is piloted remotely from a control-room. An accel-
erator safety system ascertains that persons cannot be harmed by voluntarily or 
accidentally getting close to the beam. Its functions are:
• Prevent access to the accelerator area during operation.
• Prevent accelerator operation as long as personnel are present in accelera-
tor area.
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• If an access is forced during accelerator operation, the accelerator is brought rap-
idly to a safe state, by turning off the particle beam. The three first elements are 
fulfilled by the access safety system
• In periods without particle beam, permit access only to authorised personnel. 
This part is played by the access control system.
An overview of the topic is given in [16, 17].
5.3.1  Accelerator Safety System
The purpose of the Accelerator Safety System (ASS) is to allow operation of the 
accelerator only when it cannot cause harm, in particular by preventing persons 
from accessing the vicinity of the accelerator during operation. The ASS consists of 
the following elements:
• Barriers to make the accelerator or its components inaccessible during opera-
tion. For low-energy accelerators or for beamlines with low duty factor the bar-
riers may consist of fences. In many cases the radiation shielding has also the 
role of an access barrier. The highest-energy particle accelerators are built under-
ground and communicate with the surface with a few access shafts. In this case, 
the barriers are localised at these shafts.
• Access doors through the barrier to the accelerator area. In the simplest case, the 
access door must be locked by the responsible operator before starting the accel-
erator. In contemporary facilities the doors are equipped with electronic locks 
operated remotely from a control room. The closed state of the doors is super-
vised with an interlock switch.
• Accelerator interlocks which prevent the particle beam from circulating. 
Accelerator interlocks can act on different components of the accelerator: they cut 
the power supply to the particle source, or to a bending magnet which injects the 
beam into a different area. They can also consist of a beam stopper, a massive 
metal block with a similar lay-out as a collimator or a beam dump (Sect. 2.5) 
which is moved into the beam path to stop or to diffuse the particles and make them 
inoffensive. The status of accelerator interlocks is verified with electronic switches.
• Interlock keys are an element of the accelerator interlocks. Every person access-
ing the accelerator area removes a key from a distribution panel located at the 
access door. Only when all keys are replaced in the corresponding locks in the 
distribution panel, the interlock is raised, and the accelerator can be re-started. 
This prevents accidentally “forgetting” a person and exposing her to the dangers 
of an accelerator beam.
• Patrols of the accelerator area are organised after longer interruptions of service, 
for example after a shut-down. The patrol is formed by at least two experienced 
members of the accelerator personnel with a good knowledge of the area. They 




Analogous to preventing personnel access, environmental protection consider-
ations can enter the scope of the ASS, for example by preventing the release of 
harmful substances.
The status of all elements of the ASS is transmitted to the control room. Only 
when all monitored elements are safe for operation, the accelerator can be started. 
The ASS uses positive logic: if the switch is either open or not functioning, the 
accelerator is considered unsafe for operation. Today, an ASS can be realised by 
transmitting the status of the elements by Ethernet or an equivalent data bus and the 
logical state can be evaluated by a programmable logic controller (PLC). Special 
Safety PLCs are on the market which embody internal self-checking functions and 
redundancy. Some local legislations, however, require that the ASS be realised in 
“hardware”, in this case the interlock switches are wired with dedicated signal 
cables and the logic controller is realised by discrete electronics, without program-
ming. The question of the reliability of the ASS is treated in Sect. 5.4.
5.3.2  Access Control System
The purpose of the Access control system (ACS) is in its name: it controls and regu-
lates the access of persons to the accelerator area. Permission to enter an accelerator 
area depend on several prerequisites:
• The person requesting access must have a permission to do so. This permission 
is linked to the task he or she must execute.
• For accessing areas with particular hazards (electricity, oxygen deficiency, radia-
tion), the person must have received adequate safety instructions or training 
before being allowed to work there.
The ACS is ranking below the ASS: even when the prerequisites above are met, 
access is only permitted in operational states of the accelerator in which safety risks 
are tolerable for personnel. This means generally that no beam is accelerated and 
that its main components (magnets and RF systems) are not powered. 
The access to areas with high beam loss (Sect. 3.1) may be linked to the radiation 
dose rate.
The ACS is materialized by the access doors, which are also part of the 
ASS (Fig. 5.4). In small facilities, control room personnel supervise and operate the 
access doors remotely, the access permission can be checked personally because the 
operators know each other, or they consult lists of authorised personnel. In larger 
facilities with dozens or hundreds of employees, this method is error-prone and 
inefficient. Automatic access control systems are now the standard. Personnel carry 
a badge with barcode or RF identifier to identify themselves at the access door. 
Their permits can be coded on the card, or the ACS is linked to a database with all 
permits. When the permits are sufficient, the door opens automatically and gives 
access to the area.
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A biometric identification, where the identity of the cardholder is checked with a 
fingerprint, an image of the iris or a photo-id may be necessary in facilities where 
theft or sabotage are feared, for example in nuclear facilities where fissile material 
is handled under regular control  by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) or by EURATOM.
5.4  Functional Safety and Safety Integrity Levels
Functional safety covers situations where the safety of a system or an equipment 
depends on safety functions, realised by electrical, electronic, or programmable- 
electronic (E/E/PE) means. The safety function acts on demand, after being  trig-
gered by a sensor, or manually, and brings the system or equipment into a safe state.
The previous Sect. 5.3 on beam safety showed a few application examples of 
functional safety at particle accelerators. The accelerator interlocks of the 
Accelerator Safety System (ASS) employ electrical door contacts as sensors for an 
attempted entry to the accelerator tunnel. A safety control system (programmable 
electronics) acts on the sensor information from the door and gives commands via 
electrical or electronic switches to beam safety elements, hindering the injection of 
a particle beam as long as the presence of persons in the accelerator area has not 
been excluded by a patrol. Likewise, the Access Control System (ACS) relies on 
doors with electronic locks, personal identification with identity badges and the 
Fig. 5.4 Access doors of the Proton Synchrotron at CERN. Right, a personal door, letting only one 
authorized person pass at a time. Left, a material lock, in which the two doors cannot be open at 
the same time. Centre, the access control system with interlock key panel. (Photo: CERN)
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access to a database where access information of duly authorised personnel 
is stored.
Other examples of functional safety at particle accelerators are quench detection 
and quench protection systems in superconducting magnets (Sect. 2.2.3), and the 
early detection of smoke (Sect. 4.4.4) or of oxygen deficiency (Sect. 2.3.3) by sen-
sors, triggering an evacuation alarm.
To fulfil their purpose to guarantee the safety of a system or an equipment, safety 
functions must work reliably when they are demanded. [18] gives an overview of 
the topic with a focus on accelerator applications. The fundamental reference are a 
series of international standards [20, 22], covering the reliability of safety functions. 
The standard introduces the Safety Integrity Level (SIL), which quantifies the reli-
ability of a safety function on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. A safety system with SIL 
4 has the highest probability to satisfactorily deliver its safety function on demand: 
a safety system with SIL n has an average probability of a dangerous failure PFD 
upon demand between 10−(n+1) < PFD < 10−n. Safety functions covering risks having 
the highest stakes, for example the protection of human lives, must have the highest 
safety integrity levels SIL.
The safety integrity level for a safety function is evaluated in a special type of 
risk assessment. One evaluates the probability of an accident under the assumption 
that safety functions covering this particular risk are not present. Then, the required 
SIL of these safety functions are determined such that they fill the gap between the 
failure probability of the system and the targeted maximal probability for an acci-
dent. A simplified, hypothetical example illustrates this concept:
The access safety system for a specific room in an accelerator facility consists of 
a door with an electronic lock, which is shut when the accelerator operates, and, 
independent from it, a mobile beam dump which can be moved into the beam to 
block it from the accessible room. The request to the accelerator safety system ASS 
is to prevent the exposure of a person entering the room accidentally to the beam. 
The failure of doing so shall be less than paccess,beam< 10−5. This system is represented 
in the simple fault tree in Fig. 5.5.
Table 5.3 shows the steps leading to the evaluation of the SIL of the mobile 
dump. A component with SIL 1, having a failure probability of up to 10% on 
demand, would not be sufficient. Therefore, the dump control system must meet the 
requirements of SIL 2.
In [18] a more elaborate example of functional safety for a particle accelerator 
safety system can be found.
In many practical applications of functional safety, it is too complicated to draw 
up a complete fault tree. This approach suffers from the often-incomplete knowl-
edge of failure probabilities of components. In such a case, one can determine the 
required SIL of a safety function with qualitative methods or with hybrid methods 
combining quantitative and qualitative elements. Part 5 of [22] summarises recom-
mended methods for SIL evaluation.
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Once the required SIL of a safety function is determined, it needs to be imple-
mented. Manufacturers offer electrical and electronic components as well as 
mechanical components which meet the reliability requirements of a defined 
SIL. These components have been tested and certified by authorised institutes. For 
example, in Germany, VDE offers a certification service for functional safety [24].
The concepts of functional safety are also applied to the controls of machines 
(Sect. 4.2.2) in [21] and to the process industry [23]. The latter standard can be used 
as a template for the implementation of functional safety in cryogenic systems.
For further information on the topic, the UK Health and Safety Executive main-
tains an informative website on functional safety [19] with many references to in- 
depth articles and studies.
Fig. 5.5 Fault tree for the 
simple ASS in the example 
for SIL determination. The 
two safety systems, 
electronic lock, and mobile 
dump are independent and 
can be represented as 
parallel blocks feeding an 
AND-gate: they must fail 
both to lead to a complete 
system failure.
Table 5.3 Failure probabilities of the components of a hypothetical accelerator safety system 
(ASS) and evaluation of the required SIL of a component
Target failure probability: person enters 
accelerator room
paccess,beam < 10−5 per demand
Failure probability of electronic lock pdoor,fail 5 10−4 per demand










< 2 10 −2 per demand
Average failure probability of a control system 
with SIL 1
PFD (SIL 1) 10−2 < PFD (SIL 1) < 
10−1
Average failure probability of a control system 
with SIL 2
PFD (SIL 2) 10−3 < PFD (SIL 2) < 
10−2
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 Annexes
 Annex A: Hazard List for Accelerator Facilities
As described in Sect. 5.1.2, the establishment of a hazard register is the second 
phase of the occupational safety process for an accelerator facility, one of its com-
ponents or one of its operational processes. The following systematic list of safety 
hazards can be edited depending of the scope of the safety process. The list is origi-
nally based on a model from the Swiss Occupational Accident Insurance SUVA [1], 
tailored for accelerator facilities and in use in CERN’s Technology Department.
Hazard Examples
1 External Hazard
Climate and weather Storms, heat waves
Earthquake In sensitive areas, e.g. Italy, Japan, California
Fire, external
Flooding If facility close to rivers or at the sea
Ground Pressure For underground structures (tunnels and caverns)
Landslide In sensitive areas
Wildlife
2 Hazard to the Environment
Activation of ground Radioactive isotopes 22Na, 3H
Additional Traffic Commuting of employees, Transport of goods to 
accelerator sites
Noise (Environment) Permanent, intermittent, and instantaneous
Release of pollutants: air Atmospheric emissions (ex: greenhouse gases)
Release of pollutants: solid Industrial waste
Release of pollutants: water Impact on the aquatic environment
Energy Overall consumption of electrical energy
Release of radioactive liquid By cooling water
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Hazard Examples
Release of radioactive solid
Release of radioactivity by air By the ventilation system
Waste Conventional and hazardous waste
3 Physical Hazards
Field, electrical EMF, non-ionising radiation
Field, magnetic EMF, non-ionising radiation
Noise (Workplace) Workshops, machine rooms
Oxygen deficiency Accidental release of cryogens
Temperature: cold gas/liquid In cryogenic systems
Temperature: Heat radiation
Temperature: Surface, cold In cryogenic systems




Activated air or gases Activation of air by stray radiation in accelerator tunnel
Activated dispersed solids Radioactive dust from machining activated solids
Activated or contaminated liquids Activated and contaminated cooling water
Activated solids Solids interacting with beam and stray radiation
Naturally occurring radioactive 
materials
Particle beam Direct exposure to beam in experimental area
Radioactive aerosols
Radioactive surface contamination
Radioactive test sources Used for test and calibration of detectors
X-ray (parasitic) From RF amplifiers and cavities
X-ray generators Calibration of dosimeters, structural analysis
5 Non-ionising Radiation
Laser Surface treatment, optical measurement, ionisation
Microwaves
Radiofrequency From RF amplifiers and wave guides
UV
6 Noxious Substances
Dust, particles (non-radioactive) From machining; nanoparticles
Substance, biologically hazardous Legionella bacteria
Substance, carcinogenic, 
mutagenic, sensitising
Benzene, beryllium, cadmium, asbestos, ….
Substance, corrosive Strong bases and strong acids
Substance, explosive Inorganic azides
Substance, harmful for environment Hydrocarbons,
Substance, harmful, irritant Alkalines
Substance, oxidising Oxygen, hydrogen peroxide, halogens
Substance, toxic Carbon monoxide, methanol, arsenic acid,





Combustible materials Paper, wood, plastics
Explosive atmosphere Use of large quantities of solvents
Explosives Flammable gases in cylinders
Ignition source Open flame, electricity, welding activities
Substance, flammable, pyrophoric Fuel, solvents, liquefied gas
8 Mechanical Hazards
Dangerous surface Angles, corners, cutting edges, roughness
Fall of object from height During transport with overhead crane or forklift
Fluid under pressure Gas, vapour, oil, accumulators
Uncontrolled object in motion Rolling, sliding, projection
Unprotected element in movement Crushing, shear, cutting, entanglement, abrasion, 
drawing-in
Yield under stress or pressure, 
rupture
Material fatigue,
Moving transport and lifting 
equipment
Cars, slings, lifting chains, cranes,
9 Electrical Hazards
Electrical contact, direct Touching live conductor
Electrical contact, indirect Touching badly earthed metallic surface in accidental 
contact with live conductor
Electrostatic phenomena Electrostatic discharge, spark
Short-circuit, overload, electric arc Arc flash, overheating of ohmic resistance
10 Working Conditions
Climate in closed environment HVAC systems, pressurised areas
Climate, weather For external work only
Heat, cold
Insufficient lighting Natural and artificial lighting
Restricted visibility Fog, smoke
Slippery surface Spills, effect of snow, ice or rain, wet leaves
11 Physiological Constraints
Manual lifting and handling Unloading cars, transport of components
Movement under constraint RSI (Repetitive Strain Injury)
Repetitive actions
Vibrations Hand-arm vibration, whole body
Working posture Musculoskeletal problems
Confined spaces Work inside cryogenic tank
12 Unexpected events
Loss of containment Rupture of storage vessel,
Loss of control Failure of electronic- or programmable electronic control 
system
Loss of cooling Rupture of cooling water line
Loss of power Interruption of electricity supply





Constraining schedule Shift work, irregular schedules
Disorder Insufficient housekeeping
Frequent interruptions
Isolated worker Executing dangerous tasks alone
Lack of clarity of task attribution
Lack of collaborator participation
Lack of feedback
Lack of information and training No or poorly documented procedures, no training, 
language barrier
Lack of qualification Assignment of tasks beyond personal capability
14 Psychological Constraints
Incomplete and monotonous 
activities
High degree of work partition
Lack of decision margin Assembly chain work
Overload Permanent stress, concentration, responsibility overload, 
over or underqualification





 [1] suvapro, Connaissez-vous le potentiel des phénomènes dangéreux dans votre 
entreprise ?, SUVA 66105.f, (Luzern 2011), https://www.suva.ch/66105.f
 Annex B: European Directives
To strengthen the cohesion between its member states, the European Parliament and 
Council publish Directives which must be converted into national law within a 
delay of a few years after publication. The purpose of the “consumer” directives is 
to provide customers in the whole Union with products meeting agreed safety stan-
dards, laid down in the “Essential Health and Safety requirements” of each Directive. 
The directives formalise a declarative regime, in which manufacturers declare by 
affixing the “CE” sign on their products that they are conforming to the require-
ments. For a few, high hazard domains, conformity must be asserted by independent 
testing bodies. These bodies are “notified”, meaning that they operate under a 
license from a member state and meet  requirements of technical competency 
and quality assurance. One domain where conformity assessment by a notified body 
is required are pressure vessels, and if one plans to include such vessels in the accel-




The EU legislation applies also to imported devices. This is relevant if a European 
accelerator centre acquires specialised equipment from overseas of which the man-
ufacturer (often another laboratory) has not declared the conformity with EU regu-
lations. In this case, the importer must guarantee that such equipment meets the 
requirements of the directive and its standards. This principle is of course valid in 
both directions and an accelerator laboratory in the United States has to demonstrate 
that every piece of equipment acquired from a European or Asiatic manufacturer 
would meet US standards.
In the New Legislative Framework of the EU [4], the formal requirements for 
conformity declaration are streamlined. An important element is the publication of 
Harmonised Standards [5] by the European standardisation organisations CEN 
(European Committee for Standardization, [1]), CENELEC (European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Standardization [2]) and ETSI (European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute [3]). A product designed and constructed 
in accordance with one of the harmonized standards is deemed to meet the EHSR of 
the corresponding directive.
European texts with relevance to particle accelerators are:
Transportable Pressure Equipment – Directive 2010/35/EU
Construction products – Regulation (EU) No 305/2011
Simple Pressure Vessels – Directive 2014/29/EU
Electromagnetic Compatibility – Directive 2014/30/EU
Lifts – Directive 2014/33/EU
ATEX – Directive 2014/34/EU
ATEX Equipment Directive 1992/92EC
Low Voltage – Directive 2014/35/EU
Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC
Pressure equipment – Directive 2014/68/EU
Personal protective equipment – Regulation (EU) 2016/425 
An overview of the directives in the New Legislative Framework with links to the 
original texts and further information can be found at [4]
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Accelerator safety system (ASS), 133, 134
Access control system (ACS), 134, 135
Activation of matter, 62
ATmosphère EXplosive (ATEX) area, 103
B
Bonner sphere spectrometer, 74
C
Carnot factor, 22
Cascade, electromagnetic, 57, 64

















Effluents, liquid, 109, 110
Electrical arc, 20
Electrical hazards of magnets, 19, 20
Electric shock and burns, 84
EMF, Biophysical effects of, 35, 36
Emission measurement, 111
EU Directive, conformity with, 91, 92









Fire detection, 104, 105
Fire dynamics in tunnels, 101
Fire permit, 103
Fire risk assessment, 102, 103
Fire risk mitigation, 103, 104









Hazard register, 118, 141
Health effects of magnetic fields, 17





Ionisation energy, 69, 72
Ionising radiation, directly, 63







Magnetic field hazard, 16




Noise, environmental, 110, 111
Noise, occupational, 105–108
Notified body, 98, 144
O
Occupational Safety Assessment, 118
Occupational Safety Process, 117
Optically stimulated luminescence (OSL), 71
Overpressure, 23, 24
Oxygen deficiency hazard, mitigation, 29, 30
Oxygen deficiency, helium gas, 28, 29
Oxygen deficiency, nitrogen gas, 25–28
P
Personal protective equipment (PPE), 88
Photon detectors, gas-filled, 69, 71




Pressure relief device, 97
Pressure vessels, 95







Reference quantities for non-ionising 
radiation, 37, 38
Rem-counter, 73





Risk assessment, quantitative, 2, 122, 123
Risk assessment, semi-quantitative, 121, 122
Risk matrix, 121
S
Safe system of work, 87, 131, 132
Safety awareness and training, 130, 131
Safety awareness sessions, 130
Safety Integrity Level (SIL), 136
Safety management system, 120, 125, 126
Safety policy, 128
Safety regulations, internal, 130
Safety responsibility, hierarchical, 127
Safety support unit, 129
Shower, electromagnetic, 57
Smoke control, 101, 102
Sound pressure level, 106
Spallation process, 59





Synchrotron light sources, 9
T
Thermoluminescence (TL), 71
W
Waveguides, 32
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